Macedonian Press Online

Vaccine May Be More Dangerous Than Swine Flu

2009-11-10T09:04:00.002+01:00

An outbreak of swine flu occurred in Mexico this spring that eventually affected 4,910 Mexican citizens and resulted in 85 deaths. By the time it spread to the United States, the virus caused only mild cases of flu-like illness.

Thanks to air travel and the failure of public health officials to control travel from Mexico, the virus spread worldwide. Despite predictions of massive numbers of deaths and the arrival of doomsday, the virus has remained a relatively mild disease, something we know happens each year with flu epidemics.

Worldwide, there have only been 311 deaths out of 70,893 cases of swine flu. In the United States, 27,717 cases have resulted in 127 deaths. Every death is a tragedy, but such a low death rate should not be the basis of a draconian government policy.

It is helpful to recall that the Centers for Disease Control with the collusion of the media, constantly tell us that 36,000 people die from the flu each year, a figure that has been shown to be a lie. In this case, we are talking about 300 plus deaths for the entire world.

This virus continues to be an enigma for virologists. In the April 30, 2009 issue of Nature, a virologist was quoted as saying,“Where the hell it got all these genes from we don’t know.” Extensive analysis of the virus found that it contained the original 1918 H1N1 flu virus, the avian flu virus (bird flu), and two new H3N2 virus genes from Eurasia. Debate continues over the possibility that swine flu is a genetically engineered virus.

Naturally, vaccine manufacturers have been in a competitive battle to produce the first vaccine. The main contenders have been Baxter Pharmaceuticals and Novartis Pharmaceuticals, the latter of which recently acquired the scandal-ridden Chiron vaccine company. Both of these companies have had agreements with the World Health Organization to produce a pandemic vaccine.

The Baxter vaccine, called Celvapan, has had fast track approval. It uses a new vero cell technology, which utilizes cultured cells from the African green monkey. This same animal tissue transmits a number of vaccine-contaminating viruses, including the HIV virus.

The Baxter company has been associated with two deadly scandals. The first event occurred in 2006 when hemophiliac components were contaminated with HIV virus and injected in tens of thousands of people, including thousands of children. Baxter continued to release the HIV contaminated vaccine even after the contamination was known.

The second event occurred recently when it was discovered that Baxter had released a seasonal flu vaccine containing the bird flu virus, which would have produced a real world pandemic, to 18 countries. Fortunately, astute lab workers in the Czech Republic discovered the deadly combination and blew the whistle before a worldwide disaster was unleashed.
Despite these two deadly events, WHO maintains an agreement with Baxter Pharmaceuticals to produce the world’s pandemic vaccine.

Novartis, the second contender, also has an agreement with WHO for a pandemic vaccine. Novartis appears to have won the contract, since their vaccine is near completion. What is terrifying is that these pandemic vaccines contain ingredients, called immune adjuvants that a number of studies have shown cause devastating autoimmune disorders, including rheumatoid arthritis, multiple sclerosis and lupus.

Animal studies using this adjuvant have found them to be deadly. A study using 14 guinea pigs found that when they were injected with the special adjuvant, only one animal survived. A repeat of the study found the same deadly outcome.

So, what is this deadly ingredient? It is called squalene, a type of oil. The Chiron company, maker of the deadly anthrax vaccine, makes an adjuvant called MF-59 which contains an ingredient of serious concern--squalene. A number of studies have shown that squalene can trigger all of the above-mentioned autoimmune diseases when injected.

The MF-59 adjuvant has been used in several vaccines. These vaccines, including tetanus and diphtheria, are the same vaccines frequently associated with adverse reactions.

I reviewed a number of studies on this adjuvant and found something quite interesting. Several studies done on human test subjects found MF-59 to be a very safe immune adjuvant. But when I checked to see who did these studies, I found—to no surprise—that they were done by the Novartis Pharmaceutical Company and Chiron Pharmaceutical Company, which have merged. They were all published in “prestigious” medical journals. Also, to no surprise, a great number of studies done by independent laboratories and research institutions all found a strong link between MF-59 and autoimmune diseases.

Squalene in vaccines has been strongly linked to the Gulf War Syndrome. On August 1991, Anthony Principi, Secretary of Veterans Affairs admitted that soldiers vaccinated with the anthrax vaccine from 1990 to 1991 had an increased risk of 200 percent in developing the deadly disease amyotrophic lateral sclerosis (ALS), also called Lou Gehrig’s disease. The soldiers also suffered from a number of debilitating and life-shortening diseases, such as polyarteritis nodosa, multiple sclerosis (MS), lupus, transverse myelitis (a neurological disorder caused by inflammation of the spinal cord), endocarditis (inflammation of the heart’s inner lining), optic neuritis with blindness and glomerulonephritis (a type of kidney disease).

Because squalene, the main ingredient in MF-59, can induce hyperimmune responses and induce autoimmunity, a real danger exists for prolonged activation of the brain’s immune cells, the microglia. This type of prolonged activation has been strongly associated with such diseases as multiple sclerosis, Alzheimer’s disease, Parkinson’s disease, ALS and possibly vaccine-related encephalitis. It has been shown that activation of the systemic immune system, as occurs with vaccination, rapidly activates the brain’s microglia at the same time, and this brain inflammation can persist for long periods.

What most people do not know, even the doctors who recommend the vaccines, is that most studies by pharmaceutical companies observe the patients for only one to two weeks following vaccination—these types of reactions may take months or even years to manifest.

It is obvious that the vaccine manufacturers stand to make billions of dollars in profits from this WHO/government-promoted pandemic. Novartis, the maker of the new pandemic vaccine, recently announced that they would not give free vaccines to impoverished nations—everybody pays.

One must keep in mind that once the vaccine is injected, there is little you can do to protect yourself—at least by conventional medicine. It will mean a lifetime of crippling illness and early death.

There are much safer ways to protect oneself from this flu virus, such as higher doses of vitamin D3, selective immune enhancement using supplements, and a good diet.

Flying Pigs and the WHO

2009-05-08T13:06:00.007+02:00

WHO takes a page from a Michael Crichton Novel

As the late great American poet Yogi Berra might have put it, ‘this just gets absurder and absurder.’ The international agencies supposedly responsible for monitoring worldwide dangers of new pandemic threats, the WHO and CDC are acting like the directors of a Hollywood ‘B’ grade sci-fi movie or the author of a copycat version of Michael Crichton’s Andromeda Strain novel. The global panic over outbreak of a new human-to-human Swine Flu pandemic is increasingly revealed as a likely operation in mass psychological terror whose only beneficiaries are the few global pharmaceutical giants that are in the business of peddling so-called ‘antiviral’ drugs—Roche, SmithKlineGlaxo and Novavax most prominently. The losers are the rest of us normal folks.

The own releases of the WHO in Geneva and the US Centers for Disease Control in Atlanta, the central coordinating agencies in this production, are worth careful study. On April 30 the CDC issued a detailed report with the alarming title, Swine-Origin Influenza A (H1N1) Virus Infections in a School --- New York City. The report described in detail a school in New York City where, ‘As of April 28, approximately half (45) of all U.S. cases of S-OIV infection had been confirmed among students and staff members.’ The CDC called these cases all ‘genetically similar to viruses subsequently isolated from patients in Mexico.’1 We are not told in scientific terms what ‘genetically similar to’ means, but it sure sounds ominous.

At that point, the CDC claimed 109 victims of confirmed Swine Flu in the United States. Forty five of the 109 came from this New York School. The TV news channels were flooded with panic messages of the uncontrolled spread of Swine Flu.

On April 29, the next day, the WHO Director-General, Dr Margaret Chan, upgraded their Swine Flu Pandemic alert status from a Phase 4 event to Phase 5, a step below full global Pandemic Alert.

According to WHO, Phase 5 indicates that there is evidence of the virus being spread from human-to-human in at least two countries in one WHO region. Phase 6, the pandemic phase, is characterised by increased and sustained transmission in the general population. In her announcement of the upgrade, Dr Chan made an unfortunate panic-making added comment that was predictably grabbed onto by CNN and the world media: ‘After all it really is all of humanity that is under threat during a pandemic.’2 Note the WHO Director-General had not declared a Pandemic Phase 6 alert, but in a speech in Geneva in an apparent side comment, merely made the self-evident observation that ‘during a pandemic’ all humanity is under threat.’

A press release by the Atlanta-based CDC stated, ‘On May 3, CDC is scheduled to complete deployment of 25 percent of the supplies in the Strategic National Stockpile (SNS) to all states in the continental United States. These supplies and medicines will help states and US territories respond to the outbreak. In addition, the Federal Government and manufacturers have begun the process of developing a vaccine against the novel H1N1 flu virus.’3 The pandemic response apparatus was going into high gear.

The 45 New York City school children the CDC solemnly reported were ‘confirmed cases of swine-origin influenza A (H1N1) virus (S-OIV) infection,’ ninety-five percent of whom reported to the health authorities symptoms that included ‘fever plus cough and/or sore throat, meeting the CDC definition for influenza-like illness (ILI).’

OK. Better to be cautious when dealing with a new form of Andromeda Strain. But cough? Sore throat? Fever? Aren’t these pretty vague ordinary symptoms? Not for CDC apparently. The 45 kids were immediately added to the growing ‘confirmed cases’ statistics, fuelling emergency responses, statements by the President of the United States, economic catastrophe to the fragile Mexican economy as tourism dried up overnight, and worldwide fears of a new Black Death or at least a new version of the 1918 Spanish Flu plague.

The CDC hastened to add the note, ‘symptoms in these patients appear to be similar to those of seasonal influenza.’ For those bothering to read through three detailed pages of the CDC New York report, they found near the end that, ‘on April 27, 37 patients (84%) reported that their symptoms were stable or improving, three (7%) reported worsening symptoms (two of whom later reported improvement), and four (9%) reported complete resolution of symptoms. Only one reported having been hospitalized for syncope and released after overnight observation.’ The CDC adds, ‘To date, this school-based outbreak is the largest cluster of S-OIV cases reported in the United States.’4

In addition to the 109 ‘confirmed cases’ reported in the United States, including one death of a Mexican boy in Texas, the CDC reported as of April 29, ‘a total of 57 confirmed cases had been reported, including seven deaths (in Mexico). By country, the following numbers of cases had been reported: Mexico (26); Canada (13); United Kingdom (five); Spain (four); Germany and New Zealand (three each); Israel (two); and Austria (one).’5 Is this another case of ‘Chicken Little’ crying the sky is falling?

A revealing name change

Now, not only are the alleged victims in New York of the worst plague since the Black Death showing signs of remarkable recovery after only days, but the WHO also announces a name change in the middle of the worldwide events. By May 1 the WHO, the CDC and the National Institutes of Health in Maryland all announced the name Swine Flu was no longer appropriate, that, despite the fact that according to Dr. Raul Rabadan, a professor of computational biology at Columbia University, six of the eight genetic segments are purely swine flu and the other two segments are bird and human, but have lived in swine for the past decade.6

We instead are told to call it Influenza A (H1N1). That’s a catchy name.

The name change came following a heavy lobbying campaign by the US pig industry to drop the Swine Flu label as it was apparently cutting into pork sales. The largest US and world pig producer, Smithfield Foods of Virginia, was most certainly among those lobbying CDC and the WHO for the name change. They won their wish. But name change or not, the swine production process of Smithfield Foods and other industrialized Factory Farms or as they are technically known, CAFOs—Concentrated Animal Feeding Operation—bears closer scrutiny.

As I detailed in Part I, the Mexican Swine Flu deaths and illness first were recorded in La Gloria, Perote Municipality, Veracruz State, Mexico, where local residents had for weeks prior to the official announcement been protesting the dangers of the huge Smithfield Foods pig CAFO in the village. Children and adults alike were reported having a rash of symptoms in the vicinity of the vast pig waste linked to the site. Smithfield Foods is the world’s largest industrialized pig meat producer. It also has one of the most egregious health and safety records.

Pig feces and other niceties

Feces is the Latin term for what most of the world terms shit, the waste product of human or animal digestion. Pigs are world champion waste producers. An average pig produces some three times in weight the amount of fecal matter that an adult person does. As GRAIN, an agricultural organization reports, ‘the rise of large-scale factory farms in North America has created the perfect breeding grounds for the emergence and spread of new highly-virulent strains of influenza.’7 The pig fecal waste product is at the center of the problem, something the CDC name change conveniently tends to obscure.

As the GRAIN study notes, because concentrated animal feeding operations tend to concentrate large numbers of animals close together, they are ideal breeding grounds for toxins and virulent pathogens. In 2003 Science magazine warned that swine flu was ‘on a new evolutionary ‘fast track’ due to the increasing size of factory farms and the widespread use of vaccines in these operations.’8 It’s the same story with bird flu, where huge industrial CAFO Factory Farms with tens of thousands of chickens breed toxic waste galore.

Smithfield Foods, the world’s biggest hog butcher and CAFO owner has an impressive track record of violations of health and safety including water safety laws. In the USA, the world’s largest pig CAFO is in Tar Heel, North Carolina. According to local reports the town could easily be renamed Pig Waste, N.C. given the scale of fecal waste and combined matter Smithfield Foods’ Tar Heel CAFO emits locally.

As Jeff Tietz, in an analysis of the pig waste problem calculated, ‘the best estimates put Smithfield's total waste discharge at 26 million tons a year. That would fill four Yankee Stadiums. Even when divided among the many small pig production units that surround the company's slaughterhouses, that is not a containable amount.’9

Tietz adds, ‘So prodigious is its fecal waste, however, that if the company treated its effluvia as big-city governments do -- even if it came marginally close to that standard -- it would lose money. So many of its contractors allow great volumes of waste to run out of their slope-floored barns and sit blithely in the open, untreated, where the elements break it down and gravity pulls it into groundwater and river systems. Although the company proclaims a culture of environmental responsibility, ostentatious pollution is a linchpin of Smithfield's business model.’10

The problem, he and other critics of CAFO pollutants stress, is not just normal pig waste, but waste combined with staggering volumes of antibiotics and toxic chemicals used by Smithfield Foods and similar industrial CAFO operations to maximize ‘efficiency.’

Tietz notes, ‘A lot of pig shit is one thing; a lot of highly toxic pig shit is another. The excrement of Smithfield hogs is hardly even pig shit: On a continuum of pollutants, it is probably closer to radioactive waste than to organic manure. The reason it is so toxic is Smithfield's efficiency. The company produces 6 billion pounds of packaged pork each year. That's a remarkable achievement, a prolificacy unimagined only two decades ago, and the only way to do it is to raise pigs in astonishing, unprecedented concentrations.’11

The degrees of concentration in the Smithfield Foods vertically integrated pig meat concentrations have little to do with traditional hog farming. In facilities now spread around the world, Smithfield's pigs live by the hundreds or thousands in warehouse-like barns, in rows of wall-to-wall pens. Sows are artificially inseminated and fed and delivered of their piglets in cages so small they cannot turn around.

As Tietz notes, ‘Forty fully grown 250-pound male hogs often occupy a pen the size of a tiny apartment. They trample each other to death. There is no sunlight, straw, fresh air or earth. The floors are slatted to allow excrement to fall into a catchment pit under the pens, but many things besides excrement can wind up in the pits: afterbirths, piglets accidentally crushed by their mothers, old batteries, broken bottles of insecticide, antibiotic syringes, stillborn pigs -- anything small enough to fit through the foot-wide pipes that drain the pits. The pipes remain closed until enough sewage accumulates in the pits to create good expulsion pressure; then the pipes are opened and everything bursts out into a large holding pond.’12

He continues on the toxic CAFO conditions: ‘They become susceptible to infection, and in such dense quarters microbes or parasites or fungi, once established in one pig, will rush sprite-like through the whole population. Accordingly, factory pigs are infused with a huge range of antibiotics and vaccines, and are doused with insecticides. Without these compounds -- oxytetracycline, draxxin, ceftiofur, tiamulin -- diseases would likely kill them. Thus factory-farm pigs remain in a state of dying until they're slaughtered. When a pig nearly ready to be slaughtered grows ill, workers sometimes shoot it up with as many drugs as necessary to get it to the slaughterhouse under its own power. As long as the pig remains ambulatory, it can be legally killed and sold as meat.’ 13

Jeff Tietz is not the only one who has noticed the gargantuan scale of the Smithfield Foods CAFO pig waste problem. The United States Government Environmental Protection Agency, EPA, has repeatedly fined Smithfield Foods for damage to local water supply with discharge of its pig waste from its CAFOs at Tar Heel and elsewhere across the USA. In Virginia, its home state, Smithfield was fined $12.6 million in 1997 for 6,900 violations of the Clean Water Act -- the third-largest civil penalty ever levied under the act by the EPA, for waste generated during the hog-slaughtering and meat processing operations.14 There was little convincing evidence the fines changed their practice of waste disposal in any significant way.

Smithfield Foods has spread its hog CAFOs to other countries where environmental regulations are presumably less strict, including Romania, Poland, and of course, rural Mexico. Several years ago the Smithfield pig CAFO in Romania was focus of major accusations by local and Government health officials. Smithfield refused to let local authorities enter its pig farms after residents complained of the stench coming from hundreds of dead corpses of pigs left rotting for days at the farms. ‘Our doctors have not had access to the American [company's] farms to effect routine inspections,’ stated Csaba Daroczi, assistant director at the Timisoara Hygiene and Veterinary Authority in Romania. ‘Every time they tried, they were pushed away by the guards. Smithfield proposed that we sign an agreement that would oblige us to warn them three days before each inspection.’ It later emerged that Smithfield had been covering up a major outbreak of classical swine fever on its Romanian CAFO farms.15

The Drug Cartel comes in

Rather than order a full-scale independent investigation into the pathogen-generation in the toxic waste of Smithfield Foods’ Veracruz CAFO pig operations or other similar pig CAFOs around the world for production of deadly toxics and various possible pathogens, the CDC and increasingly the WHO seem to be more concerned with creating a climate for mass distribution of what have been documented to be dangerous, and in some cases deadly, influenza drugs such as Tamiflu.

On April 14, almost two weeks before the panic over Mexico’s cases of Swine Flu or as CDC now prefers, Influenza A H1N1, the US pharmaceutical company, Novavax announced a pre-clinical study allegedly showing, ‘an investigational H1N1 virus-like particle (VLP) vaccine based on the 1918 Spanish influenza strain protected against both the Spanish flu and a highly pathogenic H5N1 avian influenza strain.’ The genetically-manipulated vaccine of Novavax, the company claimed, ‘protected Mice and Ferrets Against the Spanish Flu and Highly Pathogenic H5N1 Bird Flu,’ and also conveniently ‘provided protection against highly pathogenic H1N1 and H5N1 Influenza strains.’16

On April 24, the WHO issued a press release stating that ‘The Swine Influenza A/H1N1 viruses characterized in this outbreak have not been previously detected in pigs or humans. The viruses so far characterized have been sensitive to oseltamivir…’ Osteltamivir is the technical name for Tamiflu, the drug invented by Donald Rumsfeld’s Gilead Sciences and licensed to Roche Inc. The US Food and Drug Administration (FDA) issued a convenient Emergency Authorization on April 27 that allows US health officials and others to administer Tamiflu even to infants under one year of age. The FDA statement added it had decided, ‘to authorize the use of unapproved or uncleared medical products or unapproved or uncleared uses of approved or cleared medical products following a determination and declaration of emergency.’17

That suggests that the US Government has or is about to release experimental drugs on a panicked population such as the VLP-based Influenza vaccine of Novavax, as well as the vast stockpiles of Tamiflu and influenza drugs sold by giants like GlaxoSmithKline’s Relenza (zanamivir).

With the evidence to date of the scale of the ‘confirmed’ cases of Swine Flu H1N1 variety worldwide, 985 cases of influenza A (H1N1) or Swine Flu infection, there is hardly grounds to subject the human population to drugs whose side effects have included death or severe complications and typically flu-like symptoms and, as in the case of Tamiflu, never even claim to ‘prevent or cure’ the influenza. The entire drama of the past weeks is reading more and more like a bad remake of Crichton’s Andromeda Strain.

Adding a note of the bizarre to the entire drama, in November 2004, amid the early days of the then-world panic over alleged Avian Flu, when Tamiflu was first promoted as a wonder drug by Donald Rumsfeld and others, the WHO published an extraordinary fantasy scenario. In a UN agency normally given to issuing dull scientific notices to world health professionals, the 2004 report was extraordinarily ‘prescient’ of the current scenario with Swine Flu panic. In a fantasy section titled ‘Sometime in the future…’ the WHO wrote four years ago,

Rumours of an outbreak of unusually severe respiratory illness in two vil-
lages in a remote province reach the ministry of health in one of the World
Health Organization’s (WHO’s) Member States. A team is dispatched to
the province and learns that the outbreak started about a month earlier.
The team is able to identify at least 50 cases over the previous month. All
age groups have been affected. Twenty patients are currently in the pro-
vincial hospital. Five people have already died of pneumonia and acute
respiratory failure. Surveillance in surrounding areas is increased, and new
cases are identified throughout the province. Respiratory specimens col-
lected from several patients are tested at the national laboratory and are
found to be positive for type A influenza virus, but they cannot be further
subtyped. The isolates are sent to the WHO Reference Centre for Influ-
enza for further characterization, where they are characterized as influ-
enza A(H6N1), a subtype never isolated from humans before. Gene
sequencing studies further indicate that most of the viral genes are from a
bird influenza virus, with the remaining genes derived from a human strain.18

If one changed the name from Influenza A (H6N1) to Influenza A (H1N1) we could be talking about the current situation.

That 2004 WHO fictional scenario reads as if it were the handbook for what has unfolded since late April in the US Mexico and beyond. It leads to serious question whether the world is being submitted to a giant psychological warfare game aimed at inducing them to take massive doses of dangerous drugs to counter a danger that does not actually exist as claimed.

With the reported cases in Mexico clearly dropping off at present and little sign of the feared repeat of the 1918 Spanish Flu or worse as officials were warning only days earlier, it is well beyond time to launch a full-scale worldwide health inquiry into the toxic conditions of CAFO pig and other animal Factory Farm concentrations, and to end the official coverup of what has become a colossal health danger.

Notes:

1 Centers for Disease Control, Swine-Origin Influenza A (H1N1) Virus Infections in a School --- New York City, April 2009, April 30, 2009. Accessed in
http://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/preview/mmwrhtml/mm58d0430a1.htm.
2 Margaret Chan, WHO Director-General, quoted in Murray Wardrop, Swine flu All of humanity under threat WHO warns, Daily Telegraph, London, April 30, 2009.
3 CDC, H1N1 (Swine Flu), accessed in http://www.cdc.gov/h1n1flu/.
4Centers for Disease Control, Swine-Origin Influenza A (H1N1) Virus Infections in a School --- New York City… Op. Cit.
5 Ibid.
6 Seth Borenstein, Swine flu name change? Flu genes spell pig, AP, May 1, 2009, accessed in
http://www.physorg.com/news160371024.html.
7 GRAIN, A food system that kills: Swine flu is meat industry’s latest plague, April 2009, accessed in
http://www.grain.org/articles/?id=48.
8 Bernice Wuethrich, Chasing the Fickle Swine Flu, Science, Vol. 299, 2003.
9 Jeff Tietz, Pork’s Dirty Secret: America’s Top Hog Producer is also one of America’s Worst Polluters, Rolling Stone, December 14, 2006.
10 Ibid.
11 Ibid.
12 Ibid.
13 Ibid.
14 EPA, UNITED STATES SUES SMITHFIELD FOODS FOR POLLUTING VIRGINIA WATERWAYS, Press Release, December 16, 1996.
15 Mirel Bran, Swine Plague: Romania Criticizes American Group’s Attitude, Le Monde, 15 August
2007, translated by Leslie Thatcher, cited in GRAIN Op Cit..
16 Tricia J. Richardson, NOVAVAX Announces Publication of a Preclinical Study Demonstrating that a Virus-like Particle Vaccine Provided Protection Against Highly Pathogenic H1N1 and H5N1 Influenza Strains, April 14, 2009, Rockville, Md. Press Release.
17 FDA News, FDA Authorizes Emergency Use of Influenza Medicines, Diagnostic Test in Response to Swine Flu Outbreak in Humans, April 27, 2009.
18 WHO, WHO checklist for influenza pandemic preparedness planning, November 2004

An EU realpolitik to unravel the riddle of unruly Russia

2009-04-24T10:52:00.001+02:00

Russia’s behaviour is neither unfathomable nor about to change for the better, says Tunne Kelam, an Estonian MEP who is part of the EU-Russia Parliamentary Cooperation Committee. He warns that as Moscow always acts in its own national interest, it’s left to the EU to insist on the international rule of law

Europe’s view of Russia frequently reflects misconceptions. Either people hide behind Winston Churchill’s famous (but often misrepresented) comment that Russia “is a riddle wrapped in a mystery inside an enigma,” or they betray a naïve optimism about Moscow’s understanding of democracy and the rule of law.

Neither of these views reflects the true nature of Russia and neither does the European Union any favours as it tries – and fails – to establish a working relationship with its increasingly assertive neighbour. What Europe needs is a healthy and robust realpolitik, one that is free from illusions about the giant next door. Past experience shows there is nothing mysterious about Russia’s pursuit of its national (even imperialist) interests. The trick for Europe is to counter-balance Russian self-interest, and this means the EU has to agree on – and jointly promote – Europe’s own interests, and to channel relations with Moscow into an international framework that upholds the rule of law.

The danger of taking Churchill’s phrase at face value has been clear enough for some 80 years, especially at times of crisis. Western leaders have used it as an excuse for making ignoble compromises which by-passed western values. Eastern, central and south-eastern Europe suffered the tragic results of these compromises after World War II. The “Russian riddle” mindset is still to be found in the confusion and hesitation of Western policymakers who often desperately try to reconcile their strategic and pragmatic interests with a democratic code of conduct – even though Russia mostly ignores such international standards.

Viewing Russian behaviour as a riddle also reinforces Moscow’s traditional standpoint that it is a country with a unique role in history that places it outside any existing political or national models. Moscow expects people to make an exception in Russia’s case, and its refusal to ratify and implement the Energy Charter (after having signed it without reservations) was just one example of this conduct. When the EU prevaricates in its condemnation of Russia’s broken promises, it just reinforces the Kremlin’s accusations about European double standards.

It would be far better if Europe rigorously applied internationally-recognised standards when judging Moscow’s actions. These standards should include reciprocity based on common democratic values and the rule of law. There was a chance to start implementing such a policy in 1991 when the West had “won” the Cold War. Instead, the West fell for the second great illusion about Russia, that provided it had the opportunity, enough freedom and plenty of Western goodwill it would almost automatically transform itself into a democratic society and respect the rule of law. This optimistic view ignored the question of whether post-Soviet Russia had sufficient good will of its own to make such a transition, even when it refused to make moral or political judgements about its totalitarian past. Such a crucial issue was not considered relevant.

Deluded by its own mistaken views of Russia, Europe has failed to find a coherent and realistic strategy on how to deal with its biggest neighbour. A 2005 European Parliament resolution summed up the problem very well: “Russia is a big neighbour with whom the European Union has every interest to further develop good relations. However, the EU strategy cannot be seen as a success. There is still lack of trust – a situation that became more pronounced after the EU enlargement. The ambiguity in the role of democracy and human rights in the development of Russia complicates the partnership.” More presciently still, in the same year the U.S. civil rights group Freedom House demoted Russia from a “semi-free” country to a “non-free” state. Events since then have shown that the alarm bells were rung with good reason.

Counter-democratic developments in Russia today make it essential to understand where in real terms we stand vis-à-vis Russia. This is all the more urgent as spin doctors are busy creating new illusions around the personality of President Dmitry Medvedev. Depending on who you listen to, Medvedev is either a new John Kennedy or he’s a technocrat with no KGB background, or again he is a more decent and softer version of Vladimir Putin, his predecessor. Western leaders who buy into such illusions and race one another to the gates of the Kremlin demonstrate a classic case of European confusion regarding Russia. They also furnish proof of their own vulnerability to Moscow’s manipulations.

What, then, are the current realities that should inform a more accurate EU analysis of Russia? First, we have to acknowledge that Russia is not a democracy. In fact the policy of building a “normal” society which respects the rule of law has been reversed. Under the guise of "sovereign democracy," Russia openly and defiantly abandons the goal of becoming an advanced open society, marked by political liberty and the rule of law. Russia is an authoritarian centralized state where Soviet-style security services play the key role in politics as well as economics. Kremlin leaders are creating their own Moscow-centred system and reasserting Russia’s status as a great power.

That does not mean that Russia today is the same as the old Soviet Union; Russian society is now based on capitalism, albeit state-controlled. But disturbing comparisons can be drawn with another regime from the past. Aggressive Russian nationalism and officially-inspired bouts of xenophobia seem reminiscent of Nazi Germany in the mid-1930s, and look to be designed to recompense Moscow for the humiliation of its Soviet empire. It also compensates for the ignominy of having the terms of its democratic reforms “dictated” by its old adversaries. Blatant harassment of selected foreign diplomats and the loyalist youth movement dubbed “Putinjugend” sometimes appear to echo Hitler's rise to power.

Europe must stop thinking of Russia as a “normal” strategic partner. While the EU-Russia Partnership and Cooperation Agreement declares common values as the basis of a strategic partnership, this is deceptive. We can speak about common interests, certainly, but not common values. Russia no longer aims to integrate with the West under western terms and conditions. As former EU External Relations Commissioner Chris Patten said three years ago, “Europe should clearly work for a comprehensive partnership with Russia, but at the moment it is nonsense to suggest that this will be based on shared values.” He described his first meetings with the Kremlin as follows: "Russian officials – President Putin, prime ministers and foreign ministers – obfuscated and lied. They ignored our letters. They denied that we had raised concerns about specific issues with them ... Naturally, they got away with that.

So the EU should forget any notion that Russia is a friend, ally or reliable partner. Russia’s strategic interests in Europe directly oppose those of the EU. Moscow wants to split the Union apart and is trying to set old and new member states against each other. It is also making systematic efforts to demonstrate that the EU’s 2004 “big bang” enlargement has been at least a partial failure. The former Soviet-occupied Baltic states are the main target and testing ground for these divisive policies. Russia combines political and economic pressure on the three Baltic states with disinformation campaigns and the exploitation of Soviet-era immigrants. Russia has also tried to turn these EU members into bargaining chips in possible future deals with the Union. Such manoeuvring was firmly rejected at the 2007 Samara Summit by Germany’s Chancellor Angela Merkel and Commission President José Manuel Barroso, so there are grounds for optimism that at least this element of the Russian strategy has failed.

Beyond Europe, Russia is eagerly seeking to deepen the rifts between the U.S. and the EU. The Kremlin concentrates on bilateral deals with the most important EU members and exploits its role as their major energy supplier. Russia is unreliable as a partner in areas of international conflict. The Kremlin supplied modern arms to Saddam Hussein of Iraq until the last moment, and now pragmatically and cynically endeavours to assert its national interests in relations with Iran, Syria and Sudan, while simultaneously weakening the positions of the U.S. and European democracies.

Energy is a sector where the EU needs to get a real grip on today’s realities. Of course Russia’s economic development has been fuelled by its hydrocarbons and the EU is increasingly dependent on Russian oil and on gas especially. The more sober economic analyses show, though, that Russia needs the EU more than the EU needs Russia. Russia’s over-dependence on its energy sector has meant that its recent economic boom was highly vulnerable to the downturn in oil prices. Despite these structural weaknesses, the Kremlin retains the psychological upper hand in EU-Russian discussions.

European companies continue, meanwhile, to do business with Russia, in spite of its flagrant disregard for Western norms, its dramatic lack of reciprocity and a general disdain for legal guarantees. They rush into Russian markets in search of short-term gain and accept the crippling moral price of having to share their profits with the ruling elite. The business practices involved cast aside most EU principles of fairness and transparency. This sort of systematic disregard for the rules of fair play undermines the credibility of our own value-based free market economy.

The EU’s weakness extends beyond economic and commercial relations and into the political sphere. Russia’s Council of Europe membership is a case in point. In 1996, Russia was accepted as a member only after lengthy debate and in return for a long list of democratic commitments which were to be met in the shortest possible time. The decision was purely political: the majority concluded that Russia was “better in than out.” The justification was that membership would speed up Russia’s democratic transformation. Sadly, the opposite is true. Most of Russia’s commitments have been left unrealised and Russia has exerted much more influence on the Council than vice versa. The Kremlin’s influence is increasing, and its ability to block initiatives enhanced. As a result of political pressure and economic carrots, several politicians have apparently lost their objectivity in dealing with Moscow. By playing at democracy, authoritarian Russia has won and the oldest post-war European democratic organisation has lost.

So where do we go to from here? An intriguing analysis by Mexican political scientist Fredo Arias King compares Russia to a person with the psychological condition known as borderline personality disorder. This involves a split cultural identity, unstable self image, black-and-white thinking and difficulties of perceiving one’s own responsibilities. Sufferers often have bursts of anger and aggressiveness, and attempts to appease and indulge them are counter-productive. The way to handle them, it is said, is to be stable, polite and firm, defining non-negotiable rules that are then stuck to.

Applied to Russia-EU relations, this formula could be the best remedy for unruly Russian behaviour. The EU should set clear rules which are not subject to change as a result of whim or exceptional circumstances. They must be based on the international standards for the rule of law. Europe’s working relationship with Moscow should start afresh on the basis of friendly but firm reciprocity.

The mission of a united Europe should be to speak the truth, set boundaries and underline that our principles and values are not up for negotiation. Such a common and unwavering EU policy would help Russia to differentiate between normal national interests and imperial ambitions, eventually resulting in a Russia that is less unpredictable and more cooperative. Russia is not a mystery, the full text of Churchill’s celebrated October 1939 remark is as follows: “I cannot forecast to you the action of Russia. It is a riddle wrapped in mystery inside an enigma, but perhaps there is a key. That key is Russian national interest.”

Macedonia and the Macedonians: A History

2009-01-15T13:26:00.000+01:00

Throughout history, every power that aspired to dominate the Balkans—from the ancient Romans to Bulgaria, Greece, and Serbia in the age of imperialism and nationalism in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries—has sought to control Macedonia. But although Macedonia figured prominently in history, it remained a little-known land until the nineteenth century. This detailed volume surveys the history of Macedonia from 600 B. C. to the present day, with an emphasis on the past two centuries. It reveals how the so called Macedonian question has long dominated Balkan politics, and how for well over a century and a half, it was the central issue dividing Balkan peoples, as neighboring nations struggled for possession of Macedonia and denied any distinct Macedonian identity—territorial, political, ethnic, or national.

The book shows how, during the long struggle for Macedonia, some ethnic Macedonians adopted or had to adopt the national identity of one of the competing nations, most chose a Macedonian identity—and how Macedonia's struggle to establish a distinct national identity goes on even today. The author concludes that Balkan acceptance of a Macedonian identity, nation, and state has become a necessity for stability in the Balkans and in a united Europe.

Full-text PDF versions of each chapter can be accessed below by clicking on the desired chapter title. (PDF files require Adobe Reader. If you do not already have this software installed, click here to download it for free at the Adobe web site.)

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Incompatible Allies: Greek Communism and Macedonian Nationalism in the Civil War in Greece, 1943-1949!

2009-01-15T12:31:00.002+01:00

Such is the Slav Macedonian distrust of the Greek that even the KKE [Communist Party of Greece] is suspect…. KKE may be communist, but in the eyes of the Slav Macedonian it is primarily Greek. The development this summer of KKM [Communist Party of Macedonia] must offer a prospect of far greater appeal to the Slav-Macedonians in Greece than KKE can provide.[1]
The Macedonians of Aegean or Greek Macedonia made a significant, indeed a critical contribution to the communist side during the Civil War in Greece. They were mobilized for the struggle by their own movement, the National Liberation Front (Naroden Osloboditelen Front, or NOF), which was or sought the role of an autonomous ally and partner, even if a junior one, of the Communist Party of Greece, Kommounistiko Komma tis Elladas (KKE). The two looked like natural allies. They shared a common ideology, Marxism-Leninism, since the NOF was also a communist organization; they both rejected the status quo and wanted to replace it with a communist people’s democracy, and, by the late autumn of 1946, they seemed to agree that this aim could probably be attained only through force of arms. In reality, however, the KKE and NOF were divided by deep-seated mutual distrust and animosity. For the former, the struggle was exclusively ideological and its aim was the seizure of power in Greece. For the latter-without in the least questioning its ideological commitment-it was primarily a national struggle, a battle for the national liberation of the Macedonians in Aegean Macedonia.[2] These two perceptions of the struggle were not altogether contradictory, but the divergence in priorities exacerbated the already-existing mutual suspicions. The Greek communists saw in Macedonian nationalism disloyalty to the Greek state; the Macedonians, in contrast, saw in the strong patriotism and nationalism of their Greek comrades a denial, indeed a betrayal, of their own national rights. Both assessments were correct, but these two incompatible allies were doomed to fight together; they had no alternative. The success of each depended on the other The Macedonians could not even conceive of national liberation without the victory of the KKE, the only party in Greece that had recognized their existence and national identity. By the same token, the KKE could not realistically expect to win without direct or indirect support from their communist neighbors to the north, especially federal Yugoslavia; but aid from Yugoslavia, where the Macedonians had already won the status of a state within the federation, would hardly be forthcoming unless the Greek Communist Party could win the active support of the Macedonians in Greece.
The Macedonians bore the brunt of the war. They inhabited central and western Aegean Macedonia, the area bordering Yugoslavia and Albania, where the heaviest fighting, including the decisive battles, took place. Throughout the Civil War it served as a base for the political and military operations of the so-called democratic movement. The KKE and its military arm, the Democratic Army of Greece (Dimokratikos Stratos tis Elladas, or DSE), both maintained their headquarters there. It also embraced the so-called liberated territories, lands that came under the control of the DSE, formed its home front, and supplied or were compelled to supply most, if not all, the necessary provisions. As one participant and close observer put it: “[Theyj were turned into military workshops for the DSE, where everyone, young and old, male and female, served the needs of the DSE."[3]
Even more notable was the Macedonian contribution to the fighting strength of the Left. Throughout the struggle their participation in the ranks of the rebel army was very high, far out of proportion to their relatively low number in the total population of Greece at the time. Reliable statistics do not exist, but Macedonians seem to have constituted only around a twentieth of the total population of about seven million.[4] Their estimated representation in the DSE ranged from more than a quarter in April 1947 to more than two-thirds in mid-1949. Risto Kirjazovski maintains that they numbered 5,250 out of 20,000 in April 1947;[5] and Lieutenant Colonel Pando Vajnas claimed that in January 1948 there were about 11,000 Macedonian partisans in the DSE.[6] According to C. M. Woodhouse, “they numbered 11,000 out of 25,000 in 1948, but 14,000 out of less than 20,000 by mid-1949.”[7]
In the most critical theaters of military operations the Macedonians constituted an even higher percentage of the fighting strength.[8] Gianis Ioanidis, a member of the Politbureau (PB) of the KKE, reported as early as October 24, 1947, that they constituted three-quarters of the manpower of the command of central and western Macedonia.[9] Vajnas evaluated the contribution of the Macedonians as “first rate” and “unique.”[10] Vasilis Bartziotas, a member of the Politbureau and the Political Commissar of the General Headquarters of the DSE, paid tribute to “this heroic people [who] gave everything … it sacrificed its children, its property, its homes. Every household has a wounded or a dead [member].”[11]
It is therefore rather surprising that scholarly writings on the Civil War in Greece published during the last three decades in the West have hardly considered the NOF and the Macedonians.[12] In this study I will focus on the role of the Macedonians led by the NOF in what proved to be the bloodiest conflict in the history of modern Greece. Their motivations and aims shaped their relations with the KKE, the senior partner, and are therefore of critical importance in understanding the fortunes of the Left, Greek as well as Macedonian, during the Civil War.
I
The roots of the alliance between Greek communism and Macedonian nationalism went as far back as the immediate post-World War I years. The KKE, as well as its fraternal parties in Bulgaria and Yugoslavia, had already been influenced by the Comintern in the early 1920s to appeal to the Macedonians and to manipulate Macedonian discontent to further the cause of revolution in Greece and in the Balkans generally It was the only political party in Greece to recognize Macedonian national identity and to have a public policy on the Macedonian national question.[13] Against considerable opposition, the Third Extraordinary Congress of the KKE, meeting from November 26 to December 3, 1924, endorsed the Comintern line: support for a united Macedonian state in a future Balkan communist federation. This position was in basic accord with the demands of Macedonian activists and patriots, but it was extremely unpopular among the Greeks. The inauguration of the Popular Front line by the Comintern gave the Greek Communist Party the opportunity to replace it. Its Sixth Congress, in December 1935, adopted a new policy supporting equality for all national minorities in Greece, including the Macedonian; this remained its official stand until early l949.[14] From the limited perspective of the average Macedonian it was also most striking that the KKE was the only political organization in the country to raise a voice in their defense. This was true throughout the interwar period, but especially during the dictatorship of General Metaxas, which for them was an extremely harsh and repressive era.[15]
So long as the KKE remained a well-disciplined and active, yet relatively small opposition force, it was able to impose its rather theoretical Macedonian policy on its membership, both Greek and Macedonian, without being overly concerned about the views of the rest of society. The outbreak of World War II, the collapse of the old order; the occupation of the country, and the repartition of Macedonia by the Axis powers transformed the positions of the KKE and the Macedonians and the relationship between them. The KKE organized and led by far the most powerful resistance movement in the land, the National Liberation Front (Ethniko Apelefiherotiko Metopo, or EAM), and its military arm, the Greek Popular Liberation Army (Ellinikos Laikos Apeleftherotikos Stratos, or ELAS). While maintaining its commitment to social revolution, it also cultivated an image of determined defense of the traditional national interest of Greece. It succeeded in attracting a large noncommunist patriotic following and was intent on seizing power after the liberation of the country. [16]
In Macedonia, however, the KKE and EAM-ELAS faced stiff competition for the allegiance of the Macedonians. At the very outset of the war the KKE paid no particular attention to this. The Sixth and Seventh Plenums of its Central Committee (CC), held in June and September 1941, called on all citizens to join the struggle against the occupiers, but they did not mention the national minorities.[17] The resolutions of the Eighth Plenum, in January 1942, and the All-Greek Conference of the KKE, in December 1942, went a step further. They urged the Macedonians to join the Greeks in a common struggle with the Bulgarian and Serbian peoples against the fascists and for the victory of the USSR as well as for their own national and social liberation.[18] Large numbers of Macedonians joined the ranks of EAM-ELAS;[19] but after years of neglect, oppression, and repression, this predominantly peasant people felt alienated from the Greek state. It was difficult for them to show loyalty to it or to take at face value vague promises of equality in a future people’s Greece. Many responded instead to the calls of the Italian, German, and Bulgarian occupation authorities and of Vanco Mihailov’s Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization (IMRO), who promised them liberation from Greek rule in the form of a “free,” “autonomous” “independent” or “united” Macedonian state.[20] Their propaganda and coercion organizations appealed to the Macedonians’ traditional and deeply ingrained distrust of the Greeks. They kept warning that “the partisans are Greek nationalists,”[21] that “The Andartes [partisans] are with the British and the British will bring back the king and an old GREECE (i.e. the GREECE of METAXAS). Therefore you must take arms against the Andartes.”[22] They succeeded in arming many villages and recruited and armed paramilitary bands, the so-called komiti or kontracheti to fight on their side.[23]
By 1943, however, these rightist and largely foreign influences were overshadowed and thwarted by a much more powerful attraction and example: the Macedonian national liberation movement in Vardar or Yugoslav Macedonia, whose presence was also felt in Aegean Macedonia. Many, including loyal members of the KKE and followers of EAM-ELAS, were impressed by its apparent autonomy status within Tito’s national liberation movement in Yugoslavia. Moreover, they were struck by its clearly Macedonian national character It had its own general headquarters and a Macedonian partisan army officered by Macedonians; it used Macedonian as the language of command and a Macedonian flag as its symbol; it propagated openly the national liberation of all Macedonians and, in a more subdued fashion, Macedonian national unification.[24] This was in sharp contrast to the practice in Greece, where, as Captain P H. Evans, a station commander of the Special Operations Executive (SOE) in western Aegean Macedonia in 1943-44, wrote, “ELAS.. . have always officered their Macedonian units with GREEKS and this has made a bad impression on the Slavophone Andartes in ELAS. It has made them feel, as the civilians also feel, that the millennium announced by EAM/ELAS, with the Slav-Macedonians enjoying equal privileges and full freedom, is just a sell out after all; GREECE will go on excluding them from state posts, from promotion in the army and so on” [25] Influenced by the Yugoslav example, Macedonian “leftists,” to use Captain Evans’s well-chosen term, began to demand a separate national liberation movement in Aegean Macedonia. This demand, as well as the recognition of their right to self-determination, constituted, as the Yugoslav practice showed, important means for drawing Macedonians into the communist-led resistance movements in the Balkans.[26] However, at a high-level meeting of representatives of the central committees of the Albanian, Greek, and Yugoslav parties on June 20, 1943, the Greek delegate, Tilemachos Ververis, rejected all such proposals. He argued in effect that the mere raising of the Macedonian question in Greece would alienate Greeks from the KKE and EAM-ELAS.[27] Nonetheless, from then on and throughout the Civil War it became the KKE’s difficult task to maintain and enhance its support among the Greeks while attempting to conciliate the Macedonians.[28] Since the two were so divided and their interests could not be easily reconciled, the Greek communist leadership chose to manipulate the Macedonian question to further its own party interests. Whenever the KKE needed the political and military support of the Macedonians, it paid lip service to their demands and made some half-hearted concessions to them without giving up control over them or their movement. When the KKE no longer felt in need of their support, it turned against them, canceled the concessions, and downplayed their demands and the Macedonian problem in Greece.[29]
In 1943, relations between EAM-ELAS and the smaller nationalist resistance organizations deteriorated dramatically. Armed clashes of ELAS with units of the National Republican Greek League (Ethnikos Dimokratikos Ellinikos Syndesmos, or EDES) in early autumn, during the so-called First Round of the Civil War, compelled the communists to court the Macedonians in order to draw them away from Bulgarian influence and into the ranks of ELAS. in September 1943 a Macedonian unit, “Lazo Trpovski,” was organized within ELAS. The following month the KKE reluctantly sanctioned the formation of the Slav-Macedonian National Liberation Front (Slavjano-Makedonski Narodno Osloboditelen Front, or SNOF) and its military arm, the Slav-Macedonian National Liberation Army (Slavjano-Makedonska Narodno Osloboditelna Vojska, or SNOV), under the direct authority of EAM-ELAS.[30] For the more radical elements in the Macedonian leadership, those who were in closest contact with Vardar Macedonia, this was clearly only a first step. They wished to see SNOF-SNOV transformed into a truly Macedonian national liberation movement. They wanted it to be autonomous, perhaps even independent of EAM/ELAS, with its own organization, leadership, and command structure through-out Aegean Macedonia; such a movement, with a national liberation program based on their right to self-determination, would appeal to the overwhelming majority of Macedonians.[31] One of these radical leaders, Lazo Damovski (Oshenski), informed the leaders of the KKE that promises of full equality in a people’s Greece in the future were no longer sufficient. He wrote of the Macedonians of Greece:
Do they or don’t they have the right, . . . in accordance with the eight points of the Atlantic Charter on the self-determination of nations, to demand, together with the other two parts under Serbia and Bulgaria, to establish their own Slavmacedonian people’s republic?!The Slavmacedonians justly ask: Why do they not permit us to develop fully our national culture and to realize our national ideals …?! We are not Greeks, but a Slav-macedonian nation, with different ideals. How could we remain in Greece, content solely with equality? How could this be reconciled with the basic principles on the self-determination of nations?[32]
In fact, even the SNOF-SNOV this modest Macedonian version and satellite of EAM-ELAS that the party conceded to recognize, won immediate acceptance and widespread support among the Macedonians. Paradoxically, though, it was this very success that sealed its fate. The KKE wanted an obedient and subservient, token Macedonian instrument to draw the Macedonians into the fold of EAM-ELAS and thus away from the various “free” and “autonomous” Macedonian bands supported by the Bulgarians and Germans.[33] It was not willing to tolerate, let alone accept as a partner, an authentic Macedonian national liberation movement on the Left that enjoyed a popular mass following and thus an independent power base. Consequently, from the very outset, while the movement was still in its organizational stage, the party leadership severely curtailed its independence, restricting and hindering its activities. And in the end, after existing for only six months, SNOF-SNOV was suppressed in April-May l944.[34] Some of its leaders were arrested, but a group of eighty partisans, led by Naum Pejov, fled across the border and joined the Macedonian army in Vardar Macedonia.[35]
In the summer the KKE was forced once again to conciliate the Macedonians. The problem was solved temporarily with the help of the Macedonian leadership in Yugoslavia when the KKE promised to permit the formation of separate Macedonian units within ELAS.[36] However, only two battalions were allowed to form, the Voden (Edesa) in June and the Kostur-Lerin (Kastoria-Florina) in August.[37] Their activities were tightly controlled and their numerical strength was purposely restricted. As the commanders of the latter complained to the headquarters of the National Liberation Army of Macedonia: “they [the leadership of EAM-ELAS] are determined to prevent by all possible means the rise of a Macedonian partisan movement in Greece. They want to keep dispersed throughout the various units of ELAS both those already in ELAS and the new [recruits] who want to join the Macedonian detachments?[38] Or, as the secretary of the Macedonian bureau of the party confessed cynically: two Macedonian bands would be formed “so that the Slav Macedonians are not deceived by an eventual plot by the Bulgarians?[39]
Relations between the two sides remained tense and reached crisis proportions by October, when, faced with the prospect of liquidation, the two Macedonian battalions revolted and crossed into Vardar Macedonia.[40] The flight of the two battalions, which included the best-known Macedonian “leftists,”[41] represented an open break between the communist-led resistance and the Macedonians in Greece. There is no doubt that the rebels enjoyed mass support. As Giorgis Milonas, a district leader of the KKE in Kastoria (Kostur) reported to the regional leadership for Macedonia: “The population is reserved, fear retaliatory measures from FLAS; they look toward Yugoslavia and the vast majority sympathizes with the separatist movement?’[42] The KKE denounced the rebellious Macedonian leaders as traitors, komitajis, kontrachetniks, instruments of the Gestapo and the “Intelligence Service?”[43] The Macedonian leaders in turn accused the KKE and EAM-ELAS of great Greek chauvinism and opportunism for denying the Macedonians equality and the right to self-determination.[44] In a lengthy letter to the Central Committee of EAM and the General Headquarters of ELAS, the leaders of the Kostur-Lerin battalion insisted that there could be no further cooperation between them unless the Greek Communist Party corrected its policy on the Macedonian question and met the Macedonian demands: separate Macedonian units, a separate Macedonian national front represented in the Central Committee of EAM, Macedonian institutions of local self-government, freedom to conduct their own propaganda and education even on subjects such as Macedonian self-determination and unification. Until then, “the Macedonian national fighters will not subordinate themselves to the dictatorship and discipline of EAM-ELAS; [they] will carry on an independent policy and struggle for national justice?”[45] This split, which also had a chilling effect on KKE-CPY (Communist Party of Yugoslavia) relations, occurred at a most inopportune moment for EAM-ELAS: on the eve of the so-called Second Round in the Civil War in Greece. The defeat of the Greek Left in the Battle of Athens and its acceptance of the Varkiza Agreement, on February 12, 1945, only served to widen the rift even further Both the Macedonian leaders in Greece and the victorious communists in Yugoslavia considered the accord a shameful capitulation.[46]
II
The flight of the two battalions, which included the most seasoned and well-known Macedonian communist leaders in Aegean Macedonia, did not represent a rejection of the Greek political Left. It was rather an attempt on their part to force the KKE and EAM-ELAS to accept the Macedonians as equals and to respect their national rights. As the leaders of the Lerin-Kostur battalion explained:
We did not leave, as you accuse us, to becorne servants of fascism . . . , because we are enemies of the people. . . , because we harbor treacherous intentions; we left precisely because we are fighters, Macedonian fighters, precisely because we want to fight against fascism . . . , to win recognition for the fundamental principles of the allied struggle, the national rights of our people and to become free. . . . We fight against the Germans here .. . ; we want to return there, to our lands, to fight shoulder to shoulder with you, to help you in your struggle… in unity and brotherhood. However, to establish unity and [for usj to accept the policy and central leadership of EAM and ELAS we have set forth our... demands as conditions.... We are certain that EAM-ELAS will respond correctly.[47]
In the meantime they began to organize on the free territory of Vardar Macedonia. In November, in Bitola, the two battalions and other armed Macedonians escaping from Greece were organized in a brigade. It became known as the First Aegean Brigade and comprised four battalions with a reported strength of four to five thousand men.[48] It took part in the final operations of the war on the territory of Vardar Macedonia and was disbanded on April 2, 1945. During the Civil War many, if not most, of these seasoned fighters returned to Greece and fought in the ranks of the DSE.[49] At the same time, in early November; their delegates met in Bitola and, according to Naum Pejov, one of the participants, “selected a political body of 29 members headed by a commission of 10 members?”[50] The larger body was the Provisional Revolutionary Committee of Macedonia under Greece (Privremen Revolucioneren Komitet na Makedonija pod Grcija);[51] the smaller was the Temporary Political Commission of Macedonia under Greece (Vremena Politicka Komisija na Makedonija pod Grcija).[52] But both Pejov and Kirjazovski refer to them simply as the Political Commission.[53] The Political Commission’s declared aim was to lead the struggle of the Aegean Macedonians for national self-determination, “guaranteed to us by the Atlantic Charter”[54] “We acquired that right with [our] three years struggle. We have won our right.”[55] For that purpose it sought to resolve the conflict with the KKE and EAM-ELAS and to establish local organizations in Aegean Macedonia.[56] After the signing of the Varkiza Peace Agreement, which also signaled the beginning of the so-called white terror against the Left and particularly against the Macedonians, the Political Commission realized the need for greater organizational unity. They met on April 23, 1945, and founded the NOF as a single united organization of all Macedonians in Greece.[57]
The founders of the NOF, all of whom were leading activists of the wartime SNOF conceived it as a direct successor of the latter, as an independent, communist-led, national liberation movement of the Macedonians in Greece.[58] It appealed not only to the Macedonians who had sided with EAM-ELAS during the war; in addition, and more important, it wished to draw into its fold all those Macedonians, the so-called autonomists, who had been armed by the occupation authorities.[59] The NOF sought and in a relatively short time largely succeeded in establishing a vast organizational network that reached all Macedonian populated areas.[60] In a report on the Edesa [Voden] region, dated May 27, 1945, Pavle Rakovski claimed: “In those localities where NOF was organized almost the entire Macedonian population embraced it. In many areas the KKE exists only formally.”[61] A few months later this state of affairs was confirmed by Atanasios Tzogas, an activist of the KKE in western Macedonia, when he complained: “Today our Party is not welcomed in many Slav Macedonian villages: and that in the name of Marxism?!”[62]
The primary aim of the NOF, as was the case with the SNOF, remained self-determination and thus national liberation. For the leaders of the NOF, who were dazzled by the successes of the communists in Yugoslavia and applauded the establishment of a People’s Republic of Macedonia (PRM) in the federation, national self-determination and liberation could only mean unification with free Macedonia in Yugoslavia. As L. Damovski, its leading ideologist, declared in June 1945: “The desire of Aegean Macedonia is Unification with Free Macedonia in accordance with the principles of the Atlantic Charter and the declarations of Stalin-Roosevelt-Churchill… The Greek people have nothing to lose from such Unification…. The common struggle of the Macedonians and the Greeks will help open the way for the unification of the Macedonians with free Macedonia; for the Greeks [it] will win democracy, throw over the foreign yoke, and pave the way for people’s rule in Greece.”[63] Macedonian political prisoners in the “Edi-Kule” jail in Salonica expressed such hopes in their New Year’s greetings to I.Dimovski-Goce: “may 1946 bring about the unification of the entire Macedonia within the framework of the Federal People’s Republic of Yugoslavia.”[64]
The defeat of the Greek Left in the Battle of Athens and its capitulation in Varkiza, which Macedonian communist leaders blamed on the incorrect policies and tactics of the KKE, represented a defeat for the national aspirations of the Macedonians in Greece as well. In the conditions of post-Varkiza Greece and the Balkans in general, the NOF had to play down, or set aside until the victory of the Greek Left, its maximal aim, national self-determination and unification, which was anathema to Greeks across the political spectrum. Instead it focused on its minimal aim: safeguarding the survival of the Macedonians in Greece, for which there was understanding and support, at least officially, within the communist-led Left.[65] As the lead article in the official organ of the NOF declared on February 20, 1946: “Only a successful united struggle of the anti-fascist forces in Greece will bring freedom to the Greek working people and national rights to the Macedonians, Albanians and the other minorities in Greece?”[66] This minimal program remained its declared policy until its Second Congress in March 1949-that is, virtually until the end of the Civil War.
The terror campaign unleashed after Varkiza by the Greek Right against the entire Left was directed with special vehemence against the Macedonians. In addition to the ideological “treachery” of supporting EAM-ELAS, they were attacked for committing the ultimate “sin” of not being, or rather not considering themselves, Greeks. They were condemned as Bulgars, komitajis, collaborators, autonomists, Sudetens of the Balkans, and so forth, and threatened with extermination.[67] And they paid a heavy price: armed attacks on their villages; murders, arrests, trials, jail, and exile; confiscation of property and movable equipment; burning of homes or entire villages; economic blockades of villages; forcible expulsions; discriminatory use of taxes and UNRRA (United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration) aid; restrictions on freedom of movement, and so on.[68] “Under such conditions,” wrote Solon Grigoriadis, a functionary of the KKE and ELAS, in Rizospastis, in early January 1946, “a mass exodus of Macedonians will begin. Entire villages escape into the mountains or seek refuge in Yugoslavia. I have seen Slav villages from which 90% of the men have run away; from others 60%-70% of the villagers have run away, and in some there is not a single inhabitant left!”[69]
As the sole, though illegal, Macedonian organization in Greece, the NOF mobilized the Macedonians in self-defense. Through its underground network it tracked the movement of rightist bands and advised villagers to abandon their homes for the safety of the hills; helped activists to move into cities or cross the border to safety; secured legal aid and expertise for those arrested; organized petitions, protests, demonstrations, and strikes. It did not exclude armed resistance; but, at least throughout 1945, its leaders did not encourage the formation of armed bands, partly because of a lack of arms but also in deference to the KKE, which opposed such measures. In early 1946 the position of the KKE began to change and the NOF again promoted the speedy formation of armed groups for self-defense. By August there were about five hundred and by September about seven hundred partisans of the NOF operating in the mountains of central and western Aegean Macedonia. [70]However, the leaders of the NOF were fully conscious of their isolation in Greece and repeatedly called for collaboration with the Greek Left. But a basis for cooperation did not exist; the conclusion of the Varkiza Agreement had exacerbated the split that already existed between them. As I pointed out above, the Macedonian leaders denounced the agreement as capitulation, convinced that the communists could seize power only through armed struggle. The KKE, however, endorsed the accord and as a legal party embraced political struggle to win power in Greece. The two positions were not compatible and precluded any meaningful cooperation against the Right.[71] Hence, in the year and a half following Varkiza, the KKE and EAM, while protesting the terror campaign directed at the Macedonian population, also rejected the NOF, denouncing it as “an autonomist” and “fascist” organization led by the “Intelligence Service”[72] and equating it with the Bulgarian-sponsored autonomist movement of the Second World War.[73] They characterized its followers as “a rebellious” group,[74] “a dangerous and anarchist element,”[75] threatened them with expulsion from the party, and, after its victory, with greater sufferings “than they are now experiencing in the hands of the reaction.”[76] They called on all Macedonians “to close their ears and not to listen to suspicious persons, . . . the feeble minded and cowardly who present themselves as armed defenders of the Slav Macedonian people, [but] are [in fact] destroyers of the unity of the people.”[77] Or, as Tanas Korovesov, an NOF leader from Ianitsa (Enidze Vardar), wrote, “The KKE fights openly against our movement and wants to destroy it. Their fight against us is even more determined than their fight against the reaction… It appears that the KKE has no intention of fighting the reaction with us.”[78]
III
The attitude of the KKE toward the NOF and, indeed, the struggle for power in Greece in general did not change as long as its leadership remained convinced that they could achieve a political victory. The first indication of the possible reorientation of the party line came at the end of December 1945.
Addressing a plenum of the regional party organization in Salonica on December 28, Nikos Zachariadis, its General Secretary, drew a sharp distinction between what he called the autonomist movement and the NOF. He condemned the former as fascist and imperialist and its followers, the autonomists, as agents of foreign, anti-Balkan interests, “enemies not only of the Greek people, but also of Slav Macedonians:’ In contrast, he recognized the NOF as “an anti-fascist organization of Slav Macedonians” and, in the name of all Greek democrats, endorsed its call “to all toilers, all inhabitants of the region [Edesa], to fight united for people’s freedom, equality, equal citizenship, for a general amnesty, etc. We will march together with them in the struggle for bread, for freedom, for a neo-Greek people’s democracy.”[79] Since the right-wing autonomist movement had already been virtually suppressed and no longer posed a threat, Zachariadis’s speech could be seen as a rejection of the NOF’s maximal aim and endorsement of its minimal aim. Early in the new year; similar sentiments were echoed by Leonidas Stringos, member of the Politbureau (PB) and secretary of the regional bureau of the KKE for Macedonia and Thrace, who also called for the reestablishment of the unity of the Greeks and Macedonians, which, according to him, had been disrupted by the Varkiza Agreement. [80] The conciliation of the NOF intensified after February 12, 1946, when the Second Plenum of the Central Committee (CC) of the KKE decided to begin preparations for a possible armed struggle.[81]
These overtures prepared the ground for a formal rapprochement between the KKE and the NOF. The first official contacts between them took place in April 1946.[82] The actual discussions on unification, which proved difficult, protracted, and acrimonious, commenced in May 1946 and concluded on November 21, 1946, with the final unification agreement between the KKE and the NOF. The first meeting took place in May, in Salonica. The KKE was represented by Zachariadis, General Markos, the commander of the DSE, and Stringos; the NOF was represented by Mitrovski. In a report written about six months later; on September 13, 1946, Mitrovski claimed that they had reached complete agreement. “We did not leave a single issue unresolved or in the dark:’[83]
As far as I know, this agreement was never formally renounced or; for that matter; publicly endorsed by Zachariadis. However; in the talks on its implementation, held during the summer between representatives of the NOF and district and regional party leaders in Macedonia, the Greeks repudiated the two most critical demands of the Macedonians: Macedonian military detachments and the co-option of NOF cadres. Instead, they insisted on forming a single, integrated army and on leaving the selection of leadership cadres, both political and military, to the KKE.[84] The talks remained deadlocked; by early autumn 1946 the communists pondered the use of force against the NOF and the NOF for its part, threatened to respond with force. As Keramitciev told Stratos Kentros: “If you attempt to impose [upon us] your views by military means, we will defend ours by military means as well. As a representative of the NOF I declare that we will consider as enemy action every measure that aims at the dissolution of the Macedonian units and the NOF [and] we will take steps against it.” [85] In a lengthy evaluation of the talks, Mitrovski blamed the regional leadership of the KKE for the difficulties. He accused them of showing a total disrespect toward the NOF trying to replace its leadership apparatus with their own people, and seeking “not the strengthening but rather the undermining of the NOF; and, possibly, its de facto dissolution in the future as in the case of the old SNOF.”[86] On the other hand, Keramitciev, who was personally involved in these discussions, questioned the honesty and sincerity of the top leaders of the KKE, including Zachariadis.[87]
The details of what followed are not entirely clear. It appears, however; that the KKE turned to the Communist Party of Yugoslavia (CPY) for assistance to break the impasse. G. Ioanidis held talks in Belgrade with Ivan Karaivanov, and they reached an agreement in principle on October 14, 1946. Mitrovski and General Markos settled the remaining outstanding issues and concluded the final unification agreement between the KKE and the NOF.[88] Among its main provisions were the following: the Macedonian party organizations in Aegean Macedonia would be absorbed by the KKE; the organization NOF including the Macedonian women’s front (AFZ), would come under the control and leadership of the KKE; the NOF, however; would retain its own Central Leadership (CL), which, among others, would include Mitrovski and Keramitciev and would be responsible to the regional committee of the KKE for Macedonia and Thrace. In addition, Mitrovski would be co-opted into its bureau and Urdov, another member of the NOF’s leadership, into its plenum. The regional committee was then to appoint other Macedonian cadres to party functions. The NOMS would be absorbed by the United Pan-Hellenic Organization of Youth (Eniea Panelladiki Organosi Neon, or EPON); Mincho Fotev, its leader; would join the regional committee for Macedonia and Thrace; the partisan army would have full organizational, political, and operational unity; separate Macedonian units would not be formed; and Urdov would join the headquarters of the DSE for Macedonia and Thrace. Finally, all political and military appointments and promotions would be made by the KKB on the basis of merit.[89]
The accord was a compromise; it did not satisfy fully either the KKE or the NOF. Under pressure, probably from the Yugoslav Communist Party, the NOF had to abandon its demand for separate Macedonian units in the DSE and to leave appointments and promotions in the hands of the KKE.[90] However; the KKE was compelled to make some concessions as well. It wanted to decapitate the NOF, to do away with its Central Leadership, and to bring the district and local organizations, as token instruments for the mobilization of the Macedonians, under direct party control. In the end, it had to accept the right of the NOF to retain its own Central Leadership, which meant its de facto recognition as the highest organ of the Macedonians in Greece.[91] As I already suggested, the two sides did not conclude the agreement because they trusted each other but, rather; because they needed and depended on each other for the realization of their respective and not entirely compatible ends-namely, seizure of power for the KKE and national liberation for the NOF. Although the NOF was no longer voicing it openly, the KKE suspected that its real aim remained self-determination leading to the unification of Aegean Macedonia, or at least of those areas inhabited predominantly by Macedonians, with the People’s Republic of Macedonia (PRM). On the one hand, therefore, the KKE distrusted the leadership of the NOF. On the other hand, past practical experience had taught the leaders of the NOF to question the KKE’s Macedonian program and, above all, the sincerity of its leadership.[92] On the basis of the available evidence it is difficult to determine exactly how each side hoped to tackle the challenge posed by the other after the common struggle. However, it would appear that the NOF leaders placed their hopes in the support of Yugoslavia, while the KKE hoped to neutralize the NOF as a factor in future relations with Yugoslavia.[93] Thus, control of the organizational apparatus of the NOF and particularly of its Central Leadership, became of vital importance to the Greek Communist Party.
IV
In public and propaganda pronouncements the KKE and the NOF stressed the cooperation, brotherhood, and unity of the Greeks and Macedonians in their common struggle.[94] In reality, however, the conclusion of the unification accord did little, if anything, to bridge the gap that divided them. Only half a year later Atanasios Tzogas, secretary of the district committee of the KKE in Kastoria, warned Todoros Evtimiadis, his counterpart in Florina, that “those friends”-or really “traitors”-”who are autonomists in orientation” comprise a dangerous antiparty element and could create many problems and do damage “to us if we are not vigilant.” “They are playing before our own eyes a double, suspicious, conniving game. Make sure that you limit their influence in the army so that they will not corrupt the good young men.”[95] Such feelings were not uncommon within the KKE and DSE, and the Macedonians were aware of them. In a report to the Central Leadership of the NOF Mitrovski maintained that cooperation would be difficult in practice due to “the chauvinism of some Greek comrades who have been appointed by the party to lead the Macedonian provinces. .. [and] who suffer from a chronic suspicion of Macedonian cadres and leaders.” This was clearly reflected “in the systematic exclusion of Macedonians from responsible and decision-making positions:’ He singled out for special criticism Panos Kapetanios, the representative of the headquarters of the DSE in central Macedonia, Statis (Janis Koriofilis), the commander of the DSE on Mt. Paikos (Pajak), and Tzogas. He called for the removal of such leaders from responsible positions in the Macedonian populated areas; otherwise the party would not win the unqualified support of the NOF and the Macedonians.[96] Lazo Poplazarov, secretary of the district NOF organization in Edesa, complained that Greek cadres showed no appreciation or respect for the Macedonians and this was affecting their fighting morale.[97] Vangel Shamardanov, a commissar of a battalion on Mt. Paikos, voiced similar sentiments and warned: “After two years of struggle. .. and under the leadership of the NOF the Macedonians have matured ideologically and nationally and view the situation differently…. They demand that their cadres be promoted in the DSE; they want to see Slav Macedonians in the leadership and this is not occurring today to the extent that it should be. .. Chauvinism exists within the Greek element in its relation to our people:.” He pointed out that flagrant discrimination was directed particularly at Macedonians belonging to the NOF and those who maintained contacts with Yugoslav Macedonia.[98]
The unsettled state of KKE-NOF relations was a major issue discussed at a party meeting that included leaders of the NOF and was held on October 24, 1947, at the headquarters of the DSE for western and central Macedonia. Both representatives of the Politbureau, Stringos and Toanidis, praised the mass participation of the Macedonians in the struggle and condemned all attempts to belittle their significant contribution. And, in a rather condescending manner; Stringos added: “We have to raise more cadres from among them. They are a bit backward; [we] must help them.”[99] However; they as well as the other KKE speakers ignored the NOF in their remarks. Speaking on behalf of the NOF Keramitciev reminded the gathering that 85 percent of the Macedonians sided with “the democratic movement”-that is, actually supported the Left-and he credited his organization with this success. Then he leveled a series of charges at the KKE: supporting the Grkomani, as the Macedonians derisively called the Greekophile or assimilated Macedonians; harboring within its ranks anti-NOF elements; discriminating against Macedonians in general and NOF cadres and activists in particular; neglecting the NOF in the administration of the liberated territories, which were inhabited mostly by Macedonians; ignoring the contribution and heroism of the Macedonians and the NOF in party and DSE propaganda; and, most important, failing to appoint a single Macedonian to the headquarters of Vich (Vitsi), Kajmackalan, and Paikos, an area that contributed more than six thousand Macedonian partisans. [100] In a private meeting in the evening, which also included Stringos and Generals Markos and Petris, Ioanidis warned Mitrovski, Keramitciev, and Vera Nikolova in no uncertain terms of their duties and obligations: “The NOF is not solely yours. First and foremost you have to be communists and only afterward patriots. That is the way you must approach the question of the Grkomani…. You must remember that you are members of the KKE. [He repeated this three times.] Only the KKE is here. No one else.” [101] In his report on the meeting, written a week later on October 31, Keramitciev drew the attention of the NOF leaders to the anti-NOF attitudes of leading Greek cadres. He warned that they aimed to destroy the influence of the NOF and the attraction-political, national, cultural-of the People’s Republic of Macedonia and Tito’s Yugoslavia among the Macedonians by bringing them under the direct authority of the EAM. They sought to achieve this by resorting to “divide et impera” playing some leaders of the NOF against others and favoring Macedonians who had never joined the NOF, had not worked for it, or had remained loyal all along only to the KKE. Only such Macedonians, he concluded, enjoyed the confidence and trust of the KKE and were appointed and promoted to higher positions. [102]
The KKE could not disband the NOF as it did the SNOF in 1944; it needed a Macedonian organization to hold and to continue to mobilize Macedonians for the struggle. However; it did want to transform the NOF into an obedient, token instrument by replacing its Macedonian national leadership with Macedonians who were first and foremost disciplined and loyal members of the KKE.[103] It took the first major step in that direction during the First Congress of the NOF, which met on January 13, 1948, in Vambel (Moskohori), a picturesque Macedonian village in the vicinity of the Albanian frontier. It was attended by five hundred delegates, including a powerful representation of the KKE and DSE. It celebrated the decisive contribution of the Macedonians, led by the NOF, to the struggle and praised the unbreakable unity and brotherhood of the Greek and Macedonian peoples. Most important, it called on the NOF and the Macedonians to make even greater sacrifices. Although this was not stated, the KKE and DSE could no longer rely on any aid, in material or manpower; from areas under the control of the Athens government. They had become almost totally dependent on the relatively small, mainly Macedonian populated areas they held in central and western Macedonia.[104]
The festive atmosphere, however; was noticeably absent behind the scenes where Ioanidis, the head of the KKE delegation, demanded changes in the leadership of the NOF. In the name of the party he dictated and coerced the Central Council of the NOF to accept new members. They included Stavros Kochopulos, Tashos Goshopulos-Maki, and Mihalis Malios, Macedonian loyalists of the KKE, who until then had refused to join the NOF; indeed, they had worked against it. Furthermore, against strong opposition Ioanidis forced the council to place them on its Executive Committee and to drop from it-for insubordination to the KKE-two veterans of the NOF, Vangel Ajanovski-Oche and Lambro Colakov. Among the top leaders of the NOF only Mitrovski, the highest-ranking member of the party, defended Ioanidis’s interventions.[105] Mitrovski’s stand cannot be adequately explained on the basis of the available evidence, but it did complete a growing estrangement between him and the other top leaders of the NOF headed by Keramitciev. They had long considered him an able and clever person but also an arrogant, vain, opportunistic, ambitious careerist-in short, “a Machiavellian.”[106]
In any event, the divided leadership opened the door to further interventions and manipulations of the NOF by the KKE. Indeed, the KKE used this quarrel as a convenient pretext to impose its will on the organization. The dispute was now taken to the Politbureau of the party and was considered at a meeting in the headquarters of the DSE on February 20-21, 1948, where Mitrovski and Vera Nikolova, the leader of the Macedonian women’s organization (AFZ), hurled criticisms at each other; Nikolova accused the former of being selfish, ambitious, and distrustful of the other veteran leaders and of monopolizing the leadership. Mitrovski denounced Nikolova and his other opponents and accused them of harboring antiparty views and forming an antiparty faction. General Markos and Vasilis Bartziotas, the Political Commissar of the General Headquarters of the DSE, listened, made some sarcastic observations, and proposed a meeting of the NOF cadres to clear up the situation.[107] That meeting, which brought together the entire Executive Committee of the NOF and some other Macedonian cadres and was chaired by Bartziotas, took place on March 27, 1948. Bartziotas listened once again to insults being exchanged by Mitrovski, on the one hand, and his opponents, led by Keramitciev, on the other. Then, like a schoolmaster scolding misbehaving pupils, Bartziotas told them that in order to resolve the leadership problem in the NOF they must all behave like communists. Only the party could judge who was right and who was wrong and the party would do so at the appropriate time. For the time being, he asked each of them to submit to the party (meaning himself) within five days a written statement of their individual views on their party colleagues. ‘The Party must know all the problems. The Party is the greatest judge.” [108] He then called for the formation of a party cell in the leadership of the NOF Mitrovski proposed Kochopulos as its leader, and his opponents proposed Keramitciev. Bartziotas endorsed the former and Kochopulos became the secretary of the party cell.[109] The following month, April 1948, the KKE administered another crippling blow to the veteran leadership of the NOF. it ordered the mobilization of its entire professional corps from top to bottom, with the exception of Mitrovski, Kochopulos, and Keramitciev, who were members of the reorganized secretariat of the Central Council. The explanation offered-that those mobilized were needed in the DSE-was not convincing; by mobilizing the one hundred to one hundred fifty leading NOF activists, the very individuals who had done so much for the mass participation of the Macedonians in the struggle, the KKE could hardly alleviate the complex manpower shortages of the DSE. In any ease, the army did not even utilize their expertise properly, since in most instances they were assigned to inferior and meaningless positions and tasks.[110] However, it did achieve a long-standing aim: the elimination with one stroke of the veteran and, from the KKE’s point of view, nationalist and unreliable, leadership of the NOF[111]
Under attack by the KKE and fearing for the future of the Macedonian liberation movement in Greece, in April 1948 a number of the best-known leaders of the NOF appealed to the Central Committee (CC) of the Yugoslav Communist Party (CPY) for help. Their letter was a strong indictment of the KKE for failing to fulfill the tennis of the unification agreement. They complained that although there were thirteen thousand Macedonians in the DSE, more than onethird of the entire fighting force at the time, the Macedonians were not treated as equals and suffered discrimination everywhere. They had no representatives in the higher organs of the party or the army, the Provisional Democratic Government, the people’s militia, or the administration of the liberated territories, and they had inadequate or merely token representation on the lower levels. Furthermore, although these grievances had been brought repeatedly to the attention of the KKE, nothing was being done and “the chronic disease continues to be tolerated” “We as a political organization actually do not participate in the resolution of these problems; and our proposals and views are not taken into account.” By resorting to the tactic of “divide and rule” by favoring a few Macedonians who all along had opposed the NOF, and by supporting Mitrovski, who, according to them, was motivated solely by his own personal ambitions and was universally distrusted by NOF cadres, the KKE had exacerbated the situation. The net result was a growing demoralization among the Macedonians and a weakening of their unity with the Greek people, which could not but harm the common struggle. In order to reverse the deteriorating situation, they demanded fair and equal treatment for the Macedonians in the democratic movement and its institutions; the termination of the tactics of “divide et impera” and favoritism; and the dismissal of “Comrade Paskal [Mitrovski], [who is] harmful to the whole organization and a stumbling block to the improvement of relations between us and the Greeks.”[112]
It is not known whether or bow the Yugoslavs responded to the letter It seems clear; however; that the CPY, which in the autumn of 1946 pressured the NOF to compromise and conclude the unification accord, was in no position to intervene and help the NOF in the spring of 1948. Its historic dispute with the Communist Party of the Soviet Union had already come into the open. It is possible, as Elisabeth Barker has indicated, that Belgrade’s maximal Macedonian policy sought the unification of the Aegean part of Macedonia with the People’s Republic of Macedonia in Yugoslavia.[113] But there is no evidence to suggest that Tito was at any time ready to risk the stability and security of his regime for the sake of Macedonian unification. In 1948, and particularly after its expulsion from the Cominform on June 28, 1948, isolated and threatened, Tito’s Yugoslavia was preoccupied with its own survival. Macedonian unification was not a priority; the NOF and the Macedonians in Greece were left to their own devices. Although the KKE did not publicly declare its support for the Cominform Resolution immediately, it was clear from the outset that it would side with Stalin.[114] The Macedonian question became an integral part of the Cominform anti-Yugoslav campaign. The CPY’s isolation and expected capitulation provided Zachariadis with a welcome opportunity to free the KKE from Tito’s shadow and tutelage and finally bring the NOF and Macedonian nationalism in Greece under its unquestioned control.
The groundwork was laid by the Politbureau of the KKE, which met on July 10 and supposedly evaluated the work done by the NOF since its First Congress. At the time more than fourteen thousand Macedonians were fighting in the ranks of the DSE and the Macedonian villages were providing most, if not all, the support for the critical battles on Grammos. After listening to a report by Mitrovski, the only representative of the NOF present, the meeting adopted a resolution criticizing the NOF and its leadership and, indirectly, the Macedonian contribution to the struggle.[115] It condemned the leadership of the NOF for allegedly failing to fulfill the tasks set by the First Congress: recruitment, material assistance, transportation, and information for the DSE; popularization of the policies of the DSE and the people’s administration; political, ideological, and organizational mobilization of the masses. It placed the blame for this situation on what it described as the unprincipled, factional, personal struggle for the leadership of the Macedonian people between Keramitciev and Mitrovski, which in turn split the NOF’s leadership into two antagonistic groups.[116] Consequently, the Politbureau called on the Central Council of the NOF to remove “the unreformable factionists” from the leadership and “to lead the NOF along the correct path indicated by the general line of the KKE and the decisions of the First Congress of the NOF.”[117] A month later, on August 8, the resolution was forced on the First Plenum of the Central Council of the NOF. It met in the village Bukovo (Oksia) in the Prespa region and was attended by thirty-two members and five candidates. As was usual by then, it was dominated by the presence of Ioanidis and Porfirogenis, the representatives of the party, who restricted the debate to the resolution of July 10. The tone of the meeting was set by the two main speakers, Mitrovski and Keramitciev. The former defended the KKE and sought to prove that his opponents in the NOF “pursued a nationalist policy … ; their eyes were turned toward Skopje, and not toward Athens.” The latter defended the NOF, accused the KKE of ignoring it, and pointed to the systemic slander and discrimination against its cadres on all levels. The other participants split into three groups: nineteen supported Keramitciev, six assumed a neutral stance, and six sided with Mitrovski. Then it was the turn of the KKE representatives. Without even touching on the issues raised in the discussion, Porfirogenis denounced Keramitciev and his allies. Ioanidis raised the principle of democratic centralism and demanded obedience and party discipline: “those who are turning toward Skopje are traitors; those who look to Athens are the true fighters.” he declared. Then he read the resolution of July 10 and asked pointedly: “Who agrees with the Resolution of the CC of the KKE?” Four agreed, while “the others bowed their heads without uttering a word.”[118] The KKE also chose two new leaders for the NOF: Kochopulos became its chairman and Vangel Kojchev its secretary. No vote was taken and the meeting, which lasted for about eight hours, came to a sudden end.[119] The KKE had triumphed. The NOF was now decapitated and, isolated from the influence of the People’s Republic of Macedonia and Yugoslavia, under the KKE’s total control.
V
However, this turned out to be no more than a Pyrrhic victory. As I already indicated, the Mitrovski-Keramitciev rift was not solely or even primarily “an unprincipled personal struggle.” It symbolized the fundamental and irreconcilable division between the KKE and the NOF on the Macedonian question, which was, at the same time, a struggle for the minds and hearts of the Macedonians. Most veteran NOF leaders had participated in the armed struggle since the very beginning of World War II. Their names were well known in their native regions. They voiced the grievances and aspirations of the villagers and pointed a way out of their collective misery in a free Macedonia. In short, they were native sons, nashi (ours), and were accepted. They had won the trust and confidence of their people, a simple peasant population that was traditionally distrustful of all outsiders, particularly Greeks.[120] They had done more than anyone else to draw the Macedonians away from the embrace of the occupation authorities and to the side of EAM-ELAS and to mobilize, organize, and inspire them for the KKE and the DSE. In fact, they constituted the link-or, to use a Leninist term, the smychka-between the Macedonian peasants and the Greek Left. By removing, isolating, and silencing them, the KKE was in effect cutting off this link and undermining the support it had hitherto enjoyed in the NOF and among the Macedonians in general.[121]
After the First Plenum of the NOF, Mitrovski and other Macedonian loyalists of the party cited virtually the same Macedonian grievances and “incorrect attitudes of the KKE as those repeatedly voiced in the past by the “discredited” NOF veterans in an attempt to draw the attention of the Greek leaders to the disillusionment, declining morale, and mounting desertions and flight into the Macedonian Republic. As Giorgi Petrichevski, an NOF activist in the Edesa region, wrote to Bartziotas: “Distrust is growing among the people and is reflected in the widespread rumor and conviction [that] they [the Greek communists] have deceived us again.” [122] In order to stop and reverse this alarming trend, at a time when the most acute problem faced by the DSE was finding new reserves, Zachariadis decided to take personal charge of the entire Macedonian problem. He initiated a series of moves carefully calculated to placate the Macedonians. In a high-level meeting with ranking Macedonians from the NOF, DSE, and KKE on October 4-5, 1948, he acknowledged that the suspended leaders of the NOF were not solely to blame for its “abnormal” internal situation. He pointed an accusing finger at Stringos and Porfirogenis, who directed the KKE’s Macedonian policy but had “proved incapable in their handling of the Macedonian question.” He even admitted that the leadership of the party bore some of the responsibility: it was harmful that the Macedonians were not represented in the Provisional Democratic Government, the headquarters of the DSE, and the Directorate for National Minorities. He promised to correct these injustices and, indeed, to form Macedonian units in the DSE. In another paradoxical move, Zachariadis dispatched the suspended veteran NOF leaders Dimovski-Goce, Keramitciev, and Ajanovski-Oce to recruit and organize units from among the large Aegean emigration in the People’s Republic of Macedonia; Poplazarov was sent on a similar mission in Albania.[123] Two months later, in December 1948, in a letter published in Dimokratikos Stratos, the organ of the headquarters of the DSE, he ordered the elimination of discriminatory practices against Macedonians in the army. More important still, he indicated that the party’s stand on the Macedonian question would change.[124] The new line-which replaced the slogan calling for “equality of the Macedonian minority within the Greek state” and was approved by the Fifth Plenum of the Central Committee of the KKE on January 30-31, 1949-endorsed the right of the Macedonians to self-determination and statehood.[125] Three days later; the Second Plenum of the NOF, which was observed and addressed personally by Zachariadis, resolved to call a congress of the NOF during March to proclaim officially the new platform on the Macedonian question: it would call for “unification of Macedonia into a single, independent, equal Macedonian state in a people’s democratic federation of Balkan peoples.” It also decided to expand the membership of the secretariat to five by reappointing Mitrovski and adding Pavle Rakovski.[126]
The Second Congress of the NOF, which was totally controlled by the KKE, met on March 25-26, 1949, in the village Levkonas (Popli), in the Prespa region.[127] In an atmosphere that was noticeably less festive than that of the First Congress a year earlier; it declared itself the “organizer of victory” and called for the fighting unity of the Macedonians as well as of the Macedonian and the Greek people, and organizational and ideological unity within the NOF. It condemned all manifestations of nationalism and chauvinism and denounced as traitors both the leaders of the NOF, who rejected the dictates of the KKE, and Tito’s Yugoslavia.[128] Most important, the congress proclaimed the right of the Macedonians to national self-determination-their right to determine their own government and social order.[129]
Immediately after the Congress, the KKE rushed to implement many of the promises that Zachariadis had made since the First Plenum of the NOF in August 1948. On March 27, 1949, 167 Macedonian communists met and in the presence of Zachariadis decided to form the Communist Organization of Aegean Macedonia (Komunisticka organizacija na Egejska Makedonija, or KOEM). It was to become “the organizer and leader of the NOF”; but as “separate and independent party organizational and political unit [it] belonged to the KKE:”[130] The first conference of the KOEM was held on August 2, 1949, the anniversary of the Macedonian Ilinden uprising of 1903, but it did not survive much beyond that: its active existence came to an end shortly thereafter with the final defeat of the DSE in the second half of August 1949. [131] On April 1, the Executive Committee of the NOF chose its new leader; on the initiative of Zachariadis, Mitrovski again became its president. [132] It also decided to reestablish the NOMS as a separate Macedonian youth organization and this was done officially on May 6.[133] Two days later, with the reorganization of the Provisional Democratic Government, Mitrovski was also appointed minister and V. Kojchev, another member of the Executive Committee, was made a member of the reorganized Military Council of the DSE.[134] However, separate Macedonian units and a Macedonian division were not established.
The KKE inaugurated its new course of action on the Macedonian question gradually, after the expulsion of the CPY from the Cominform. Moreover; it was predicated on the clear recognition that Macedonian nationalism in Greece was a force to be reckoned with and to be harnessed. Taken at face value, the new course, especially the right to self-determination and the creation of a united Macedonia, mirrored the ideals and dreams not only of the SNOF and the NOF but also of Macedonian patriots and nationalists since the very birth of Macedonianism in the 1860s. In the context of the time, however, it was obvious that the KKE was motivated by expediency. The Greek Communist Party initiated the new program exclusively for purposes of short-term propaganda and tactical gains and as an integral part of the Cominform campaign against Tito’s Yugoslavia. As Bartziotas explained at the Sixth Plenum of the Central Committe on October 9, 1949, by which time the KKE had no further use for it and was anxious to discard it, “Today the situation has changed and it is necessary for us to reexamine that policy again. Stalin teaches us that the national question should be subordinated to the more general interests of the revolution and [the policy on the national question] should change whenever it is required by wider interests of the party. We must do that now. We have to return to the slogan for national equality which was put forth by the Sixth Congress of the KKE [1935].” [135] The KKE had the following major aims: to deprive Tito and Yugoslavia of the initiative on the Macedonian question, which they had gained and enjoyed since 1943 when they promised the Macedonians equality and the status of a nation in the Yugoslav federation; to turn the Macedonians in all three parts of Macedonia, including the People’s Republic of Macedonia, against Tito and the Yugoslav resolution of the Macedonian question;[136] to discredit the old guard of the NOF, who were pro-Yugoslav and considered the Macedonian Republic as “the Piedmont” of Macedonian unification, and force them back into the fold of the KKE; and, finally, to mobilize even greater numbers of Macedonians for the struggle.[137] In short, the KKE’s new position called on the Macedonians to turn against and, indeed, destroy “the Piedmont” of Macedonian unification in return for a dubious promise of a united Macedonia in an even more uncertain future Balkan communist federation.
As an instrument in the Cominform’s anti-Yugoslav campaign, the KKE’s new course of action failed. Macedonians in Yugoslavia did not rise against Tito, and Yugoslavia survived the propaganda onslaught and all other pressure tactics engineered by Moscow. On the basis of the available evidence, which is far from complete, it would seem that it also failed to appease the Aegean Macedonians. It did not induce the old guard of the NOF, many of whom were in Yugoslav Macedonia, to return, nor did it convince Aegean refugees and deserters there to volunteer for service in the DSE.[138] At home the KKE’s new Macedonian policy undoubtedly had a disturbing effect on the morale of the Greeks in the rebel army without enhancing that of the Macedonians. It only served to create new divisions and to heighten the already-existing demoralization and confusion. While passing through Skopje in April 1949, Rakovski and Nikolova had a late-night meeting with some of their former comrades in the leadership of the NOF. Rakovski told them, “The situation down there [in Greecej is not good; relations between the NOF cadres and the Greeks as well as between the old and the new cadres of the NOF are not good." At the same gathering Nikolova confided to Ajanovski-Oce that everyone was frightened that "the KKE has again embarked on its policy of dividing the cadres of the NOF She said that there were three factions in the NOF-one adhering to Paskal [Mitrovski], one to Rakovski, and one to Kojchev-and that the KKE is again preparing something against the NOF”[139] Nonetheless, the Macedonians, who comprised well over half of the fighting strength of the DSE in mid-1949, fought to the end. But it seems that they really had no other option; the final battles on Mounts Vich and Grammos represented a fight for survival.[140] Desertion and flight into Yugoslav Macedonia was by then very risky and difficult; the DSE had sealed this only possible escape route long before Tito closed it from the other side. They were condemned to make a last stand in a doomed struggle.
There is no doubt that the Macedonians led by the NOF played an important role in the civil strife in Greece. Any serious attempt to understand that struggle, and especially the fortunes of the Left, both its early successes and its final defeat, cannot ignore them or their irreconcilable differences with the KKE. This is not to suggest that there were no other major factors. There were, for example, the failure of the communists to win wider support, especially in the urban centers; the Truman Doctrine; and the American intervention. However, the Macedonian question was of critical importance throughout. Without the KKE-NOF unification accord in November 1946, the KKE would hardly have been in a position to resort to an armed struggle. In addition, the irreconcilable differences with the national and pro-Yugoslav leadership of the NOF pushed the KKE in 1948 into Stalin’s embrace against Tito, its sole major patron. Zachariadis turned the Macedonian question into an instrument of the Commform’s anti-Yugoslav campaign because he was convinced, as was Stalin, that Tito would be toppled from power. And with Yugoslavia humbled and under Soviet control, he would enjoy a free hand to deal with the NOF and the Macedonians in Greece. It is difficult otherwise to explain the KKE’s new anti-Yugoslav course on the Macedonian question and its suddenly bold and, indeed, aggressive behavior toward the CPY after Yugoslavia’s condemnation and expulsion from the Cominform. The new course amounted to no more than token and meaningless immediate concessions and a promise of an illusory and anti-Yugoslav long-term solution of the Macedonian question. It did very little to bridge the long-standing deep gulf of suspicion, distrust, and conflicting aims that divided the incompatible allies, Greek communists and Macedonian nationalists.[141] In any event, Tito was not overthrown and the KKE’s new course backfired; by the time it was officially approved, in early spring 1949, the incompatible allies were for all practical purposes already defeated.[142]

NOTES
1. Public Record Office (London), CAB 87/79, XC/AI 61791. Broad (Caserta) to Cab-inet, October 15, 1945, Secret Intelligence Service (SIS), Salonica Bureau. “The Mace-donian Autonomy Movement in North-West Greece: Its Setting and Recent Historv.” p. 49. (All British documents cited are found in the Public Record Office [hereafter P.R.O.].) This long report (101 pages) contains some factual inaccuracies, but considering the time and the circumstances in which it was written it provides a most valuable and perceptive assessment of the Macedonian question in Greece. By KKM the authors of the report actually meant the NOF (the Macedonian National Liberation Front).
2. “Their [Slav-Macedonians'] relations with KKE are by no means clear: The bulk of them were interested primarily in autonomism rather than communism as such. Although they always tended to assume that the nationalist state [greater Macedonia] would also be communist, this did not necessarily reconcile the respective policies of the Slav-Macedonians and the KKE. KKE was still suspected by many Slav-Macedonians of having Greek nationalist leanings. Ibid., p.25. See also Stojan Kiselinovski, Egejskiot del na Makedonija, 1913-1939 (Skopje, 1990), pp.135-36.
3. Naum Pejov, Makedoncite i gragjanskata vojna vo Grcija (Skopje, 1968), p.167.
4. Ibid., p. 170 and n. 7, pp.205-6; and Komisija za publikuvanje na arhivska gragja, Egejska Makedonija vo NOB: Dokumenti za uchestvoto no Makedonskiot narod od egejskiot del no Makedonija vo gragjanskata vojna vo Grcija (1944-49), 6 vols. (Skopje, 1971-83), 5, no. 108, p.200. (Hereafter cited as EM.) These volumes constitute the most valuable source on the participation of the Macedonians in the Civil War. They contain important documents from the archives of both the KKE and NOF.
5. Risto Kirjazovski, Narodnoosloboditelniot front i drugite organizacii na Makedoncite od Egejska Makedonija, 1945-1949 (Skopje, 1985), p.176.
6. Risto Kirjazovski, ed., KPG i makedonskoto nacionamo prashanje, 1918-1974 (Skopje, 1982), no.188, p.431. (Hereafter cited as KPG.) A valuable collection of KKE documents on the Macedonian question; some were published previously in EM.
7. C. M. Woodhouse, The Struggle for Greece, 1941-1949 (London, 1976), p.262.
8. EM, 4, no.105, p.358.
9. KPG, no.181, p.418.
10. Ibid., no. 188, p. 433.
11. Ibid., no.197, pp.445-46; also in EM, 6, no.63, p.129.
12. Elisabeth Barker’s brief chapter in a short survey of the Macedonian question since the 1890s, which appeared in the immediate aftermath of the conflict, still remains the only attempt to explain their role in the struggle (Elisabeth Barker, Macedonia: Its Place in Balkan Power Politics [1950; reprint, Westport, Conn., l980], pp.109-29). More recent writers refer to Barker but lack her desire to understand the essence of the Macedonians’ involvement. Evangelos Kofos, in a frequently cited work that was published in English in Greece, presents an extreme Greek nationalist point of view. He cannot bring himself to call them what they called themselves, Macedonians, or even Slav Macedonians, as some Greek writers have called them. He denies the existence of a separate Macedonian consciousness and identity and refers to them as Slavophones, Slav-speaking Greeks, or “Slav Macedonians,” while he calls the Macedonians across the border to the north Yugoslav and Bulgarian Macedonians, respectively. He dismisses the Macedonians who sided with the communists as “an alien conscious minority”; for him the NOF was “an essentially Yugoslav inspired organization,” a blind or mindless instrument not only of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia (CPY) but also of the KKE and, at times, of the Communist Party of Bulgaria (Evangelos Kofos, Nationalism and Communism in Macedonia [Thessaloniki, 1964]). The works by Dominique Eudes, The Kapetanios: Partisans and Civil War in Greece, 1943-1949 (New York, 1972); Edgar O’Ballance, The Greek Civil War 1944-1949 (London, 1966); Woodhouse; Peter 3. Stavrakis, Moscow and Greek Communism, 1944-1949 (Ithaca, N.Y., and London, 1989); and Haris Vlavianos, Greece, 1941-1949: From Resistance to Civil War: The Strategy of the Greek Communist Party (London, 1992) on the whole conveniently avoid the subject. They touch briefly and in a rather speculative manner on the international aspects of the Macedonian problem-or, more precisely, on the Macedonian question as a factor in the relations among the communist parties in the Balkans. Elisabeth Barker, John O. Iatrides, arid Joze Pirjevec mention the Macedonians and NOF in passing in their contributions in Lars Baerentzen, John O. Iatrides, and Ole L. Smith, eds., Studies in the History of the Greek Civil War 1945-1949 (Copenhagen, 1987). Otherwise this work, as well as two other collections, John O. Iatrides, ed., Greece in the 1940s: A Nation in Crisis (Hanover, N.H., 1981); and Marion Sarafis, ed., Greece: From Resistance to Civil War (Nottingham, 1980), ignore the Macedonians and the NOF altogether.
13. See Andrew Rossos, “The Macedonians of Aegean Macedonia: A British Officer’s Report, 1944;” Slavonic and East European Review (London) 69, no.2 (April 1991):286, “The British Foreign Office and Macedonian National Identity, 1918-1941;” Slavic Review (U.S.A.) 53, no.2 (Summer 1994): 376, and ‘Macedoniasm and Macedonian Nationalism on the Left,” in National Character and National Ideology in Interwar Eastern Europe, ed. Ivo Banac and Katherine Verdery (New Haven, Conn., 1995), pp. 238-39.
14. On the KKE and its attitudes to the Macedonian national question during the interwar years, see the documents in KPG, esp. nos. 3-6, pp.8-24, and nos. 54-56, pp. 159-67. See also Stojan Kiselinovski, KPG i makedonskoto nacionalno prashanje, 1918-1940 (Skopje, 1985); Eleltherios Stavridis, Ta Paraskinia tou KKE: apo tis Idriseos tou mehri tou Simmoritopolemou (Athens, 1953); Kofos, chap. 4, pp.66-94; Dimitrios G. Kousoulas, Revolution and Defeat: The Story of the Communist Party of Greece (London, 1965), pp.54-73, 90-97
15. Josif Popovski, ed., Makedonskoto prasanje na stranicite ad “Rizospostis” megju dvete vojni (Skopje, 1982), pp.5-11; Rossos, “The Macedonians of Aegean Macedonia,” pp.286-87.
16. See John C. Loulis, The Greek Communist Party, 1940-1944: Politics, Tactics, Organization (London. 1982); Vlavianos; William H. McNeill, The Greek Dilemma: War and Aftermath (Philadelphia, 1947). For the literature in the Greek language, which is extensive, see the bibliographies in Loulis and Vlavianos.
17. Kirjazovski, Narodnoosloboditelniot front (n. 5 above), pp.53-54.
18. KPG (n. 6 above), nos. 57 and 58, pp.167-68.
19. According to official KKE information six thousand Macedonians served in the regular ELAS units and twenty thousand in its reserves. Ibid., n. 310, p.328; EM (n. 4 above), 3, no.53, p.123.
20. The activities of the Axis-supported bands in Aegean Macedonia during the Second World War have not been adequately investigated. However, see the “Report on the Free Macedonia Movement in Area Florina, 1944,” by Captain P. H. Evans, an agent and station commander of the Special Operations Executive in western Aegean Macedonia in 1943-44, in Rossos, “The Macedonians of Aegean Macedonia” (Evans’s report is given verbatim on pp.291-309). See also McNeill; Hristo Andonovski, Makedoncite pod Grcija vo borbata protiv fashizmot (Skopje, 1968), pp.91-Ill, 175-77; Vangel Ajanovski-Oce, Egejski buri (Skopje, 1975), pp.102-7, 122-28; Kofos, pp. 100-110.
21. EM, 2, no. 182, p.345. “As far as the Greek people is concerned, the Slav-Macedonian is disinclined to believe that this overlord race could ever be his friend. Even if friendly overtures were made he would regard them suspiciously, to see what lay behind. He sees himself being gradually edged out of his remaining possessions, and he resents it” (P.R.O., CAB 87/79, XC/AI 61791, p.49).
22. Rossos, “The Macedonians of Aegean Macedonia,” p.299.
23. Ibid., p.302; EM, 2, no.182, pp.344-45. See also P.R.O., CAB 87/79, XC/AI 61791, pp.28-31, 34.
24. On the influence of the Macedonian national liberation movement in Yugoslavia on the Macedonians in Greece, see EM, 1, no. 112, pp.126-27, Macedonian Bureau of the KKE (Kondurelis) to Uzunovski, May24, 1944, and no.118, pp. 135-39, Hara-lambidis-Athanatos to Macedonian Bureau of the KKE, June 2, 1944; KPG, no. 73, pp. 199-200, Andonopoulos to Macedonian Bureau of the KKE, May 30, 1944. See also National Archives (Washington, D.C.), RG 59, Dec. File 1945-49, Box 812, no. 868.00/4-1249, Cannon (Belgrade) to Secretary of State, April 12, 1949, App. A, pp. 19-20,23, App. B, pp.3-5, 11-13, 16-17 (all State Department documents cited here-after are found in the National Archives); and McNeill, pp. 217-21.
25. Rossos, “The Macedonians of Aegean Macedonia” (n. 13 above), p.305.
26. On the aims of Macedonian nationalism during the Second World War, see the informative and illuminating discussions by Kiril Miljovski, “Motivite na revolucijata 1941-1944 godina vo Makedonija,” Istorija (Skopje) 10, no.1 (1974): 19 ff.; and by Cvetko Uzunovski, “Vostanieto vo Makedonija,” Istorija 10, no.2 (1974): 103 ff. On Aegean Macedonia, see also Andonovski.
27. For the conclusions and decisions of the meeting, see KPG, no.60, pp.171-72, and no.62, pp. t75~76. See also Svetozar Vukinanovic’ [Tempo], The Struggle for the Balkans (London, 1990), pp.67-74.
28. See, e.g., the circular of the Macedonian Bureau of the KKE in KPG (n. 6 above), no.68, pp.18789, May 23, 1944.
29. Kiselinovski, Egejskiot del na Makedonia (n. 2 above), pp.129-33; Kirjazovski, Narodnoosloboditelniot front (n. 5 above), p.53. See also P.R.O., CAB 87/79, XC/AI 61791, pp.55-56; and National Archives, RG 59, Dec, File 1945-49, Box 6804, 868.00/3-ll49, Office Memorandum, March 11, 1949.
30. EM (n. 4 above), 2, no.182, pp.345-46, Lazarevski to Central Leadership (CL) of NOF, November 6, 1945; 6, no.152, pp.312-13, Keramitciev and Dimovski-Goce to Central Committee (CC) of the KKE, June 2, 1949. On the “Lazo Trpovski” unit, see also Andonovski (n. 20 above), pp.85-86. On SNOF-SNOV, see Andonovski, chap. 5; Rossos, “The Macedonians of Aegean Macedonia,” pp.305-7, and n. 54, pp.306-7; Barker, Macedonia (n. 12 above), pp.109-12, 116, and British Policy in South-East Europe in the Second World War (London, 1976), pp.195-203; Kirjazovski, Narodnoosloboditelniot front, pp.57-58, and Makedonski nacionalni institucii va egejskiot del na Makedonija (1941-1961) (Skopje, 1987), pp.21-33, 67-85; and P.R.O., CAB 87)79, XC/Al 61791, p.17. In actual fact two organizations were formed, the SNOF in the region of Kastoria (Kostur) in October 1943 and the SOF in Florina (Lerin) in November. The aim was to establish one organization, an SNOF for the entire Macedonian population in Aegean Macedonia, with its own central leadership. A general conference was to decide its program, tactical questions, aims, and relations with EAM-ELAS. The KKE rejected these demands. See Kirjazovski, Narodnoosloboditelniot front, p.58.
31. As Naum Pejov wrote to Giorgis Gianulis, commander of an ELAS unit on Vich (Vitsi): “we are struggling for people’s power and the right of nations to self-determination” EM, 1, no.166, p. 133, May 31, 1944.
32. Ibid., no.8, p.18, January 24, 1944; also in vol.2, no.6, pp. 15-22, March 12, 1945. See also vol.1, no.3, pp.7-8, and no.6, pp.10-11.
33. Ibid., vol.2, no.6, p.19, Damovski to Politbureau (PB) of the KKE, March 12, 1945; vol.6, no.152, pp. 312-13, Dimovski-Goce and Keramitciev to CC of the KKE, June 2, 1949. See also National Archives, RG 59, Dec. File 1945-49, Box 4003, no. 760H.68/12-1845, MacVeagh (Athens) to Secretary of State, December 18, 1945, Enclosure 1; and PRO., CAB 87/79, XC/AI 61791, pp. 32-34.
34. EM, 1, no.68, pp.227-29, Headquarters of Kostur-Lerin Battalion to CC of EAM and Headquarters of ELAS, October 1944, and no.182, p.250. See also Rossos, “The Macedonians of Aegean Macedonia,” pp.395-97; Andonovski, pp.156-64.
35. EM, 1, no.113, p.129, Pejov to Georgievski-Dejan, May 26,1944; and vol.6, no. 152, p.312, Dimovski-Goce and Keramit6iev, June 2, 1949.
36. Ibid., 2, no. 182, p.346, Lazarevski to CL of NOF November 6, 1945.
37. On the enthusiastic response of the Macedonians, see KPG, no, 88, pp.223-24; no.89, p.225; and no.93, p.233.
38. EM, 1, no.150, p. 196, Command of Battalion “Goce” to Headquarters of National Liberation Army of Macedonia, September 19, 1944; see also no.151, pp.198-99; and no.190, pp.270-71; Andonovski, pp.177-82; P.R.O., CAB 87/79, XC/AI 61791, pp.34-37.
39. EM, 2, no.6, p.20, Damovski to PB of the KKE, March 12, 1945.
40. KPG (a. 6 above), no.105, pp.248-SO, Zonatos to Dimovski-Goce, October 6, 1944, and n. 66; and no.108, p.254, Kondurelis to Stringos, October 8, 1944. See also nos. 116 and 117, pp.268-69; Andonovski (n. 20 above), pp.190-202; National Archives, RU 59, Dec. File 1945-49, Box 4003, no. 76011.68/12-1 845, MacVeagh (Athens) to Secretary of State, December 18, 1945, Enclosure 1, pp.2-3; PR.O., CAB 87/ 79, XC/AI 61791, pp. 34-42; and PRO., P0 371/43649, Leeper (Athens) to Foreign Office, December 11, 194.
41. M. Keramitciev, I. Dimovski-Goce, P. Mitrovskl, V. Ajanovski-Oce, L. Poplazarov, P Rakovski, D. Urdov, etc.
42. KPG, no. 141, p. 32t, December 3, 1944.
43. See EM (n. 4 above), 1, no.172, p. 234, and 2, no.6, p.20; and KPG, no. 108, p. 254
44. EM, 1, no.168, pp. 225-27, and 2, no.6, pp.l5-22. See also the indictment of the KKE and FAM-ELAS policies on the Macedonian question by Renos Mihaleas, a political commissar in ELAS: EM, 1, no.182, pp. 246-55, no. 191, pp. 27 1-79, and 2, no. 5, pp. 11-15. According to the 515, ELAS wanted to disband the Macedonian battalions because “with the German withdrawal from Greece in full swing the object for which the Slav-Macedonian units were formed had been achieved. As ‘anti-fascists’ became Greeks once more there came the realization that henceforth armed Slav-Macedonian units would be more trouble than they were worth” (PR.O., CAB 87/79, XC/AI 61791, p. 41).
45. EM, 1, no.168, pp. 229-30, October 1944.
46. See Pejov (n. 3 above), pp.18-19, 22-23; Andonovski, pp. 210-1 5; Ajanovski-Oce (n. 20 above), pp.146-55; and Svetozar Vukmanovic’-Tempo, How and Why the People’s Liberation Struggle of Greece Met with Defeat (1950; reprint, London, 1985); Kirjazovski, Narodnoosloboditelniot front (a. 5 above), pp.67-74.
47. EM, 1, no.168, pp.230-31, Command of the Kostur-Lerin Battalion to CC of EAM and Headquarters of ELAS, October 1944.
48. Kirjazovski, Makedonski nacionalni institucii (n. 30 above), pp.88-90; Barker, Macedonia (n. 12 above), n. 5, pp.110-1l.
49. Kirjazovski, Makedonski nacionalni institucii, pp.85-86; Rossos, “The Macedonians of Aegean Macedonia” (n. 13 above), p.304 and n. 50.
50. Pejov, p. 110.
51. It issued a declaration on November 4, 1944; EM, 1, no.187, p.266.
52. It issued a declaration on November 12, 1944; ibid., no.189, p.269. The identities of the two bodies are not entirely clear here.
53. Its members were G. Atanasov, M. Keramitchiev, P Mttrovski, T. Nikolov, N. Pejov, L. Poplazarov, C. Turundzov, P Rakovski, D. Urdov, N.Supurkov, Pejov, n. 4, p.204; Kirjazovski, Narodnooslobodirelniot front. p. 103. See also PR.O., P0 371/48181, Maclean (Belgrade) to Sargent, February 1,1945; and PRO., P0371148184, Stevenson (Belgrade) to Bevin, August 14, 1945, Enclosure, App. B2.
54. EM (n. 4 above), 1, no.187, p.266; italics in the original.
55. Ibid., no.189, p.269; italics in the original.
56. Pejov (n. 3 above), p.132; Kirjazovski, Narodnoosloboditelniot front (n.5 above), pp.103-4; Ajanovski-Oche (n. 20 above), pp.155-67.
57. They also chose its Central Leadership (Glavno Rakovodstvo), which included Paskal Mitrovski, Secretary, and Mihailo Keramitciev, Dzodzo Urdov, Atanas Koro-vesov, Pavle Rakovski, and Minco Fotev, and formed under its direction two affiliated bodies, the Anti-Fascist Women’s Front, Anti-Fashisticki Front na Zenite (AFZ), and the National Liberation Youth Union, Narodno Osloboditelen Mladinski Sojuz (NOMS). Pejov, p.132; Kirjazovski, Makedonski nacionalni institucii pp.101-62, and Narodnoosloboditelniot front, pp.106 if.; see also Barker, Macedonia, pp. 118 ff.; Kofos (n. 12 above), pp. 170 ff.
58. EM, 5, no.9, p.19, Keramitciev, Report to the First Congress of NOF, January 13, 1948; Pejov; p. 132.
59. Ajanovski-Oche, pp. 167-79; Kirjazovski, Narodnoosloboditelniot front, pp. 109-16; Pejov, pp.134-40.
60. In his speech to the first plenary meeting (Aktiv) of NOE on May 20, 1947, Keramitciev reported a membership of 6,331 in NOF, 5,509 in NOMS, and 4,509 in AFZ; that there were 220 organized villages; and that NOF “has influence and enjoys authority among 85% of the Macedonians.” EM, 4, no.30, pp.162, 170. Already in December 1944 Captain Evans wrote that ‘if a plebiscite were freely and fairly held, it is more likely than not that a free MACEDONIA would result.” P.R.O., FO371143649, in Rossos, “The Macedonians of Aegean Macedonia” (n. 13 above), p.308.
61.EM, 2, no.25, p.55.
62. Ibid., no.151, p.306; also in KPG (n. 6 above), no.147, p.331.
63. EM, 2, no.60, pp. 110-11; italics in the original.
64. Ibid., 3, no.1, p.3; see also 2, no.191, p.362. As the SIS report pointed out, “For the Slav-Macedonian in Greece the outlook does not appear bright. Meanwhile external propaganda paints him a rosy picture of life in an Autonomous Macedonia…. In his ill-informed state and resentful and bitter mood small wonder if the Slav-Macedonian is inclined to look north for his salvation.” P.R.O., CAB 87/79, XC/AI 61791, p.50.
65. EM (n. 4 above) 6, no.152, p.313, Keramitciev and Dimovski-Goce to CC of the KKE, June 2, 1949. In a letter to the local organizations in the Edesa region, Ajanovski-Oce, the regional secretary; wrote on November 18, 1945: “We will demand something more than equality. We will seek self-determination . . . ; we will develop the idea for our national unification” EM, 2, no.191, p.362.
66. Ibid., vol.3, no.53, p.126. Another lead article on March 15,1946, rejected the accusations of “autonomism” leveled at the NOF by both the Greek Right and the Left. However, it defended the right of the Macedonians to national unification: “The Macedonian people in Aegean Macedonia with full justice seek to unite with their mother-land (matica), with their Piedmont, Vardar Macedonia. We won that right with arms in hand. We fought together with the Greek people in the ranks of ELAS against the despised occupier and thus we also fought for our national freedom” (no.80, p.190).
67. See Pejov (n. 3 above), pp.111-30; Kirjazovski, Narodnoosloboditelniot front (n. 5 above), pp.77-93; McNeill (n. 16 above), pp. 158-81,219-21; Heinz Richter, British intervention in Greece: From Varkiza to Civil War; February 1945 to August 1946 (London, 1985), p.151.
68. See the works cited in n. 67. However, see esp. the report of Keramitciev presented to the First Aktiv of NOF on May 20, 1947, giving detailed data and statistical evidence for the period from February 1945 to May 1947. EM, 4, no.30, pp.153-57; on the situation in the various regions see 2, nos. 13-19, 24, 31, 33, 36-37, 40, 44, and 53; on the Edesa region, between April 1945 and August 1947, see vol.4, no.61, pp. 250~51. See also National Archives, RG 59, Dec. File 1945-49, Box 6784, no.868.00/11-746, Vidnay (Salonica) to Secretary of State, November 7, 1946; P.R.O., CAB 87/79, XC/AI 61791, pp. 20-21,49-50; and PRO., FO371148184.
69. KPG, no.150, p.341.
70. By November 1946 when the KKE-NOF unification agreement was concluded there were 1,200 Macedonian partisans. EM, 6, no. 152, p.314, Keramitciev and Dimovski-Goce to CC of the KKE, June 2, 1949; see also Pejov, pp.135-39; Kirjazovski, Narodnoosloboditelniot front, pp.134-44.
71. EM, 2, no.69, pp.121-23, Keramitciev, Report to Central Leadership (CL) of NOF, July 2, 1945; Pejov; pp.133, 141-43, 146. Atanas Mitrovski, an NOF activist in the Kastoria area, wrote in September 1945: “This is unbelievable: two parties that share the same aims to develop such hatred as some members of the KKE exhibit to-ward members of the NOF” (EM, 2, no.161, p.311).
72. EM, 2, no. 116, pp.222-23 Tanas Korovesov to CL of NOF, August 7, 1945; see also nos. 150 and 153, pp.291 and 298-300.
73. KPG (n. 6 above), no 146, pp.328-29, Proclamation of the Voden Committee of the KKE, August 9, 1945. On September 7, the regional representation of the NOF in Edesa reported: “The KKE and EAM are aiding the reaction by their open struggle and denunciations against our organization NOF declaring that the organization NOF is komitaji (komitska), Bulgarofascist (Bugarofasistska)-kontracetnik (kontacetnicka).” EM, 2, no.143, pp.269-70. See also National Archives, RG 59, Dec. File 1945-49, Box 4003, no. 760H.68/12-1845, MacVeagh (Athens) to the Secretary of State, December 18,1945, Enclosure 1.
74. EM, 2, no.91, p.172.
75. KPG, no.144, p.325.
76. EM (n. 4 above), no. 116, p.222; also, no.115, p.215.
77. KPG, no.144, p.325, Proclamation of the Voden Committee of the KKE, June 28, 1945.
78. EM, 2, no.116, pp.222-23, Korovesov to CL of NOF, August 7, 1945. As the SIS report pointed out, ‘At the moment then, the Slav-Macedonians see themselves back again under pre-war conditions. Even the one political improvement from their point of view, the strengthened position of KKE, has failed them” (P.R.O., CAB 87/79, XC/AI 61791, p.49).
79. EM, 2, no.234, pp.452-53; also in KPG, no.149, pp.336-39.
80. KPG, no. 151, p.347. On NOF’s reaction to KKE’s changing attitude see EM, 3, no.29, p.68, Political Report of Central Leadership (CL), January 23, 1946; and no. 77, pp.180-81, Report of CL, March 7,1946.
81. Kirjazovski, Narodnoosloboditelniot front (n. 5 above), p.152. On the Second Plenum see also Vasilis Bartziotas, O Agonas tou Dimokratiku Stratu Elladas (Athens, 1982), pp.27-30; Ole L. Smith, “The Problems of the Second Plenum of the Central Committee of the KKE, 1946;” Journal of the Hellenic Diaspora 12 (Summer 1985): 43-62; Richter (n. 67 above), pp.482-95.
82. Kirjazovski, Narodnoosloboditelniot front, p.156; see also Stavrakis (n. 12 above), p. 109 and n. 167.
83. EM, 3, no.171, pp.380-83, Mitrovski, Report, September 13, 1946.
84. Ibid., pp.378-83; and KPG (n. 6 above), no.168, pp.397-400, Kentros to Saperas, October 14, 1946. See also EM, 3, no.162, pp.361-63; no.164, p.366; no.168, p.373.
85. KPG, no.168, p.400.
86. EM (n. 4 above), 3, no.171, p.381. Indeed, in order to silence the NOF once and for all, Kentros proposed to remove its best-known leaders, “to place them under our control so that we can contain them; otherwise we will always face the same situation.” KPG, no.168, p.399
87. EM, 3, no.180, p.398, Keramitciev, Report to CL of NOF September27, 1946.
88. Pejov (n. 3 above), p.148; Kiselinovski, Egejskiot del na Makedonija (n. 2 above), p.136 and n. 345; Kirjazovski, Narodnoosloboduelniot front, p.164. For an incomplete and not entirely clear account of the Markos-Mitrovski talks, see Mitrovski’s report, EM, 4, no.28, pp.132-40, April 19, 1947.
89. I have not been able to gain access to a complete version or text of the accord. For extensive but at times differing summaries of the provisions of the accord, see EM, 6, no.152, pp.313-14, and n. 135, Keramitciev and Dimovski-Goce to CC of the KKE, June 2, 1949; Kirjazovski, Narodnooslobodielniot front, pp. 165-66; Kiselinovski, Egejskiot del na Makedonija, p.136, n. 345.
90. See the works cited in n. 88.
91. EM, 4, no.28, p.137, Mitrovski, Report, April 19, 1947.
92. Ibid., p.136. See also Pejov, pp. 147-50; Kirjazovski, Narodnoosloboditelniot front (n. 5 above), pp.166-68.
93. On the basis of the available evidence it is not possible to determine what promises, if any, Tito made to each side. It is conceivable, however, that he made none; thus, in a typically “Titoist” fashion, he preserved his freedom to decide his moves in the appropriate time in the future.
94. See, e.g., EM. 3, no.189, pp.418-20; no.195, pp.430-32; no.200, p.443; and vol.4, no.6, pp.32-34; no.29, p.144; and KPG (n. 6 above), no.171, pp.403-4, no. 177, p. 414.
95. KPG, no.178, pp.414-15, May 30, 1947; see also no.172, p.405; and no.174, p.409.
96. EM (n. 4 above), 4, no.28, pp.136-40, Mitrovski, Report, April 19,1947.
97. Ibid., no.95, p.329, Poplazarov, Report, October 15, 1947.
98. Ibid., no.51, p.223, Samardanov, Report, July 30, 1947.
99. Ibid., no.105, p.355, Keramitciev, Report, October31, 1947.
100. Ibid., pp.356-57
101. Ibid., p.358
102. Ibid., pp.349, 359
103. Pejov (n.3 above), p.156
104. Kirjazovski, Narodnoosloboditelniot front (n. 5 above), pp.209-10.
105. EM, 5, no.111, pp.205-6, Vangel Kojchev, Report, May 1, 1948.
106. For a characterization of Mitrovski, see ibid., vol.3, no.139, pp.313-19, Rakovski, Report, June21, 1946; see also vol, 2, no.182, pp. 345-47, Lazarevski to Central Leadership of NOF, November 6,1945. It is not clear whether Mitrovski sided with the KKE because he belatedly embraced its line on the Macedonian question or because he wanted to enhance his political standing. Mitrovski, an attorney by profession, was among the best educated of the NOF leaders. Like the others, he became active in the KKE before World War II, but unlike most of them, he did not join the resistance movement until June 1943. He played a rather ambivalent role in the SNOF and was not one of the most trusted NOF leaders in Skopje or Belgrade. See ibid., pp.345-47. All of the above weakened his position within the NOF and probably made him more dependent on the KKE.
107. EM (n. 4 above), 5, no.70, pp.125-28, Nikolova, Report, March 2, 1948.
108. Ibid., no.91, pp.161-62, Nikolova, Report, March 28, 1948.
109. Ibid., p.163. See also no.133, p.229, Mitrovski to Politbureau (PB) of the KKE, May 10,1948.
110. On the mobilization and the controversies that it provoked within the leadership of the NOF, see ibid., no.94, pp.171-75; no.97, pp.182-83; no.100, pp.187-88; see also no.118, pp.213-14, Keramitciev, Report, May 4, 1948; and no.119, pp.217-18, Nikolova, Report, May 8, 1948.
111. See documents cited in n. 110; see also no.114, p.209, Nikolova, Report, May 1, 1948; and no.122, p.230, Mitrovski to PB of the KKE, May 10, 1948.
112. The letter was signed by Keramitciev, Nikolova, Rakovski, Ajanovski-Oce, and Dimovski-Goce. In a note they explained that “it would have been signed by almost all cadres of the NOF”; that was not done because “this matter is extremely delicate” (ibid., no. 108, pp. 199-203, April1948).
113. Elisabeth Barker, “The Yugoslavs and the Greek Civil War of l946-l949″ in Baerentzen, Iatrides, and Smith, eds. (n. 12 above), p.302.
114. See, e.g., the report of Giorgi Manchov: EM, 5, no.146, pp.272-73, July 15, 1948. The Fourth Plenum of the Central Committee (CC) of the KKE convened on July 28; “the plenum decided to support the Cominform Resolution but not to circulate this decision publicly for fear of straining relations with the Yugoslavs” (Stavrakis [n. 12 above], p.173).
115. The Fourth Plenum of the Central Committee, which met at the end of the month (July 28-29), seems to have attempted to appease the Macedonians. It stressed “the extraordinary contribution of the Slav Macedonian people for the common cause of liberation. The participation of the Slav Macedonians in the liberation struggle is nation-wide and total” (EM, 5, no.155, p.288, Plenum Resolution, July 29, 1948).
116. As I already pointed out, there was much more to the Keramitciev-Mitrovski struggle than “unprincipled” and “personal” rivalry. It centered on two fundamental issues: (1) whether the KKE fulfilled the terms of the unification agreement with the NOF (see Mitrovski’s reports in ibid., no.121, pp.224-26; no.122, pp.228-34; no.131, pp.244-47); and (2) whether the final aim of the Macedonian liberation movement should be “full equality within the Greek state” (KKE); or “the right to self-determination” leading to Macedonian unification (most of the founders of SNOF-NOF). See Kirjazovski, Narodnoosloboditelniot front (n. 5 above), p.223. For obvious reasons, the second issue, an extremely sensitive one, was not discussed openly by either side.
117. EM (n. 4 above), no.144, pp.266-68, Resolution of the PB of the KKE, July 10, 1948; also in KPG (n. 6 above), no.168, pp.425-26.
118. Almost a year later Keramitciev and Dimovski-Goce explained their conduct in a letter to the Central Committee (CC) of the KKE. They argued that they did not oppose the resolution actively solely because it was forced on the NOF “in the most critical moments for the DSE, during the battles on Grammos; any opposition would have had as its consequence not only the break up [of the unity] of the NOF, the Macedonian people, and the Macedonian partisans; it also would have destroyed the DSE’s defense of Grammos and that would have made it impossible to transform Vich into a second front; thus the monarchofascists would have captured it” (EM, 6, no.152, p.322, June 2, 1949).
119. Ibid., vol.5, no.166, pp. 305-11, Dimovski-Goce and Ajanovski-Oce, Report on the First Plenum, August 10, 1948. For the Resolution of the First Plenum see no.164, pp.302-4, August 8, 1948. See also Pejov (n. 3 above), pp.159-60.
120. “Nevertheless, this background of the Slav-Macedonian mind must be held constantly in view - that fundamentally he will always feel himself a part of the national entity, however nebulous it may be, that he calls ‘Macedonia” (P.R.O., CAB 87/79, XC/ Al 61791, p.57).
121. See, e.g., the report by Ajanovski-Oce, EM, 5, no.178, pp.327-34, September 25, 1948.
122. Ibid., no.201, p.376, December 16, 1948; see also no.185, pp.345-47, Mitrovski to Zachariadis, November 3, 1948; and no.196, pp.365-70, Velaki to Bartziotas, November26, 1948.
123. Ibid., vol.6, no.152, pp.321-24, Keramitciev and Dimovski-Goce to CC of the KKE, June 2, 1949. See also Kirjazovski, Narodnoosloboditelniot front, pp.253-57.
124. KPG no.189, pp.435-36, and n. 423, p.435.
125. EM, 6, no, 15, pp.44-45, Resolution of the Fifth Plenum, January 31,1949; also in KPG, no.191, p.438. The Fifth Plenum of the Central Committee of the KKE bad also resolved to appoint a Macedonian minister in the Provisional Democratic Government and a representative in the Military Council of the DSE; to establish a separate party organization of the Macedonians in Greece; and to form Macedonian units and a division in the DSE. Armed with these decisions a KKE-NOF delegation traveled to Skopje. Its main aim was to compel the authorities in Yugoslav Macedonia to close the border to deserters from the DSE, and to repatriate to Greece, if necessary by force, Aegean refugees and émigré’s, including suspended former leaders of the NOF. The talks did not produce any agreement or result. They only revealed the unbridgeable gap that divided the pro-Cominforn KKE and the CPY and its (the CPY’s) allies, the national leaders of the NOF. On the meetings with the leaders of the Macedonian Republic (L. Kolisevski and C. Uzunovski), see the partial text of Porfirogenis’s report, EM 6, no.23, pp.58-59 and no. 44-47; see also Kirjazovski, Narodnoosloboditelniot front, pp. 280ff. On the talks with the suspended leaders of the NOF, see the detailed account by Keramitciev, Dimovski-Goce, and Ajanovski-Oce, EM, 6, no.26, pp.68-77, February 10, 1949. The DSE hoped to recruit five thousand Aegean Macedonians in Yugoslavia, which would have represented 50 percent of the planned recruitment for 1949. Ibid., no.26, p.76.
126. EM, 6, no. 19, pp.53-54, Report of the Executive Committee of the Central Council of NOF on the Second Plenum of NOF, February 3, 1949. For an excerpt of Zachariadis’s speech to the plenum, see no. 20, pp.54-55. See also National Archives, RU 59, Dec. File 1945-49, Box 812, no.868.00/3-2349, Rankin (Athens) to Secretary of State, March 23, 1949; and P.R.O., FO371/78396, Crosthwaite (Athens) to FO, March 3, 1949.
127. Kirjazovski, Narodnoosloboditelniot front (n. 5 above), pp.286-87.
128. EM (n. 4 above), 6, no.75, pp.155-57, Declaration; and no.76, pp.158-68, Resolution of the Second Congress of NOF, March 26, 1949.
129. Ibid., no.75, pp.155-57. This formulation differed from that approved by the Second Plenum of the NOF. The latter provoked a strong reaction in Greece, the West, and Yugoslavia. At home the KKE came under attack even from traditional allies on the Left. This forced the Zachariadis leadership to modify its new slogan or formula on the Macedonian question. See EM, 6, no.53, p. 118, March 7, 1949; and no.55, p.121, March 9, 1949. See also National Archives, RU 59, Dec. File 1945-49, Box 812, no. 868.00/3-2349, Rankin (Athens) to Secretary of State, March 23,1949, pp.4-6, and no.868.0014-1249, Cannon (Belgrade) to Secretary of State, April 12, 1949, App. A, p.58; and P.R.O., FO37 1/78399, Foreign Office Research Department, “The Greek Communist Party and Macedonia,” May 19, 1949. It is not clear whether the KKE’s new course on the Macedonian question originated at home, in Sofia, Moscow, or elsewhere. It is interesting to note, however, that on September 8, 1949, in a letter informing Stalin of the final defeat in the struggle, the KKE also felt obliged to inform him that “in the new situation our Party will have to return to the slogan [calling) for the equality of the Macedonians of Aegean Macedonia" (EM, 6, no.206, p.434, PB of the CC of the KKE to the CC of the CPSU (b), for Comrade Stalin, September 8, 1949).
130. EM, 6, no.81, p.176, M. Maliov (Malios], Speech to the founding meeting of KOEM, March 27, 1949; see also no 80, p.172. In his speech Zachariadis declared, “You, Macedonian Communists, must look beyond the national liberation aims of the NOF. The aims that the NOF is fighting for will be attained. You will achieve your freedom. But what kind of society are we going to create? A bourgeois one? No. We will establish a people’s republican socialist society. Consequently, we should not limit ourselves to the national strivings of the NOF” (ibid., no.82, p.177).
131. On the First Conference of KOEM see EM, 6, nos. 183-86, pp.384-404.
132. See ibid., no.88, pp.184-85.
133. Ibid., no.89, p.185; and nos. 117-19, pp.247-50.
134. Ibid., no.91, pp.188-92; and no.92, pp.192-93.
135. Ibid., no.213, p.451, Bartziotas, Report, October 9, 1949; italics in the original. See also the exchange of telegrams between the Central Committee (CC) of the CPY and the CC of the KKE in early March 1949: no.44, pp. l05-6, no.49, p. 112, no.51, p.115; a letter from the CC of the CPY to the CC of the KKE, April 6, 1949: no.94, pp.197-202; and the long letter from Keramitciev and Dimovski-Goce to the CC of the KKE, June 2, 1949: no.152, pp.311-31. A State Department officer wrote: “Since then [the Second Plenum of the NOF] the KKE seems to have foundered over the Macedonian issue because of its fear of alienating all Greek citizens of the non-Communist democratic left and center while it continued in its attempts to mislead the Slavo-Macedonians” (National Archives, RG 59, Dec. File 1945-49, Box 6804, no.868.00/ 3-1149, Office Memorandum, Howard to Jernegan, Barter, Cromie, March 11, 1949).
136. See n. 135. See also RG 59, Dec. File 1945-49, Box 812, no. 868.00/4-1249, Cannon, (Belgrade) to Secretary of State, April 12, 1949, pp.6, 12-13 and App. B, pp. 3-5, 11-13, 16-17; P.R.O., FO371178396, Mason (Sofia) to Foreign Office, March 14, 1949; and P.R.O., FO371/7833, Peake (Belgrade) to Bevin, June 29, 1949.
137. EM, 6, nos. 94, 152, 213. Compare EM, 6, esp. no.87, pp.183-84, an open letter from Keramitciev, Dimovski-Goce, Ajanovski-Oce to the leaders of the NOF of Aegean Macedonia, March 1949; and no.56, pp.121-22. In his report to the Sixth Plenum Bartziotas also explained that the new course was devised in order to “counter the destructive actions of the Titoist clique and its agents and to draw even more the Slav Macedonian people into the armed struggle-until victory” (no.213, pp.450-51).
138. See the long letter of the suspended leaders of the NOF, Keramitciev and Dimovski-Goce, to the CC of the KKE, June 2, 1949, EM (n. 4 above), 6, no.152, pp. 311-31. See also National Archives, RG 59, Dec. File 1945-49, Box 812, no.868.00/4-1249, Cannon (Belgrade) to Secretary of State, April 12, 1949, pp.15-17 and App. B, p.21; and RR.O., FO371/7833, Peake (Belgrade) to Bevin, June 29, 1949.
139. EM, 6, no.112, pp.229-34, Ajanovski-Oce, Report on the meeting, April 1949. The meeting took place in the night of April 13-14; it was also attended by Keramitciev, Dimovski-Goce, and Vangelova.
140. Interviews with well over one hundred veterans of DSE in Salonica, Prague, Skopje, and Toronto. See also O’Ballance (n. 12 above), pp.179-202; Woodhouse (n. 7 above), pp.258-89.
141. See the letter from Keramitciev and Dimovski-Goce to the CC of the KKE, EM, 6, no. 152,pp.311-31,June2, 1949.
142. After the capitulation of the DSE, the KKE condemned the Macedonian organizations NOF, AFZ, NOMS, and even KOEM as agencies of Tito’s Yugoslavia, close collaborators with the “monarcho-fascists” and “imperialists,” and blamed them for the defeat. On October 3, 1949, eleven Macedonian leaders, members of the KKE, including Mitrovski, were arrested as Tito’s agents in Bureli, Albania, The Sixth Plenum of the Central Committee of the KKE, held in Bureli, October 9, 1949, ordered the Politbureau to take the necessary steps for the dissolution of the Macedonian organizations. Although they had already ceased to function, the official decision to dissolve them was not taken until February 1951 in Poland. They were finally dissolved in April 1952. Kirjazovski, Narodnoosloboditelniot front (n. 5 above), pp.311, 330; Pejov (n. 3 above), pp.159-60; and EM, 6, no.213, pp.450-51, Bartziotas, Report to the Sixth Plenum, October 9, 1949; and no.217 and n. 185, pp.458-59. After another Sixth Plenum, which met in March 1956 and dismissed Zachariadis and his close collaborators as part of the de-Stalinization drive, the KKE reversed its stand on the Macedonian organizations of the Civil War period. In May 1956 it officially rehabilitated them, declared them once again to be national liberationist movements, and credited them with the mass participation of the Macedonians in the struggle. Kirjazovski, Narodnoosloboditelniot front, p.331.

The Macedonians of Greece

2008-07-28T10:48:00.003+02:00

The Macedonians of Greece

Denying Ethnic Identity

By Human Rights Watch, 1994

The Greek government views the term "Macedonian" as a geographic term that describes all Greek citizens living in the Macedonian region in northern Greece. The government denies the assertions of the ethnic Macedonians in Greece that they are are a minority group; officials refer to them as "Slavophone Greeks" or "bilinguals." In July 1993, a fact-finding mission made up of representatives of three organizations, the Danish Helsinki Committee, Minority Rights Group-Greece, and Human Rights Watch/Helsinki, went to northern Greece to look into the situation of the Macedonian minority there. The climate of fear was striking; a large number of people asked the mission not to use their names, for fear of losing their civil service jobs or being harassed by police. The mission also journeyed to Bitola in the southern region of the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia to interview ethnic Macedonian political refugees from Greece who have been denied the right to regain their citizenship or property (taken from them after the Greek Civil War) or to visit relatives and friends in northern Greece.

April 1, 1994

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Washington Behind Terrorist Assaults In Macedonia

2008-03-16T23:44:00.001+01:00

While Washington supplies National Liberation Army (NLA) terrorists with brand new weapons "Made in America", some 3000 heavily armed NATO troops have been given the mandate to "disarm the rebels" and enforce the cease-fire. Code-named "Essential Harvest", this bogus "peacekeeping" operation under British command is intended to weaken the Macedonian Armed Forces and destabilize national institutions.

"As much as their text ["peace plan"] is brutal, more brutal and worrying is the fashion in which they are trying to break up Macedonian state institutions,' ... All of the terrorist actions in Macedonia have been supported by the Western democracies... all threats and blackmails have been presented so far, except that NATO will conduct an air-strike on us." (Macedonian Prime Minister Mr. Ljubco Georgievski)

It is now documented beyond doubt that Washington is behind the terrorist assaults in Macedonia. While Secretary of State Colin Powell reaffirms America's resolve to "combat terrorism", US military advisers are fighting alongside the NLA terrorists:

"Among the rebels that were withdrawing were 17 "instructors" - former US officers that provided military training for the rebels. Not only that: the Macedonian security forces claim that 70% of the equipment that the guerilla fighters took with them are of US production and the latter includes highly sophisticated third generation night vision devices." 1

US Forces Protect the Terrorists

In late June, the Macedonian ARM undertook a major assault against KLA-NLA positions in Aracinovo, a village close to Skopje. In a NATO sponsored operation which "was supposed to allow the Macedonian Army to gain significant rebel territory", US troops were sent in to "evacuate" and "disarm" the terrorists:2

"When the terrorists were defeated and showed a white flag, the OSCE and NATO were in panic and ordered us [the Macedonian authorities] to stop immediately the [military] action. Swedish Foreign Minister Ana Lindth and the European leaders were hysterical, threatening us with economic sanctions, etc. Furthermore, the OSCE and KFOR entered Aracinovo and 'saved' 500 terrorists together with their weaponry and took them to another village from where they are now attacking again, killing civilians and undertaking ethnic cleansing in several Macedonian villages... NATO forbids us to defend ourselves when we are attacked; our territory is brutally abused by the terrorists. We have tried to defend ourselves, and they have saved the terrorists in air-conditioned buses. That has provoked harsh reaction of the Macedonian people."3

The official "story" out of the US military base near Skopje was: "[Sorry]...but something went wrong":4

"A confidential source at Camp Able Sentry [US base near Skopje] says the bus convoy [evacuating the terrorists] was stopped by tanks manned by NLA rebels ... and the rebels left the buses and disappeared. 'Now we have some extremely angry Macedonians on our hands,' the American official said."5

The same source stated that the rebels "were escorted by lightly armed American troops", conveying the impression that the highly trained American GIs of the 502nd Infantry division could not do anything against "the tanks manned by NLA rebels" which had entrapped the bus convoy.6 The ambush story is a fabrication, for one KLA-NLA rebels do not have tanks in their arsenal.

Opening a New Front

The US sponsored "evacuation" from Aracinavo had enabled the NLA terrorists --together with their American military advisers and foreign mercenaries-- "to open up a new front" around the village of Radusa, 40 kilometers northwest of Skopje. 7 "They [NATO] are transporting the rebels, the terrorists, from one area to another and rearming them, instead of confiscating their weapons." 8 In turn, KFOR is "protecting" the NLA terrorists' supply routes including the flow of military personnel and weapons from KLA-NLA bases in Kosovo and from training camps in Albania.

Sources in the U.S. Army in Kosovo suggest that the "evacuation" mission was also intent upon saving "the 17 'instructors' among the withdrawing rebels", presumably to avoid the diplomatic humiliation and media embarrassment of senior US military personnel captured together with the terrorists by the Macedonian Security Forces.9

Meanwhile, there are indications that US Apache helicopters and unmanned "predator" drone spy planes (UAV) (dispatched by a contingent of the US 15th Military Intelligence Battalion, stationed at Camp Able Sentry) are supporting this "new front" by transmitting military-intelligence to the rebel army's US military advisers:

"The Pentagon... approved [mid March 2001] sending several unmanned spy planes to monitor the Kosovo-Macedonia border. The Air Force Predator unmanned drones can feed images immediately not only to troops in the region, but also to Washington."10

And in the wake of the US sponsored "evacuation", the KLA-NLA terrorists --together with their US military instructors-- have renewed their attacks in the Tetovo region.

Recruiting Foreign Mercenaries

Since the Soviet-Afghan war, recruiting Mujahedin ("holy warriors") to fight covert wars on Washington's behest has become an integral part of US foreign policy. A report of the US Congress has revealed how the US administration --under advice from the National Security Council headed by Anthony Lake-- had "helped turn Bosnia into a militant Islamic base" leading to the recruitment through the so-called "Militant Islamic Network," of thousands of Mujahedin from the Muslim world.11

The "Bosnian pattern" has since been replicated in Kosovo, Southern Serbia and Macedonia. Among the foreign mercenaries now fighting with the KLA-NLA are Mujahedin from the Middle East and the Central Asian republics of the former Soviet Union as well as "soldiers of fortune" from several NATO countries including Britain, Holland and Germany. Some of these Western mercenaries had previously fought with the KLA and the Bosnian Muslim Army.12

Also among NLA recruits are Albanian-American "volunteers" enlisted in New York with the tacit approval of the US government.13 In March 2001, the New York-based Albanian-language newspaper Bota Sot printed an advertisement of the National Liberation Army (NLA) "calling Albanians [in the US] to register as volunteers and to donate money." 14 Several hundred Albanian-Americans had formed an "Atlantic Brigade" which fought alongside the KLA in 1998 and 1999. In recent months, members of the "Atlantic Brigade" have reportedly joined the NLA.15

The United Nations Funds the Terrorists

Amply documented, the United Nations so-called "civilian" Kosovo Protection Corps (KPC) is the KLA in disguise, and the NLA is a proxy of the KLA. According to the Sunday Times: "Hundreds of KPC reservists were called up by their Albanian commander, Agim Ceku, in March [2001]. They subsequently disappeared to former KLA training camps in Albania and are now re-emerging in Macedonia." 16

NLA rebel Commander Ostremi was until recently Chief of Staff of the Kosovo Protection Corps (KPC). To maintain appearances, Washington has "blacklisted" the KPC commanders who joined the NLA. Washington's so-called "blacklist" --which bars the former KPC commanders from entering the US-- includes the names of "Commander Ostremi, his replacement as chief-of-staff at the KPC Commander Daut Haradinaj, the commander and deputy commander of the KPC's elite force, the Rapid Reaction Corps, plus the leaders of two of its six regional divisions, Commander Sami Lushtaku and Commander Mustafa Rrustem..." 17

From the horse's mouth: Washington's "blacklist" visibly refutes the claims of both the "international community" and the Western media mantra that "the NLA has no links to KLA". In fact, the "blacklist" confirms that they are one and the same thing, with the same commanding officers in both the KPC and the NLA. Moreover, it also confirms that the terrorist assaults are led by military personnel paid by the United Nations.

When Commander Ostremi took leave from his UN job to lead the NLA, the UN "assumed he had gone on holiday". 18 According to the Irish Times, UN Secretary General Kofi Annan failed to remove the NLA commanders from the United Nations payroll. The "international community" was still (early July) footing the bill under the disguise of UN "peacekeeping":

"...the United Nations says it will take no action against these five men [NLA commanders], all still serving officers [in the UN sponsored KPC] because Washington has yet to pass on details of what the men are supposed to have done."19

This pattern of "financing terrorism" from the UN purse is nothing new. The former head of the UN Interim Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) Bernard Kouchner had established close personal ties with KLA Commander in Chief Agim Ceku, who in a bitter irony was on the list of "alleged war criminals" of the Hague Tribunal. But because he was wanted in relation to "crimes committed in Croatia" rather than Kosovo, this was not an issue in his appointment by the UN to the position of Commander in Chief of the KPC. 20.

An independent report submitted to UN Secretary General Kofi Annan in 2000 confirmed that the KPC had been involved in "criminal activities - killings, ill-treatment/torture, illegal policing, abuse of authority, intimidation, breaches of political neutrality and hate speech."21. In a cruel irony, "the United Nations is paying the salaries of many of the gangsters."22

But what the report fails to mention, however, is that barely two months after the official inauguration of the KPC under UN auspices (September 1999), KPC-KLA commanders --using UN resources and equipment -- were already preparing the assaults into Macedonia, as a logical follow-up to their terrorist activities in Kosovo. According to the Skopje daily Dnevnik, the KPC had established a "sixth operation zone" which:

"included Presevo, Bujanovac, Medvedja [in Southern Serbia] and Macedonian villages in the area of Skopska Crna Gora, Lojane, Vaksince, Straza and Lipkovo... Sources, who insist on anonymity, claim that headquarters of Kosovo protection brigades [directly linked to the UN sponsored KPC] have [March 2000] already been formed in Tetovo, Gostivar and Skopje. They are being prepared in Debar and Struga [on the border with Albania] as well, and their members have defined codes." 23.

According to the BBC, "Western special forces were still training the guerrillas" meaning that they were assisting the KLA in opening up "a new front" in Southern Serbia and Macedonia. 24

Links to Organised Crime

Also acknowledged by official US sources as well as by numerous press reports are the links of the KLA-NLA to powerful criminal syndicates involved in the Balkans' multi-billion dollar drug trade. Albanian and Kosovar criminal organizations are providing "a very significant support to them [the NLA terrorists in Macedonia]." 25 These criminal groups are also involved in the traffic of Albanian women into prostitution in several European countries including Britain, Italy and Germany. And part of the proceeds of these illicit activities is used to arm and equip the KLA-NLA terrorists.

In other words, in providing support to the KLA-NLA, Washington (not to mention the United Nations) is indirectly upholding the organised criminal-business syndicates which are behind the terrorists.

Treason within the Macedonian Security Forces

In April, the Commander in Chief of the Macedonian Armed Forces (ARM) General Andrejevski was accused by A1 TV Skopje of having transmitted military intelligence to the NLA through MPRI General Richard Griffiths, who is director of the US "equip and train" program with the Macedonian ARM under a US military aid programme. 26. Sixteen senior (retired) US military officers are advising the ARM.

But it so happens that the same US mercenary outfit on contract to the Macedonian ARM is also assisting the NLA rebels in their terrorist assaults. In other words, Washington is arming and advising both the KLA attackers and the Macedonian defenders under military and intelligence authorization acts approved by the US Congress. MPRI is helping Macedonia --as part of a US military aid package-- "to deter armed aggression and defend Macedonian territory." But MPRI is also advising and equipping the KLA, which is responsible for the terrorist assaults. In this war, the American military-intelligence apparatus is pulling strings "on both sides of the fence". 27

Faced with mounting pressure, General Andrejevski has since given up his position as Commander in Chief of the ARM. But immediately following his resignation, Andrejevski was appointed "Military Adviser" to President Trajkovski, while maintaining his personal links with MPRI`s Richard Griffith who is still in Skopje, responsible for channeling US "military aid" on behalf of the Pentagon. In other words, the US military establishment is still involved on both sides, advising the NLA as well as "assisting" the Macedonian ARM. The ultimate objective of this military-intelligence ploy is to prevent the Macedonian ARM from defeating the terrorists.

Civil Society Ploy

Despite the barrage of media falsehoods, Macedonian citizens are fully aware that Washington is supporting the terrorists. To diffuse public resentment, several Western "foundations" and "human rights organisations" --including the International Crisis Group (ICG) and Human Rights Watch (HRW) are working closely with local citizens groups in Macedonia. While their formal mandate is in the areas of "confidence building", "governance", "peace-making" and "inter-ethnic reconciliation", in practice, they work hand in glove with NATO. They are an integral part of the military-intelligence ploy. The role of these front organisations is to ensure that public resentment is directed against the Macedonian government and Military rather than against Washington, NATO or the IMF. 28

The Open Society Institute (OSI) in Skopje, controlled by Wall Street financier George Soros is also playing a central role in manipulating and ultimately weakening the civilian protest movement. 29 The OSI in Macedonia has launched an "Appeal for Peace" endorsed by a large number of Macedonian organisations. (More than 300 organisations and individuals have signed the OSI "Appeal for Peace"). In other words, Soros' OSI in Skopje hosts and finances the citizens' movement against terrorism while carefully omitting to mention the causes of terrorism.

Moreover, George Soros is also part of the Wall Street financial establishment which is colonising the Balkans. And this "economic conquest" by American financial interests is supported by the US military-intelligence apparatus, which is funneling covert support to the terrorists.

While George Soros finances "peace" and "reconciliation" initatives in Macedonia, he also supports the KLA. Across the border in Kosovo, the Soros sponsored Kosova Foundation for an Open Society (KFOS) is funding the activities of "local governments" controlled by KLA appointees. This assistance was initially channeled through a World Bank "Post Conflict Trust Fund", of which 90 percent of the financing is controlled by George Soros.30

Needless to say, Soros is close to the seat of political power in the US, he works hand in glove with the World Bank and has significant economic interests in the Balkans. His Open Society Institute is also supporting the "alternative media" in Macedonia with all the appearances of purporting to advance "democracy" and "freedom of the press".

NATO Sponsored Refugee Crisis

The refugee crisis has been deliberately triggered by the US sponsored terrorist assaults. Both Macedonian and Albanian civilians are among the victims. More than 100,000 people are affected. According to the United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) some 73,800 people have crossed the border into Kosovo, and another 34,500 people are "internally displaced" within Macedonia.31 In Albanian villages occupied by the rebels, Albanian civilians rather than being "protected" by NLA "freedom fighters" are often the object of intimidation and reprisals.

In villages inhabited by Macedonians in the Tetovo region, ethnic cleansing is being implemented in the presence of US military personnel who are advising rebel commanders. The KLA-NLA is reported to "have committed unprecedented acts of terror against the inhabitants, forcing them to leave the villages completely. The displaced persons from [these] villages have strongly criticized the OSCE and the International Committee of the Red Cross - whose representatives have consistently avoided contact with the residents of these Tetovo villages" 32

Entire communities are uprooted. According to the UNHCR, the majority of the refugees crossing into Kosovo are women, children and elderly men. Other reports suggest that the terrorists are enlisting ethnic Albanian men to join the KLA-NLA often through force and intimidation. The evidence suggests that those who refuse face serious reprisals. 33 The pattern in this regard, is very similar to what occurred in Kosovo in 1999 where entire villages were uprooted.34

Ethnic Cleansing

Washington is indelibly behind the process of ethnic cleansing in Macedonia. It is worth mentioning in this regard that MPRI (the mercenary outfit working with the KLA-NLA) was on contract with the Croatian Armed Forces in 1995, in charge of the ethnic cleansing and civilian massacres directed against the Serb population in the Krajina region of Croatia. In this regard, MPRI was working closely with Commander Agim Ceku, who at the time was a Brigadier General in the Croatian Armed Forces. Ceku was not only one of the key planners of "Operation Storm", he was also commander of the artillery division responsible for shelling Krajina Serb civilians. It is no wonder that the pattern in Macedonia is similar to that of Krajina and Kosovo. 35

The same commanding officers from the KLA and the MPRI are now involved in the terrorist assaults and ethnic cleansing in Macedonia. "Protected" by American and British troops stationed in Kosovo and Macedonia, the KLA-NLA rebels now control a significant portion of Macedonian territory.

Bogus Peace Plan

Washington's design is to prevent the Macedonian Security Forces from fighting the rebels and protecting its borders. In other words, the hidden agenda of the EU-US brokered "peace plan" is to gain time, drag out the conflict, keep the Macedonian Security Forces in the barracks while continuing to arm and equip the rebels. And this gruesome military-intelligence ploy is possible because the Macedonian President and part of his entourage are puppets of the US. Moreover, the MPRI, which is actively advising the NLA, is still on contract with the Macedonian government "helping the Macedonian Armed Forces".

Meanwhile General Andrejevski, who recently resigned his position as ARM Commander in Chief, is still in charge as "military adviser" to the President, acting on behalf of the MPRI and the Pentagon.

In other words, key senior military officers in the ARM are collaborating with the enemy, against the lower ranking officers and the ARM rank and file who are fighting for their country. Despite the divisions within the government, Prime Minister Mr. Ljubco Georgievski, has openly accused US envoy James Pardew and the EU's Francois Leotard of "forcing Macedonia to cave in to demands from Albanian guerrillas" 36:

"It becomes obvious that all of the terrorist actions in Macedonia have been supported by the western democracies. Now, we practically have 95% of Ali Ahmeti's [the NLA leader] document on the table. It is clear that the international community has decided on its position beforehand, and now it is trying to realize it in Macedonia" 37

"'As much as their text is brutal, more brutal and worrying is the fashion in which they are trying to break up Macedonian state institutions,' Mr. Georgievski said ... The Prime Minister further stated that the proposed peace package constituted 'a serious interference in the internal affairs of the Republic of Macedonia'... Asked about the extent of pressure Macedonia could sustain, Georgievski said all threats and blackmails had been presented so far, 'except that NATO will conduct an air-strike on us.' " 38

The Anglo-American Axis

In the negotiation of the "peace plan", the Anglo-US position has prevailed over that of France and Germany. In this regard, Prime Minister Georgievski "underlined that the French expert in law [former Minister of Justice] Robert Badinter was brutally eliminated from the political process", meaning that his recommendations on constitutional reform were turned down by James Pardew in consultation with NLA leader Ali Ahmeti. 39

Although NATO is not formally part of the EU-US "mediation", EU High Representative Javier Solana (who occupied the position of Secretary General of NATO during the 1999 bombings of Yugoslavia) has been working hand in glove with his successor at NATO Lord George Robertson. In turn, British Ambassador Mark Dickinson was appointed in May by Solana to act on his behalf in Skopje. British paratroopers and Special Forces --which trained the KLA in 1999-- are slated to lead the bogus "Essential Harvest" operation to "disarm the rebels".

Increasingly, the corridors of international diplomacy have been taken over by military-intelligence officials with previous experience in Croatia, Bosnia and Kosovo. James Pardew started his Balkans career in 1993 as a senior intelligence officer for the Joint Chiefs of Staff responsible for channeling US aid to the Bosnian Muslim Army. Coronel Pardew had been put in charge of arranging the "air-drops" of supplies to Bosnian forces, working closely with the Chairman of the National Security Council Anthony Lake. 40 NATO's Peter Feith who has been "put in charge of contacts with the [KLA-NLA] guerillas" is a longstanding "colleague" of James Pardew. He was political advisor to the IFOR High Command in Bosnia in the mid-1990s.41

Replicating Bosnia and Kosovo

America's "mediator" James Pardew has been given the mandate to replicate the Bosnia-Kosovo pattern. In this regard, Washington's military-intelligence ploy is to fracture Macedonian territory, foster internal social divisions and fuel ethnic strife. The design is to destroy all social and political ties between Albanians and Macedonians, who have coexisted for more than half a century within a multi-ethnic society. These socio-ethnic divisions are deliberately created so as to curb all forms of social resistance. More importantly, Washington wants to prevent the development of a broader "common front" against the enemy.

The US sponsored terrorist assaults as well as the bogus "peace plan" are intent upon eventually splitting up the country and transforming Macedonia into a NATO protectorate. Operation "Essential Harvest" to be led by British parachutists would constitute a first step towards a military occupation of Macedonian territory. NATO forces are not only protecting the rebels in the territories under their control, MPRI advisers on contract to the Pentagon are assisting indirectly in the implementation of "ethnic cleansing" in these territories. In the latter, Macedonian State institutions are no longer functioning.

In other words, the territories under KLA-NLA control --which border Kosovo-- are de facto under the jurisdiction of NATO. Moreover, there are indications that the KLA --with NATO support-- may attempt to trigger a unilateral secession of Kosovo from Yugoslavia. This would not only heighten the political crisis in Belgrade, it would also raise the issue of the political status of the territories occupied by the KLA-NLA from which the Macedonian population has been expulsed (much in the same way as the Serbs were expulsed from Kosovo). In this design, NATO's intent is clear, it consists in fracturing and destroying Macedonia as a country.

Endnotes

Hamburger Abendblatt, Hamburg, 27 June 2001, English translation by OK-Macedonia, Skopje, 28 June 2001, at http://www.ok.mk/news/story.asp?id=1631.
Christian Science Monitor, 27 June 2001.
Report from informed source in Skopje, 3 July 2001.
Christian Science Monitor, op. cit.
Ibid.
Ibid.
AFP. Paris, 4 July 2001.
Statement of Ljubica Acevska, Macedonia's first ambassador to the United States, UPI, 5 July 2001.
See Col. David Hackworth, Wanted Guns for Hire, Toogood Reports, July 10, 2001, at http://toogoodreports.com/column/general/hackworth/071001.htm.
See The Record, Bergen County New Jersey, 25 March 2001, and the New York Times, 17 July 2001.
Washington Times, 14 December 1997 and US Congress, Press Release, "Militant Islamic Base", Congressional Press Releases, 16 January 1997.
Scotland on Sunday, Glasgow, 15 June 2001, http://www.scotlandonsunday.com/text_only.cfm?id=SS01025960, see also UPI, 9 July 2001.
New York Times, 19 March 2001. In March 2001, the New York-based Albanian-language newspaper Bota Sot printed an advertisement by the National Liberation Army (NLA) "calling Albanians [in the US] to register as volunteers and to donate money." See The Guardian, London, 20 March 2001.
The Guardian, 20 March 2001, available at http://gu.com/Kosovo/Story/0,2763,459596,00.html. See also ITAR Tass, Moscow, 20 March 2001.
According to the editor of Bota Sot, Dervish Jahjaga interviewed by The Guardian, London, 20 March 2001.
For further details see Sunday Times, London, 10 June 2001 at http://www.sunday-times.co.uk/news/pages/sti/2001/06/10/stifgneeu01001.html. See also Jared Israel, Sorry Virginia, but they are NATO troops, not Rebels, Emperors Clothes, June 2001 at http://emperors-clothes.com/mac/times2.htm.
Irish Times, Dublin, 5 July 2001.
Ibid.
Ibid.
See Michel Chossudovsky, The United Nations Appoints an Alleged War Criminal in Kosovo, March 2000, at http://www.emperors-clothes.com/articles/chuss/unandthe.htm.
Quoted in John Sweeney and Jen Holsoe, "Kosovo Disaster Response Service Stands Accused of Murder and Torture," The Observer, London, 12 March 2000.
Ibid
Macedonian Information Centre Newsletter, Skopje, 21 March 2000, published by BBC Summary of World Broadcast, 24 March 2000.
BBC, 29 January 2001, at http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/english/world/europe/newsid_1142000/1142478.stm.
UPI, 8 July 2001.
See Michel Chossudovsky, Macedonia: Washington Military Intelligence Ploy, June 2001, at http://emperors-clothes.com/articles/choss/ploy.htm. See also MPRI Republic of Macedonia, Stability and Deterrence Program (1998-Present) at http://www.mpri.com/subchannels/int_europe.html.
See Michel Chossudovsky, Washington Finances Ethnic Warfare in the Balkans, April 2001, http://emperors-clothes.com/articles/choss/fin.htm and Michel Chossudovsky, Macedonia: Washington's Military-Intelligence Ploy, June 2001 at http://emperors-clothes.com/articles/choss/ploy.htm.
See ICG's report on Macedonia at http://www.intl-crisis-group.org/projects/showreport.cfm?reportid=318. Both HRW and ICG are funded by Wall Street financier George Soros.
See the OSI Macedonia webpage at http://www.soros.org.mk/.
World Bank, Kosova Foundation for an Open Society (KFOS) World Bank, World Bank Launches First Kosovo Project, Washington, November 16, 1999 News Release No. 2000/097/ECA, http://www.worldbank.org/html/extdr/extme/097.htm. See also Michel Chossudovsky, Opening Kosovo to Foreign Capital, March 2000, at http://emperors-clothes.com/articles/chuss/opening.htm.
UNHCR Press Briefing, Geneva, 3 July 2001, at http://www.unhcr.ch/refworld/cgi-bin/newsbrowse.pl?source=UNHCR%20Press%20Briefing%20Note&country=Macedonia.
Macedonian Radio, Skopje, in Macedonian, 200 GMT 8 July 2001, BBC Monitoring Service, 8 July 2001.
The Red Cross has registered some 34,000 "internally displaced persons", expulsed by the terrorists, See Red Cross, Report Macedonia, 26 June 2001, at http://crisis.vmacedonia.com/RedCross25062001/index.html.
In this regard, recent evidence suggests that the KLA was instrumental in uprooting the civilian population in Kosovo during the 1999 bombing of Yugoslavia. See Jared Israel, What's Behind KLA Strategy in the Balkans? Emperors Clothes, and the interview with Kosovo historian Chedomir Pralinchevich, May 2001, http://emperors-clothes.com/interviews/strategy.htm.
See Michel Chossudovsky, NATO Installs a Reign of Terror in the Kosovo, July 1999 at http://www.suc.org/politics/kosovo/papers/Chossudovsky.html.
Quoted in The Independent, London, 19 July 2001.
Press Release, Macedonian Information Agency, Skopje, 19 July 2001 at http://www.sinf.gov.mk/PressRoomEN/2001/07/n0719.htm#2.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Washington Times, 14 December 1997 and US Congress, Press Release, "Militant Islamic Base", Congressional Press Releases, 16 January 1997.
Deutsche Press Agentur, 12 July 2001.

Articles by the author on Macedonia

Washington Finances Ethnic Warfare in the Balkans, Ottawa, April 2001,
http://emperors-clothes.com/articles/choss/fin.htm.

America at War in Macedonia, June 2001, http://emperors-clothes.com/articles/choss/pipe.htm.

Macedonia: Washington's Military Intelligence Ploy, June 2001,
http://www.transnational.org/forum/meet/2001/Chossudov_WashingtPloy.html.

Bush Administration War Plans directed against Iran

2007-09-21T00:26:00.000+02:00

Quoting official sources, the Western media is now confirming, rather belatedly, that the Bush Administration's war plans directed against Iran are "for real" and should be taken seriously.

"Punitive bombings" directed against Tehran could be launched within the next few months.

The diplomatic mode has been switched off: The Pentagon is said to be "taking steps to ensure military confrontation with Iran" because diplomatic initiatives have allegedly failed to reach a solution.

These diabolical statements come within barely a couple of weeks following the release of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) report. The later confirms unequivocally that Iran's nuclear program is of a civilian nature and that Iran has neither the intention nor the capabilities to develop nuclear weapons:

Article IV (1): These modalities cover all remaining issues and the Agency [meaning IAEA] confirmed that there are no other remaining issues and ambiguities regarding Iran's past nuclear program and activities.

Article IV (3): The Agency's delegation is of the view that the agreement on the above issues shall further promote the efficiency of the implementation of safeguards in Iran and its ability to conclude the exclusive peaceful nature of the Iran's nuclear activities.

Article IV (4): The Agency has been able to verify the non-diversion of the declared nuclear materials at the enrichment facilities in Iran and has therefore concluded that it remains in peaceful use. (IAEA Report, italics added)

At the same token, the IAEA report is a slap in the face for Washington. It confirms the lack of legitimacy and criminal nature of US foreign policy as well as Washington's resolve to violate international law:

"The Bush administration’s abrupt dismissal of last Thursday’s IAEA report is one more sign that Washington has no interest in a diplomatic resolution to its confrontation with Tehran. Following Bush’s bellicose denunciations of Iran last week, the US has reiterated its intention to push for tougher UN sanctions against Tehran this month." (Peter Symond, Global Research, September 2007)

No Public Outcry

Despite the overtly aggressive nature of US statements, these war plans directed against Iran, which in a real sense threaten the future of humanity, are not the object of public concern or debate. A US sponsored pre-emptive war, using thermonuclear weapons, which according to "authoritative" scientific opinion (on contract to the Pentagon), are "harmless to the surrounding civilian population" is simply not front page news in relation to any other trivial topic.

The dangers of a broader Middle East war are downplayed or ignored by the main anti-war coalitions. The proposed use of nuclear weapons in a conventional war theater is not a matter for debate.

Moreover, the planned attacks on Iran and their various devastating consequences are not being addressed by "progressive" civil society organizations including the "Left", which tacitly considers The Islamic Republic as a real threat to human rights. According to Jean Bricmont:

"All the ideological signposts for attacking Iran are in place. The country has been thoroughly demonized because it is not nice to women, to gays, or to Jews. That in itself is enough to neutralize a large part of the American "left". The issue of course is not whether Iran is nice or not according to our views -- but whether there is any legal reason to attack it, and there is none; but the dominant ideology of human rights has legitimized, especially on the left, the right of intervention on humanitarian grounds anywhere, at any time, and that ideology has succeeded in totally sidetracking the minor issue of international law." (Jean Bricmont, Global Research, September 2007)

Background of War Planning

For the last three years, in several carefully documented articles, Global Research has been reporting in detail on US sponsored war plans directed against Iran. These war plans include the preemptive use of thermonuclear weapons against Iran in retaliation for Tehran's alleged non-compliance with the demands of the "international community".

War plans in relation to Iran have been an advanced stage of readiness since mid 2005. Israel, Britain and NATO are part of the US led coalition and are slated to play an active role in the military operation.

The first phase of these war plans was formulated initially in mid-2003, under a Pentagon scenario entitled TIRANNT (Theater Iran Near Term). The military build-up has occurred over a period of more than three years.

In Summer 2006 as well as earlier this year, extensive war games were conducted in the Persian Gulf and the Eastern Mediterranean.

The Israeli bombing of Lebanon in July 2006 was an integral part of the broader military agenda. In recent developments, Israel has conducted bombing raids inside Syrian territory visibly in an act of provocation.

Recent official statements by Washington confirm the broad nature of these war plans:

"Senior American intelligence and defense officials believe that President George W Bush and his inner circle are taking steps to place America on the path to war with Iran, ...

Pentagon planners have developed a list of up to 2,000 bombing targets in Iran, ...

Pentagon and CIA officers say they believe that the White House has begun a carefully calibrated programme of escalation that could lead to a military showdown with Iran.

In a chilling scenario of how war might come, a senior intelligence officer warned that public denunciation of Iranian meddling in Iraq - arming and training militants - would lead to cross border raids on Iranian training camps and bomb factories.

A prime target would be the Fajr base run by the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Quds Force in southern Iran, where Western intelligence agencies say armour-piercing projectiles used against British and US troops are manufactured.

The intelligence officer said that the US military has "two major contingency plans" for air strikes on Iran.

"One is to bomb only the nuclear facilities. The second option is for a much bigger strike that would - over two or three days - hit all of the significant military sites as well. This plan involves more than 2,000 targets." (quoted in The Sunday Telegraph, 16 September 2007)

US-NATO naval deployments are taking place in two distinct theaters: the Persian Gulf and the Eastern Mediterranean.

In recent developments, it is reported that two aircraft carrier strike groups (USS Nimitz and USS Truman) are en route to the Persian Gulf to join up with the USS Enterprise, which means that there will be, by late September, three carrier strike groups in the Persian Gulf.

According to military sources, the USS Kearsarge Expeditionary Strike Group took up position in late August opposite the Lebanese coastline.

The attacks on Iran are now officially supported by America's European allies including France and Germany. France's Foreign Minister Bernard Kouchner has called upon France to support the US war on Iran:

"We have to prepare for the worst, and the worst is war," Mr Kouchner said in an interview on French TV and radio. Mr Kouchner said negotiations with Iran should continue "right to the end", but an Iranian nuclear weapon would pose "a real danger for the whole world" .(quoted by BBC, 16 September 2007)

Britain is closely involved, despite denials at the diplomatic level. Turkey occupies a central role in the Iran operation. It has an extensive military cooperation agreement with Israel. NATO is formally involved in liaison with Israel, with which it signed a military framework agreement in November 2004.

While the US, Israel, as well as Turkey (with borders with both Iran and Syria) are the main military actors, a number of other countries in the region, allies of the US, including Georgia and Azerbaijan have been enlisted.

There are indications from several media sources that Israel is also in an advanced stage of military preparedness and would be involved in carrying out part of the aerial bombardments. Syria and most probably Lebanon would also be targeted.

Already in 2005, the Israeli Air Force had reached a state of preparedness. Israeli air attacks of Iran's nuclear facility at Bushehr had been contemplated using US as well Israeli produced bunker buster bombs. The attack was planned to be carried out in three separate waves "with the radar and communications jamming protection being provided by U.S. Air Force AWACS and other U.S. aircraft in the area".

(See W Madsen, http://www.globalresearch.ca/articles/MAD410A.html

Escalation Scenarios

If this military operation were to be launched, the entire Middle East Central Asian region would flare up.

The war would encompass an area extending from the Eastern Mediterranean to China's Western frontier.

In this regard, US military planners have analyzed various "escalation scenarios".

In fact, they expect the war to escalate. In other words, escalation, namely retaliation by Iran is a desired objective. It is part of the military agenda.

"A strike will probably follow a gradual escalation. Over the next few weeks and months the US will build tensions and evidence around Iranian activities in Iraq....

Under the theory - which is gaining credence in Washington security circles - US action would provoke a major Iranian response, perhaps in the form of moves to cut off Gulf oil supplies, providing a trigger for air strikes against Iran's nuclear facilities and even its armed forces. (Sunday Telegraph, op cit)

Iran Retaliates

The nature of Iran's retaliation should be understood. General David Petraeus, who is responsible for managing the Iraq war theater, has voiced his opposition to an attack on Iran.

"Gen David Petraeus, Mr Bush's senior Iraq commander, denounced the Iranian "proxy war" in Iraq last week as he built support in Washington for the US military surge in Baghdad." (Sunday Tewlegraph, op cit)

General Petraeus is fully aware of the underlying implications for the Iraq war theater. A war on Iran would immediately spill over into Iraq:

Iran is the third largest importer of Russian weapons systems after India and China. In the course of the last five years, Russia has supported Iran's ballistic missile technology, in negotiations reached initially in 2001 under the presidency of Mohammed Khatami.

Iran tested three new types of land-to-sea and sea-to-sea missiles in the context of its "Great Prophet II" military exercises last November. These tests were marked by precise planning in a carefully staged operation. According to a senior American missile expert, "the Iranians demonstrated up-to-date missile-launching technology which the West had not known them to possess."

Tehran has the ability to retaliate and wage ballistic missile attacks against US and coalition facilities in Iraq, Afghanistan and the Gulf states. Israel could also be a potential target, if Israel were to be an active partner in the bombing campaign.

Iranian ground troops could cross the border into Iraq and Afghanistan.

Iran's forces total about 350,000 active military personnel as well 350,000 reserve forces (Jane's Iran Profile). The Iranian Army disposes of some 2200 tanks. With these capabilities, in terms of military personnel and hardware, Iran could potentially inflict significant losses to US and coalition troops on the ground in Iraq and Afghanistan.

Bush-Cheney Military Appointments

Several key military appointments were made in recent months which tend to reinforce Bush-Cheney control over the Military. Specifically, these appointments pertain to the positions of Chairman and Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the commanders respectively of USCENTCOM, USSTRATCOM and US Pacific Command. All three commanders recently relinquished their respective positions.

These new appointments are crucial because USSTRATCOM, USCENTCOM and US Pacific Command are slated to play key roles in the coordination and implementation of the Iran military operation, in liaison with Israel and NATO.

1. Joint Chiefs of Staff

In May, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) General Peter Pace was fired ("non-renewal"). General Pace, in recent months, had indicated his disagreement with the Administration regarding both Iraq and the proposed attacks on Iran. General Pace stated (February 2007) that he saw no firm evidence of Tehran supplying weapons to Shiite militias inside Iraq, which was being heralded by the Bush administration as a justification for waging war on Iran:

"[M]aybe that's why he's the outgoing chairman. Maybe that's why they're not renewing him. Because ...He has seen no evidence that Iran is fomenting unrest in Iraq that's causing Americans lives... " (Fox News' Alan Colmes, ox News, June, 13, 2007),

General Peter Pace's term as Chairman of the JCS ends at the end of September. Defense Secretary Gates' chosen successor Admiral Michael Mullen, formerly U.S. Chief of Naval Operations, is slated to replace General Peter Pace as Chairman of the Joint chiefs of Staff.

Mullen's discourse is in marked contrast to that of General Peter Pace. Mullen, who was in charge of coordinating 2006-2007 naval war games off the Iranian coastline, has expressed an unbending commitment to "waging" and "winning asymmetric wars", while also "protecting the United States":

"we must ensure we have the Battle Force, the people, and the combat readiness we need to win our nation's wars...

Our Navy is fighting the Global War on Terror while at the same time providing a Strategic Reserve worldwide for the President and our Unified and Combatant Commanders.... Simply reacting to change is no longer an acceptable course of action if our Navy is to successfully wage asymmetric warfare and simultaneously deter regional and transnational threats (Statement, Senate Armed Services Committee, 7 May 2007)

Admiral Mullen's stance is in line with that of the Bush Administration's key Neo-conservative ideologues. With regard to Iran, echoing almost verbatim the stance of the White House, Admiral Mullen considers that it is "unacceptable that Iran is providing U.S. enemies in Iraq and Afghanistan with capabilities that are hurting and killing U.S. troops." (Inside the Pentagon, June 21, 2007). But on the issue of Iran, the Democrats are on board. There is a bipartisan consensus, expressed by Senator Jo Lieberman:

"I want to make clear I'm not talking about a massive ground invasion of Iran,... [but a] strike over the border into Iran, where we have good evidence that they have a base at which they are training these people coming back into Iraq to kill our soldiers" (AP, June 11, 2007)

In June, Secretary of Defense Gates appoints the Commander of USSTRATCOM, General Cartwright to the position of Vice-Chairman of the JCS. Together with the appointment of Admiral Mullen, who is slated to take on his position of Chairman of JCS in October, these two new appointments imply a significant overhaul in the power structure of the JCS

In the meantime, USSTRATCOM is headed, pending Senate confirmation of a new commander, on an interim basis, by Air Force Lt. Gen. C. Robert Kehler

2. CENTCOM

Admiral. William J. Fallon, was appointed Commander of U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) in March by Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates.

Admiral Fallon is fully compliant with the Bush administration's war plans in relation to Iran. He replaces Gen. John P. Abizaid, who was pushed into retirement, following apparent disagreements with Rumsfeld's successor, Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates. While Abizaid recognized both the failures and the weaknesses of the US military in Iraq, Admiral Fallon is closely aligned with Vice President Dick Cheney. He is also firmly committed to the "Global War on Terrorism" (GWOT). CENTCOM would coordinate an attack on Iran from the Middle East war theater.

Moreover, the appointment of an Admiral is indicative of a shift in emphasis of USCENTCOM's functions in the war theater. The "near term" emphasis is Iran rather than Iraq, requiring the coordination of naval and air force operations in the Persian Gulf.

3. Pacific Command

Another major military appointment was implemented, which has a direct bearing on war preparations in relation to Iran. Admiral Timothy J. Keating Commander of US NORTHCOM was appointed in March, to head US Pacific Command, which includes both the 5th and the 7th fleets. The 7th Fleet Pacific Command is the largest U.S. combatant command. Keating, who takes over from Admiral Fallon is also an unbending supporter of the "war on terrorism". Pacific Command would be playing a key role in the context of a military operation directed against Iran.(http://www.pacom.mil/about/pacom.shtml)

Of significance, Admiral Keating was also involved in the 2003 attack on Iraq as commander of US Naval Forces Central Command and the Fifth Fleet.

It should be understood that these new military appointments tend to consolidate the power of Bush-Cheney in the military, overriding potential dissent or opposition to the Iran war agenda from within the upper echelons of the US military.

It is, however, unlikely that a major military operation would be launched immediately following Mullen's instatement as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and prior to the confirmation of a new USSTRATCOM Commander by the US Senate.

USSTRATCOM's Central Role in Coordinating the Attacks

USSTRATCOM would have the responsibility for overseeing and coordinating this military deployment as well as launching the military operation directed against Iran. (For details, Michel Chossudovsky, Nuclear War against Iran, Jan 2006 ).

In January 2005 a significant shift in USSTRATCOM's mandate was implemented. USSTRATCOM was identified as "the lead Combatant Command for integration and synchronization of DoD-wide efforts in combating weapons of mass destruction." To implement this mandate, a brand new command unit entitled Joint Functional Component Command Space and Global Strike , or JFCCSGS was created.

Overseen by USSTRATCOM, JFCCSGS would be responsible for the launching of military operations "using nuclear or conventional weapons" in compliance with the Bush administration's new nuclear doctrine. Both categories of weapons would be integrated into a "joint strike operation" under unified Command and Control.

According to Robert S. Norris and Hans M. Kristensen, writing in the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists,

"The Defense Department is upgrading its nuclear strike plans to reflect new presidential guidance and a transition in war planning from the top-heavy Single Integrated Operational Plan of the Cold War to a family of smaller and more flexible strike plans designed to defeat today's adversaries. The new central strategic war plan is known as OPLAN (Operations Plan) 8044.... This revised, detailed plan provides more flexible options to assure allies, and dissuade, deter, and if necessary, defeat adversaries in a wider range of contingencies....

One member of the new family is CONPLAN 8022, a concept plan for the quick use of nuclear, conventional, or information warfare capabilities to destroy--preemptively, if necessary--"time-urgent targets" anywhere in the world. Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld issued an Alert Order in early 2004 that directed the military to put CONPLAN 8022 into effect. As a result, the Bush administration's preemption policy is now operational on long-range bombers, strategic submarines on deterrent patrol, and presumably intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs)."

The operational implementation of the Global Strike would be under CONCEPT PLAN (CONPLAN) 8022, which now consists of "an actual plan that the Navy and the Air Force translate into strike package for their submarines and bombers,' (Japanese Economic Newswire, 30 December 2005, For further details see Michel Chossudovsky, Nuclear War against Iran, op. cit.).

CONPLAN 8022 is 'the overall umbrella plan for sort of the pre-planned strategic scenarios involving nuclear weapons.'

'It's specifically focused on these new types of threats -- Iran, North Korea -- proliferators and potentially terrorists too,' he said. 'There's nothing that says that they can't use CONPLAN 8022 in limited scenarios against Russian and Chinese targets.' (According to Hans Kristensen, of the Nuclear Information Project, quoted in Japanese Economic News Wire, op. cit.)

USSTRATCOM would play a central decision making and coordinating role in the eventuality of a war on Iran. The administration has demanded USSTRATCOM to elaborate centralized war plans directed against Iran. CENTCOM would largely be involved in carrying out these war plans in the Middle East war theater.

USSTRATCOM's is described "a global integrator charged with the missions of full-spectrum global strike".

USSTRATCOM is in charge of the coordination of command structures under global C4ISR (Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance). "Day-to-day planning and execution [by STRATCOM] for the primary mission areas is done by five Joint Functional Component Commands or JFCCs and three other functional components:"

If Iran Retaliates, the US Could Use Nuclear Weapons

US, NATO and Israeli military planners are fully aware that the aerial "punitive bombings" could lead coalition forces into a ground war scenario in which they may have to confront Iranian and Syrian forces in the battlefield.

Tehran has confirmed that it will retaliate if attacked, in the form of ballistic missile strikes directed against Israel as well as against US military facilities in Iraq, Afghanistan and the Persian Gulf, which would immediately lead us into a scenario of military escalation and all out war.

Iranian troops could cross the Iran-Iraq border and confront coalition forces inside Iraq. Israeli troops and/or Special Forces could enter into Syria.

If Iran were to retaliate in a forceful way, which is contemplated by US military planners, the US could then retaliate with tactical nuclear weapons.

This scenario of using nuclear weapons against Iran has been in the pipeline since 2004. In 2005, Vice President Dick Cheney ordered USSTRATCOM to draft a "contingency plan", which "includes a large-scale air assault on Iran employing both conventional and tactical nuclear weapons." (Philip Giraldi, Attack on Iran: Pre-emptive Nuclear War , The American Conservative, 2 August 2005).

In relation to current war plans, Cheney has confirmed his intention to strike Iran with nuclear weapons.

"The vice president is said to advocate the use of bunker-busting tactical nuclear weapons against Iran's nuclear sites. His allies dispute this, but Mr Cheney is understood to be lobbying for air strikes if sites can be identified where Revolutionary Guard units are training Shia militias.

Recent developments over Iraq appear to fit with the pattern of escalation predicted by Pentagon officials." (Sunday Telegraph, op cit)

Nuclear Weapons Deployment Authorization

In May 2004, National Security Presidential Directive NSPD 35 entitled Nuclear Weapons Deployment Authorization was issued.

The contents of this highly sensitive document remains a carefully guarded State secret. There has been no mention of NSPD 35 by the media nor even in Congressional debates. While its contents remains classified, the presumption is that NSPD 35 pertains to the deployment of tactical nuclear weapons in the Middle East war theater in compliance with CONPLAN 8022.

Tactical nuclear weapons directed against Iran have also been deployed at military bases in several NATO non-nuclear states including Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Belgium and Turkey.

It should be understood that even without the use of nukes, the proposed US aerial bombardments of Iran's nuclear facilities could result in a nuclear Chernobyl type disaster on a significnatly larger scale.

World War III Scenario

While the war on Iran is acknowledged by the Western media, it is not front page news.

The broad implications of an impending catastrophe are simply not addressed.

Escalation could lead us into a World War III scenario.

Through media disinformation, the seriousness of a US-led war on Iran allegedly in retaliation for Iran's defiance of the "international community" is downplayed . The objective is to galvanize Western public opinion in support of a US-led military operation, which would inevitably lead to escalation.

War propaganda consists in "fabricating an enemy" while conveying the illusion that the Western World is under attack by Islamic terrorists, who are directly supported by the Tehran government.

"Make the World safer", "prevent the proliferation of dirty nuclear devices by terrorists", "implement punitive actions against Iran to ensure the peace". "Combat nuclear proliferation by rogue states"...

Supported by the Western media, a generalized atmosphere of racism and xenophobia directed against Muslims has unfolded, particularly in Western Europe, which provides a fake legitimacy to the US war agenda. The latter is upheld as a "Just War". The "Just war" theory serves to camouflage the nature of US war plans, while providing a human face to the invaders.

What can be done?

The antiwar movement is in many regards divided and misinformed on the nature of the US military agenda. In the US, United for Peace and Justice tacitly supports US foreign policy. It fails to recognize the existence of an Iraqi resistance movement. Moreover, these same antiwar organizations, which are committed to World Peace tend to downplay the implications of the proposed US bombing of Iran. More generally the antiwar movement fails to address the existence of a broader Middle East military agenda, a long-war. Its actions are piecemeal, focusing on Afghanistan, Iraq and Palestine without addressing the relationship between these various war theaters.

To reverse the tide requires a massive campaign of networking and outreach to inform people across the land, nationally and internationally, in neighborhoods, workplaces, parishes, schools, universities, municipalities, on the dangers of a US sponsored war, which contemplates quite explicitly the use of thermonuclear weapons. The message should be loud and clear: As confirmed by the IAEA report, Iran is not the threat.

Debate and discussion must also take place within the Military and Intelligence community, particularly with regard to the use of tactical nuclear weapons, within the corridors of the US Congress, in municipalities and at all levels of government.

Ultimately, the legitimacy of the political and military actors in high office must be challenged.

The corporate media also bears a heavy responsibility for the cover-up of US sponsored war crimes. It must also be forcefully challenged for its biased coverage of the Middle East war.

For the past two years, Washington has been waging a "diplomatic arm twisting" exercise with a view to enlisting countries into supporting its military agenda. It is essential that at the diplomatic level, countries in the Middle East, Asia, Africa and Latin America take a firm stance against the US military agenda.

What is needed is to break the conspiracy of silence, expose the media lies and distortions, confront the criminal nature of the US Administration and of those governments which support it, its war agenda as well as its so-called "Homeland Security agenda" which has already defined the contours of a police State.

The World is at the crossroads of the most serious crisis in modern history. The US has embarked on a military adventure, "a long war", which threatens the future of humanity.

It is essential to bring the US war project to the forefront of political debate, particularly in North America and Western Europe. Political and military leaders who are opposed to the war must take a firm stance, from within their respective institutions. Citizens must take a stance individually and collectively against war.

Canada Recognizes Macedonia's Constitutional Name

2007-09-21T00:22:00.000+02:00

The United Macedonian Diaspora is pleased to announce that Canada recognized Macedonia by its constitutional name. UMD congratulates all Canadian-Macedonians on this momentous occasion – their dedication, perseverance, and endless efforts contributed towards this positive change of Canadian policy. Macedonians started immigrating to Canada over a century ago and have helped build Canadian society in all spheres of life - social, economic, and political. Today, some 200,000 Macedonians live in Canada.

In addition, United Macedonian Diaspora would like to use this opportunity to thank Macedonia's Ambassador to Canada, Dr. Sashko Nasev for his continuous and tireless hard work to educate Canadian policymakers. Canada and Macedonia are working together to rebuild Afghanistan. Furthermore, Canada strongly supports Macedonia's path to NATO.

The Treaties That Divided Macedonia Now Online

2007-09-13T10:38:00.000+02:00

Macedonians can now access and read the key treaties that divided and shaped Macedonia under a new project by Pollitecon Publications which brings these documents together on the internet for the first time.

The new web page is titled Treaties and Legal Cases, and has the full text of 16 international treaties and when complete will have the texts for at least 22 treaties. See

http://www.pollitecon.com/html/treaties/index.html

The key treaties that affected Macedonia and Macedonians were the:
* Secret Protocol Between Greece And Serbia,
* Treaty of Bucharest,
* Treaty Concerning The Protection Of Minorities In Greece,
* Convention Between Greece And Bulgaria Respecting Reciprocal Emigration, and
* Convention Concerning The Exchange Of Greek And Turkish Populations.

It is interesting, if not coincidental, that I found some of these were also the treaties most difficult to find and some were not available on the internet. Their republication on the Pollitecon web site now makes all of them easily accessible for the first time.

Other treaties in the project include the major treaties signed at the end of the First World War: the Treaty Of Neuilly between the Allied Powers and Bulgaria, and the Treaty Of Sevres and the Treaty of Lausanne between the Allied Powers and Turkey.

A second section of the project reprints major legal and human rights cases by Macedonian political and other organizations. There are eight initial legal cases in the project - five by Macedonians against Bulgaria, two by Macedonians against Greece, and one by Macedonians against the State of Victoria.

The aim of the project is to enable Macedonians to have a better understanding of the legal documents and procedures that divided the Macedonian land and people. At present most Macedonians are aware of these and their contents only through second hand sources and have not read the primary documents themselves.

It is also possible that a better understanding of these documents could lead to improved human rights for Macedonians in Greece and Bulgaria. International law is certainly one method that Macedonians should explore further to begin to right the many current and historical wrongs against the Macedonian people. Sidiropoulos and Others, Vinozhito, and OMO Ilinden-Pirin have already had initial success in the European Court of Human Rights. But these ground-breaking cases should be seen as only the beginning. Macedonians have many more injustices that need to be rectified. There may also be other international courts and forums available to the Macedonian people.

It would be an interesting exercise to commission one or several of the leading practitioners in international law to give an expert legal opinion on the current standing of all of these key treaties and whether there are any opportunities that can be utilized to improve the well being of all or part of the Macedonian people, particularly in Greece and Bulgaria which are the most difficult countries for Macedonians.

It would also be useful for the Macedonian people to have a more vigorous and rigorous public discussion about these treaties. With that objective in mind I would like to make three observations of a general nature that could be relevant to understanding these treaties, and which
I hope will be interesting topics for public discussion.

The first is that there is not one signature on any of these treaties by a Macedonian Government, Macedonian organization, Macedonian individual or anyone appointed to represent the Macedonian people.

Since the Macedonian people were not signatories to these documents, many Macedonians cannot see how there could be any expectation that the Macedonian people should agree with or be bound by these documents.

To take one example - the Treaty of Bucharest that divided Macedonia between Greece, Serbia and Bulgaria. It is a fact that Macedonians have never accepted this Treaty and never will. Macedonians find it extraordinarily unjust that the fate of their land and their fate as a people was decided without their input or consent. The Treaty does not have the consent of the native population, and particularly the Macedonians of Aegean Macedonia and Pirin Macedonia, nor of the other ethnic groups who lived in these lands at the time. Without this consent, there will always be the shadow of moral illegitimacy over the Treaty and over the initial occupation and continued possession of these lands by Greece and Bulgaria.

It would be interesting to explore these issues at the highest levels of international law, including whether the Macedonian people have options for any legal redress, or whether the problem ultimately requires a political solution?

The second observation I would like to make is about the Treaty Concerning The Protection of Minorities In Greece.

Apart from its initial intent, nothing kind can be said about this Treaty. While the document purports to protect all ethnic and religious minorities in Greece, the fact is that in the years after signing this piece of paper Greece went on to commit cultural genocide against the Macedonian people and to this day does not recognize a single ethnic minority and only one religious minority within its borders. This comprehensive failure makes this Treaty a major international tragedy and probably one of the great failures of international diplomacy and law.

The question about this Treaty is not which article Greece may have broken, but whether there is an article it has not broken. Encyclopedias could be filled with examples of where this Treaty has been ignored, particularly in regard to:
* Article 7 paragraph 1
* Article 7 paragraph 3
* Article 7 paragraph 4
* Article 7 paragraph 5
* Article 8
* Article 9 paragraph 1
* Article 9 paragraph 2

Let's look at a small number of examples.

Article 7 paragraph 1 states "All Greek nationals shall be equal before the law and shall enjoy the same civil and political rights without distinction as to race, language or religion."

If so, why does Greece allow the return to Greece of fighters from the Greek Civil War who are "Greek by genus" but not the return of those who are Macedonian by genus? Why is the concept of "Greek by genus" necessary if everyone is equal?

Article 7 paragraph 3 states "Differences of religion, creed or confession shall not prejudice any Greek national in matters relating to the enjoyment of civil or political rights, as, for instance, admission to public employments, functions and honours, or the exercise of professions and industries."

Yet Macedonians, and especially those employed in the public service, still fear they will suffer discrimination if they openly identify as Macedonian.

Article 7 paragraph 4 states "No restriction shall be imposed on the free use by any Greek national of any language in private intercourse, in commerce, in religion, in the press or in publications of any kind, or at public meetings."

Yet Macedonians have been forced to take pledges not to speak their Macedonian language, and to this day languages other than Greek and religions other than Greek Orthodox are restricted.

Article 8 states "Greek nationals who belong to racial, religious or linguistic minorities shall enjoy the same treatment and security in law and in fact as the other Greek nationals. In particular they shall have an equal right to establish, manage and control, at their own expense, charitable, religious and social institutions, schools and other educational establishments, with the right to use their own language and to exercise their religion freely therein."

Ethnic Macedonians in Greece have been struggling for decades to have their own religious and social institutions but are prevented from establishing these.

Article 9 paragraph 1 states "Greece will provide in the public educational system in towns and districts in which a considerable proportion of Greek nationals of other than Greek speech are resident adequate facilities for ensuring that in the primary schools the instruction shall be given to the children of such Greek nationals through the medium of their own language. This provision shall not prevent the Greek Government from making the teaching of the Greek language obligatory in the said schools."

Is there a single primary school in Greece that teaches the Macedonian language?

Macedonians are not alone here. Other ethnic minorities including the Turks, Albanians and Vlachs, and other religious minorities including the Catholics, other Orthodox, and Muslims also face similar discrimination.

My third observation is really a question: can Greece be held accountable, and do the Macedonians and other minorities have a remedy?

Under Article 16 Greece agreed for its obligations to be placed under the guarantee of the League of Nations, and that "any Member of the Council of the League of Nations shall have the right to bring to the attention of the Council any infraction, or any danger of infraction, of any of these obligations, and that the Council may thereupon take such action and give such direction as it may deem proper and effective in the circumstances.

"Greece further agrees that any difference of opinion as to questions of law or fact arising out of these Articles between the Greek Government and any one of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers or any other Power, a Member of the Council of the League of Nations, shall be held to be a dispute of an international character under Article 14 of the Covenant of the League of Nations. The Greek Government hereby consents that any such dispute shall, if the other party thereto demands, be referred to the Permanent Court of International Justice. The decision of the Permanent Court shall be final and shall have the same force and effect as an award under Article 13 of the Covenant."

Although the League of Nations was dissolved, its successor organization is the United Nations. Likewise, although the Permanent Court of International Justice was dissolved, its successor court is the International Court of Justice.

Article 37 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice says "Whenever a treaty or convention in force provides for reference of a matter to a tribunal to have been instituted by the League of Nations, or to the Permanent Court of International Justice, the matter shall, as between the parties to the present Statute, be referred to the International Court of Justice."

Thus the International Court of Justice has jurisdiction to hear a dispute regarding a League of Nations Treaty or Convention.

The next question is who has standing to bring a dispute, and who would be prepared to do so? As well as Greece, the signatories to the Treaty were: Britain, France, Italy, Japan, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, South Africa, and India. What legal and moral obligations do these countries have to enforce the Treaty? Can one or more of these countries be persuaded to bring an action?

Article 20 states "All rights and privileges accorded by the foregoing Articles to the Allied and Associated Powers shall be accorded equally to all States, Members of the League of Nations." Does this mean that any member of the United Nations may also bring a dispute? Could the Republic Of Macedonia do so? If so, would it be prepared to do so? If not, is there another country that could do so, either on behalf of the Macedonians or on behalf of some or all of the ethnic and religious minorities in Greece?

It is obvious that Greece had no intention of fulfilling the Treaty, and to this day continues to violate the spirit as well as the letter of the law. Greece claims that the Treaty only refers to a "Moslem" minority. Yet the Treaty clearly speaks of "racial, religious or linguistic minorities" in the plural. Perhaps a country with standing could bring a dispute to clarify this and the many other issues that arise from Greece's behaviour.

Action by the signatory countries could in one move redeem their past inaction, and at the same time offer the international community a relatively quick and painless way to improve the very low level of human rights in Greece and raise them to an acceptable European standard.

If these issues are not resolved, the treaties that divided Macedonia will continue to raise legal and ethical questions and continue to generate discontent among the Macedonian people around the world. My hope is that the answers to these questions may lead to a better life for Macedonians and other ethnic and religious minorities in Greece.

Imperialism and Fascism are on the Rise in the USA

2007-07-17T16:13:00.001+02:00

If Tyranny and Oppression come to this land, it will be in the guise of fighting a foreign enemy."
James Madison (1751-1836), 4th U.S. President and author of the U.S. Constitution

"When fascism comes to America, it will be wrapped in the flag and carring the cross."
Sinclair Lewis, (It Can't Happen Here, 1935)

"Unhappy events abroad have retaught us two simple truths about the liberty of a democratic people. The first truth is that the liberty of a democracy is not safe if the people tolerate the growth of a private power to a point where it becomes stronger than the democratic state itself. That, in its essence, is fascism - ownership of government by an individual, by a group, or by any other controlling private power."
Franklin D. Roosevelt (1882-1945), 32nd US President

"...An empire is a despotism, and an emperor is a despot, bound by no law or limitation but his own will; it is a stretch of tyranny beyond absolute monarchy. For, although the will of an absolute monarch is law, yet his edicts must be registered by parliaments. Even this formality is not necessary in an empire."
John Adams (1735-1826), 2nd American President

"I'm the commander in chief, see, I don't need to explain, I do not need to explain why I say things. That's the interesting part about being president. Maybe somebody needs to explain to me why they say something, but I don't feel like I owe anybody an explanation."
George W. Bush, quoted in Bob Woodward's book 'Bush at War'

It may be partly a consequence of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, and the perceived rising external threat coming from fanatical Islamists, but it is undeniable that imperialism abroad and fascism at home are on the rise in 21st Century America. This is amazing, because, along with totalitarian communism, these were precisely the two most disastrous political diseases of the 20th Century against which the United States and other democracies fought. They led to two world wars and turned the 20th Century into the most murderous century in the history of mankind. —Such a development is important for the United States, but it is also of paramount importance for all the other democracies, because if the United States, which has one of the best democratic constitutions in the world, falls to a form of benign totalitarianism, what is the fate of democracy elsewhere?

Before we proceed, let us define a few terms. Indeed, what is imperialism? What is fascism? What is totalitarianism? And what is democracy?

Firstly, imperialism is the use of force in international relations outside the realm of international law and the requirements of self-defense, with the purpose of taking control of foreign countries, their populations and their resources, and with the express intention of changing their cultures or systems of government.

—The best book on imperialism is J.A. Hobson's Imperialism: A Study (1902).
Secondly, fascism is a political regime that is characterized by a high degree of concentration of power in the state, in one political party or in one person, accompanied by a messianic and belligerent form of nationalism, by the usurpation of legislative and judicial prerogative by the executive branch of the government, by the suppression of individual freedoms at home, by the worshipping of national symbols such as flags, and by a rise of militarism and the pursuit of military expansions abroad, often so as to avenge some perceived humiliation.

—One of the best books on fascism is Robert O. Paxton's The Anatomy of Fascism (2004).
Thirdly, totalitarianism is a broad concept concerning the exercise of power by one party or one person within a country through force, while being unrestrained by laws or by rules.

—Perhaps the best book on totalitarianism is Hannah Arendt's The Origins of Totalitarianism (1958).

Finally, democracy is a form of government where the citizens’ preferences are paramount in adopting public policies and where people elect a government of the people, by the people and for the people. It rests on the rule of law, the decentralization and separation of powers, and the protection of fundamental liberties and individual rights. It is the antithesis of imperialism, fascism and all types of totalitarianism.

— A classic analysis of American-style democracy is Alexis de Tocqueville's Democracy in America (1835).

Now, let us look at a few facts and events that have recently taken place in the United States. When they are placed together to form a whole, they form a powerful political and legal framework that could allow President George W. Bush or any other politician to run the United States by decree rather than by the will of the people.

First, there is the September 2002 Neocon imperialist doctrine adopted by the Bush-Cheney administration that was used to launch the March 2003 illegal military invasion of Iraq. This was done according to the imperialistic "Bush Doctrine" of pre-emptive wars1., of international unilateralism, and of American assertive military supremacy around the world. —According to this hubristic foreign policy doctrine, the United States could invade any country, especially in the Middle East, in order to impose a local democratic government friendly to the United States and its allies. The occupied country would then become a model to other countries which would adopt the same type of political regime and the same policies. —We all know how this new imperialistic doctrine has fared in Iraq and what have been its disastrous consequences.

The 2002 'Bush Doctrine', in asserting the right for the U.S. to invade other nations for vague reasons of social engineering, nation building or regime change, represents a repudiation of the Nuremberg Principles and the United Nations Charter's ban on wars of aggression, both strongly supported by American leaders sixty years ago. For example, the Nuremberg Charter stipulates that “To initiate a war of aggression…is not only an international crime, it is the supreme international crime." As for the U.N. Charter, its Preamble says that it has been established "to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war."

Second, in a manner somewhat reminiscent of the regime of Adolf Hitler suspending the right of habeas corpus in Germany on February 28, 1933, the Bush-Cheney regime also suspended the right of habeas corpus in the United States. Indeed, on October 17, 2006, President George W. Bush signed into law S.3930, the Military Commissions Act, a law that cancels the right of habeas corpus for foreigners accused of terrorism and for both Americans and foreigners who have been designated as “enemy combatants” by the Executive branch. Under this law, any individual, citizen or non-citizen, can be deprived of the protection of due process at the whim of the Executive branch, and be imprisoned indefinitely without legal recourse. —The United States is probably the only country in the world where the right of habeas corpus has been suspended and yet is still being called a 'democratic' country.

Third, the Defense Authorization Act of 2006 (H.R. 1815), passed by Congress on September 30 2006, and signed into law by President George W. Bush on October 17, 2006, empowers the president to impose martial law in the event of a terrorist “incident,” if he or other federal officials perceive a shortfall of “public order”. The resort to martial law could come, for example, as a response to a terrorist attack, but it is not excluded that it could be imposed if some antiwar protests were to get unruly or after any major political disturbance. Since the current Bush-Cheney administration got away with declaring a war abroad on a pretext, what would prevent them from imposing martial law at home also on a pretext?

Fourth, let us consider that when Congress passed the Insurrection Act in 1807, the purpose was to severely restrict the president’s ability to deploy the military within the United States. The Posse Comitatus Act of 1878, tightened these restrictions, imposing a two-year prison sentence on anyone who used the military within the U.S. without the express permission of Congress. Indeed, its Section 1385 .(Use of Army and Air Force as posse comitatus), as later amended, states that "Whoever, except in cases and under circumstances expressly authorized by the Constitution or Act of Congress, willfully uses any part of the Army or the Air Force as a posse comitatus or otherwise to execute the laws shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than two years, or both".

These protections are all gone now. —Indeed, the adoption of the John Warner National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007 (H.R. 5122) changed the name of the key provision in the statute book from “Insurrection Act” to “Enforcement of the Laws to Restore Public Order Act.” —While the U.S. Insurrection Act of 1807 stated that the president could deploy troops within the United States only “to suppress, in a State, any insurrection, domestic violence, unlawful combination, or conspiracy”, the new law allows the president not only to declare martial law and rule by decree, but it also gives the president the power to take charge of United States National Guard troops without the states’ governors’ authorization. The law also expands the list of such permissible cases for martial law to include “natural disaster, epidemic, or other serious public health emergency, terrorist attack or incident, or other condition”—and such “condition” is not defined or limited in scope. All the safeguards against the use of the military at home have been removed in favor of new powers being given to the president to do so nearly at his whim.

Fifth, the National Security and Homeland Security Presidential Directive, signed by President George W. Bush on May 4, 2007, an event that was generally not covered by U.S. mainstream media or discussed by the U.S. Congress, goes even further and declares that in the event of a “catastrophic event”, the president can become what is best described as a de facto dictator: "The President shall lead the activities of the Federal Government for ensuring constitutional government."

Sixth, on March 15, 2004, the National Security Agency's wire-tapping and domestic spying program, without proper judicial supervision, was authorized by the Bush-Cheney White House, without Justice Department approval and over the objections of then-Attorney General John Ashcroft. This was an illegal program of domestic spying, because it violated the 1978 Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, which established a panel of judges to hear wiretap requests in secret. When a government begins to violate the law, there is no way of knowing in advance where this will lead and how far it will go. It is an open field.

And seventh, there is the practice of submitting detainees to torture and to other degrading treatments despite the clear obligation not to do so under international law and under U.S. law. It is truly amazing that the Bush-Cheney White House had to be reminded by the Supreme Court, in June 2006, that it had to abide by the Geneva Conventions. —It seems they could not figure that out by themselves.

These are seven ominous developments among the most serious, some having gone nearly unnoticed within the United States, but which would have the Fathers of the U.S. Constitution turning in their graves, if they could see what has been done to their work. Technically, there is still a fair amount of personal liberty and freedom in the United States for the average person, but this could change at the drop of a hat, or more likely, at the stroke of a pen. Over the last six years, the Bush-Cheney administration has been unmistakably shifting the USA toward imperialism and toward fascism.

—This is not to deny that we live in dangerous and taxing times, but Americans should pray that no major catastrophic event occur under George W. Bush's watch, because all the necessary apparatus has been set into place to suspend liberties and freedoms and impose a fascist-like regime upon the American people when the pretext presents itself. This is a sobering thought.

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[1] -Bush’s March 20, 2003 Iraq War was a preventive war, not a pre-emptive war, since there was no imminent military threat coming from Iraq. However, the Bush administration, in its September 19, 2002, so-called “Bush Doctrine” document, asserted that they were ready to “act preemptively”, “to forestall or prevent such hostile acts by our adversaries.” Also, when they raised the issue of the “mushroom cloud”, they justified (wrongly, I agree) their coming war as a pre-emptive one, not as a preventive one. So, in its official political vocabulary, the Bush-Cheney regime has affirmed that the Iraq War was a pre-emptive one, even if legally it was not.

Darfur? It’s the Oil, Stupid...

2007-05-26T00:30:00.000+02:00

To paraphrase the famous quip during the 1992 US Presidential debates, when an unknown William Jefferson Clinton told then-President George Herbert Walker Bush, “It’s the economy, stupid,” the present concern of the current Washington Administration over Darfur in southern Sudan is not, if we were to look closely, genuine concern over genocide against the peoples in that poorest of poor part of a forsaken section of Africa.

No. “It’s the oil, stupid.”

Hereby hangs a tale of cynical dimension appropriate to a Washington Administration that has shown no regard for its own genocide in Iraq, when its control over major oil reserves is involved. What’s at stake in the battle for Darfur? Control over oil, lots and lots of oil.

The case of Darfur, a forbidding piece of sun-parched real estate in the southern part of Sudan, illustrates the new Cold War over oil, where the dramatic rise in China’s oil demand to fuel its booming growth has led Beijing to embark on an aggressive policy of—ironically-- dollar diplomacy. With its more than $1.3 trillion in mainly US dollar reserves at the Peoples’ National Bank of China, Beijing is engaging in active petroleum geopolitics. Africa is a major focus, and in Africa, the central region between Sudan and Chad is priority. This is defining a major new front in what, since the US invasion of Iraq in 2003, is a new Cold War between Washington and Beijing over control of major oil sources. So far Beijing has played its cards a bit more cleverly than Washington. Darfur is a major battleground in this high-stakes contest for oil control.

China Oil diplomacy

In recent months, Beijing has embarked on a series of initiatives designed to secure long-term raw materials sources from one of the planet’s most endowed regions—the African subcontinent. No raw material has higher priority in Beijing at present than the securing of long term oil sources.

Today China draws an estimated 30% of its crude oil from Africa. That explains an extraordinary series of diplomatic initiatives which have left Washington furious. China is using no-strings-attached dollar credits to gain access to Africa’s vast raw material wealth, leaving Washington’s typical control game via the World Bank and IMF out in the cold. Who needs the painful medicine of the IMF when China gives easy terms and builds roads and schools to boot?

In November last year Beijing hosted an extraordinary summit of 40 African heads of state. They literally rolled out the red carpet for the heads of among others Algeria, Nigeria, Mali, Angola, Central African Republic, Zambia, South Africa.

China has just done an oil deal, linking the Peoples Republic of China with the continent's two largest nations - Nigeria and South Africa. China's CNOC will lift the oil in Nigeria, via a consortium that also includes South African Petroleum Co. giving China access to what could be 175,000 barrels a day by 2008. It’s a $2.27 billion deal that gives state-controlled CNOC a 45% stake in a large off-shore Nigeria oil field. Previously, Nigeria had been considered in Washington to be an asset of the Anglo-American oil majors, ExxonMobil, Shell and Chevron.

China has been generous in dispensing its soft loans, with no interest or outright grants to some of the poorest debtor states of Africa. The loans have gone to infrastructure including highways, hospitals, and schools, a stark contrast to the brutal austerity demands of the IMF and World Bank. In 2006 China committed more than $8 billion to Nigeria, Angola and Mozambique, versus $2.3 billion to all sub-Saharan Africa from the World Bank. Ghana is negotiating a $1.2 billion Chinese electrification loan. Unlike the World Bank, a de facto arm of US foreign economic policy, China shrewdly attaches no strings to its loans.

This oil-related Chinese diplomacy has led to the bizarre accusation from Washington that Beijing is trying to “secure oil at the sources,” something Washington foreign policy has itself been preoccupied with for at least a Century.

No source of oil has been more the focus of China-US oil conflict of late than Sudan, home of Darfur.

Sudan oil riches

Beijing’s China National Petroleum Company, CNPC, is Sudan’s largest foreign investor, with some $5 billion in oil field development. Since 1999 China has invested at least $15 billion in Sudan. It owns 50% of an oil refinery near Khartoum with the Sudan government. The oil fields (see graphic) are concentrated in the south, site of a long-simmering civil war, partly financed covertly by the United States, to break the south from the Islamic Khartoum-centered north.

CNPC built an oil pipeline from its concession blocs 1, 2 and 4 in southern Sudan, to a new terminal at Port Sudan on the Red Sea where oil is loaded on tankers for China. Eight percent of China’s oil now comes from southern Sudan. China takes up to 65% to 80% of Sudan’s 500,000 barrels/day of oil production. Sudan last year was China’s fourth largest foreign oil source. In 2006 China passed Japan to become the world’s second largest importer of oil after the United States, importing 6.5 million barrels a day of the black gold. With its oil demand growing by an estimated 30% a year, China will pass the US in oil import demand in a few years. That reality is the motor driving Beijing foreign policy in Africa. (Source: USAID)

A look at the southern Sudan oil concessions shows that China’s CNPC holds rights to bloc 6 which straddles Darfur, near the border to Chad and the Central African Republic. In April 2005 Sudan’s government announced it had found oil in South Darfur whoich is estimated to be able when developed to pump 500,000 barrels/day. The world press forgot to report that vital fact in discussing the Darfur conflict.

Using the genocide charge to militarize Sudan’s oil region

Genocide was the preferred theme, and Washington was the orchestra conductor. Curiously, while all observers acknowledge that Darfur has seen a large human displacement and human misery and tens of thousands or even as much as 300,000 deaths in the last several years, only Washington and the NGO’s close to it use the charged term “genocide” to describe Darfur. If they are able to get a popular acceptance of the charge genocide, it opens the possibility for drastic “regime change” intervention by NATO and de facto by Washington into Sudan’s sovereign affairs.

The genocide theme is being used, with full-scale Hollywood backing from the likes of pop stars like George Clooney, to orchestrate the case for a de facto NATO occupation of the region. So far the Sudan government has vehemently refused, not surprisingly.

The US Government repeatedly uses “genocide” to refer to Darfur. It is the only government to do so. US Assistant Secretary of State Ellen Sauerbrey, head of the Bureau of Population, Refugees and Migration, said during a USINFO online interview last November 17, "The ongoing genocide in Darfur, Sudan — a 'gross violation' of human rights — is among the top international issues of concern to the United States." The Bush administration keeps insisting that genocide has been going on in Darfur since 2003, despite the fact that a five-man panel UN mission led by Italian Judge Antonio Cassese reported in 2004 that genocide had not been committed in Darfur, rather that grave human rights abuses were committed. They called for war crime trials.

Merchants of death

The United States, acting through surrogate allies in Chad and neighboring states has trained and armed the Sudan Peoples’ Liberation Army, headed until his death in July 2005, by John Garang, trained at US Special Forces school at Fort Benning, Georgia.

By pouring arms into first southern Sudan in the eastern part and since discovery of oil in Darfur, to that region as well, Washington fuelled the conflict that led to tens of thousands dying and several million driven to flee their homes. Eritrea hosts and supports the SPLA, the umbrella NDA opposition group, and the Eastern Front and Darfur rebels.

There are two rebel groups fighting in Sudan's Darfur region against the Khartoum central government of President Omar al-Bashir-- the Justice for Equality Movement (JEM) and the larger Sudan Liberation Army (SLA).

In February 2003 the SLA launched attacks on Sudan government positions in the Darfur region. SLA Secretary-General Minni Arkou Minnawi called for armed struggle, accusing the government of ignoring Darfur. "The objective of the SLA is to create a united democratic Sudan.” In other words, regime change in Sudan.

The US Senate adopted a resolution in February 2006 that requested North Atlantic Treaty Organization troops in Darfur, as well as a stronger U.N. peacekeeping force with a robust mandate. A month later, President Bush also called for additional NATO forces in Darfur. Uh huh... Genocide? Or oil?

The Pentagon has been busy training African military officers in the US, much as it has for Latin American officers for decades. Its International Military Education and Training (IMET) program has provided training to military officers from Chad, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Cameroon and the Central African Republic, in effect every country on Sudan’s border. Much of the arms that have fuelled the killing in Darfur and the south have been brought in via murky, protected private “merchants of death” such as the notorious former KGB operative, now with offices in the US, Victor Bout. Bout has been cited repeatedly in recent years for selling weapons across Africa. US Government officials strangely leave his operations in Texas and Florida untouched despite the fact he is on the Interpol wanted list for money laundering.

US development aid for all Sub-Sahara Africa including Chad, has been cut sharply in recent years while its military aid has risen. Oil and the scramble for strategic raw materials is the clear reason. The region of southern Sudan from the Upper Nile to the borders of Chad is rich in oil. Washington knew that long before the Sudanese government.

Chevron’s 1974 oil project

US oil majors have known about Sudan’s oil wealth since the early 1970’s. In 1979, Jafaar Nimeiry, Sudan head of state, broke with the Soviets and invited Chevron to develop oil in the Sudan. That was perhaps a fatal mistake. UN Ambassador George H.W. Bush had personally told Nimeiry of satellite photos indicating oil in Sudan. Nimeiry took the bait. Wars over oil have been the consequence even since.

Chevron found big oil reserves in southern Sudan. It spent $1.2 billion finding and testing them. That oil triggered what is called Sudan’s second civil war in 1983. Chevron was target of repeated attacks and killings and suspended the project in 1984. In 1992, it sold it's Sudanese oil concessions. Then China began to develop the abandoned Chevron fields in 1999 with notable results.

But Chevron is not far from Darfur today.

Chad oil and pipeline politics

Condi Rice’s Chevron is in neighboring Chad, together with the other US oil giant, ExxonMobil. They’ve just built a $3.7 billion oil pipeline carrying 160,000 barrels/day of oil from Doba in central Chad near Darfur Sudan, via Cameroon to Kribi on the Atlantic Ocean, destined for US refineries.

To do it, they worked with Chad “President for life,” Idriss Deby, a corrupt despot who has been accused of feeding US-supplied arms to the Darfur rebels. Deby joined Washington’s Pan Sahel Initiative run by the Pentagon’s US-European Command, to train his troops to fight “Islamic terrorism.” The majority of the tribes in Darfur region are Islamic.

Supplied with US military aid, training and weapons, in 2004 Deby launched the initial strike that set off the conflict in Darfur, using members of his elite Presidential Guard who originate from the province, providing the men with all terrain vehicles, arms and anti-aircraft guns to Darfur rebels fighting the Khartoum government in the southwest Sudan. The US military support to Deby in fact had been the trigger for the Darfur bloodbath. Khartoum reacted and the ensuing debacle was unleashed in full tragic force.

Washington-backed NGO’s and the US Government claim unproven genocide as a pretext to ultimately bring UN/NATO troops into the oilfields of Darfur and south Sudan. Oil, not human misery, is behind Washington’s new interest in Darfur.

The “Darfur genocide” campaign began in 2003, the same time the Chad-Cameroon pipeline oil began to flow. The US now had a base in Chad to go after Darfur oil and, potentially, co-opt China’s new oil sources. Darfur is strategic, straddling Chad, Central African Republic, Egypt and Libya.

US military objectives in Darfur—and the Horn of Africa more widely—are being served at present by the US and NATO backing of the African Union troops in Darfur. There NATO provides ground and air support for AU troops who are categorized as “neutral” and “peacekeepers.” Sudan is at war on three fronts, each country-- Uganda, Chad, and Ethiopia-- with a significant US military presence and ongoing US military programs. The war in Sudan involves both US covert operations and US trained “rebel” factions coming in from South Sudan, Chad, Ethiopia and Uganda.

Chad’s Deby looks to China too

The completion of the US and World Bank-financed oil pipeline from Chad to the Cameroon coast was designed as one part of a far grander Washington scheme to control the oil riches of central Africa from Sudan to the entire Gulf of Guinea.

But Washington’s erstwhile pal, Chad’s President for Life, Idriss Deby, began to get unhappy with his small share of the US-controlled oil profits. When he and the Chad Parliament decided in early 2006 to take more of the oil revenues to finance military operations and beef up its army, new World Bank President, Iraq war architect, Paul Wolfowitz, moved to suspend loans to the country. Then that August, after Deby had won re-election, he created Chad’s own oil company, SHT, and threatened to expel Chevron and Malaysia’s Petronas for not paying taxes owed, and demanding a 60% share of the Chad oil prieline. In the end he came to terms with the oil companies, but winds of change were blowing.

Deby also faces growing internal opposition from a Chad rebel group, United Front for Change, known under its French name as FUC, which he claims is being covertly funded by Sudan. This region is a very complex part of the world of war. The FUC has based itself in Darfur.

Into this unstable situation, Beijing has shown up in Chad with a full coffer of aid money in hand. In late January, Chinese President Hu Jintao made a state visit to Sudan and to Cameroon among other African states. In 2006, China’s leaders visited no less than 48 African states. In August 2006 Beijing hosted Chad’s Foreign Minister for talks and resumption of formal diplomatic ties cut in 1997. China has begin to import oil from Chad as well as Sudan. Not that much oil, but if Beijing has its way, that will soon change.

This April, Chad’s Foreign Minister announced that talks with China over greater China participation in Chad’s oil development were “progressing well.” He referred to the terms the Chinese seek for oil development, calling them, “much more equal partnerships than those we are used to having.”

The Chinese economic presence in Chad, ironically, may be more effective in calming the fighting and displacement in Darfur than any African Union or UN troop presence ever could. That would not be welcome for some people in Washington and at Chevron headquarters, as they would not find the oil falling into their greasy bloody hands.

Chad and Darfur are but part of the vast China effort to secure “oil at the source” across Africa. Oil is also the prime factor in US Africa policy today. George W. Bush’s interest in Africa includes a new US base in Sao Tome/Principe 124 miles off the Gulf of Guinea from which it can control Gulf of Guinea oilfields from Angola in the south to Congo, Gabon, Equitorial Guinea, Cameroon and Nigeria. That just happens to be the very same areas where recent Chinese diplomatic and investment activity has focussed.

“West Africa’s oil has become of national strategic interest to us,” stated US Assistant Secretary of State for Africa, Walter Kansteiner already back in 2002. Darfur and Chad are but an extension of the US Iraq policy “with other means”—control of oil everywhere. China is challenging that control “everywhere,” especially in Africa. It amounts to a new undeclared Cold War over oil.

New presidential directive gives Bush dictatorial power

2007-05-22T11:47:00.000+02:00

National Security & Homeland Security Presidential Directive establishes "National Continuity Policy"

The National Security and Homeland Security Presidential Directive, signed on May 9, 2007 declares that in the event of a “catastrophic event”, George W. Bush can become what is best described as "a dictator":

"The President shall lead the activities of the Federal Government for ensuring constitutional government."

This directive, completely unnoticed by the media, and given no scrutiny by Congress, literally gives the White House unprecedented dictatorial power over the government and the country, bypassing the US Congress and obliterating the separation of powers. The directive also placed the Secretary of Homeland Security in charge of domestic “security”.

The full text is below. A critical analysis on the directive can be found here.

This is another step towards official martial law (see “US government fans homeland security fears”), which suggests that a new "catastrophic event" 9/11-type pretext could be in the pipeline.

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National Security and Homeland Security Presidential Directive

NATIONAL SECURITY PRESIDENTIAL DIRECTIVE/NSPD 51

HOMELAND SECURITY PRESIDENTIAL DIRECTIVE/HSPD-20

Subject: National Continuity Policy

Purpose

(1) This directive establishes a comprehensive national policy on the continuity of Federal Government structures and operations and a single National Continuity Coordinator responsible for coordinating the development and implementation of Federal continuity policies. This policy establishes "National Essential Functions," prescribes continuity requirements for all executive departments and agencies, and provides guidance for State, local, territorial, and tribal governments, and private sector organizations in order to ensure a comprehensive and integrated national continuity program that will enhance the credibility of our national security posture and enable a more rapid and effective response to and recovery from a national emergency.

Definitions

(2) In this directive:

(a) "Category" refers to the categories of executive departments and agencies listed in Annex A to this directive;

(b) "Catastrophic Emergency" means any incident, regardless of location, that results in extraordinary levels of mass casualties, damage, or disruption severely affecting the U.S. population, infrastructure, environment, economy, or government functions;

(c) "Continuity of Government," or "COG," means a coordinated effort within the Federal Government's executive branch to ensure that National Essential Functions continue to be performed during a Catastrophic Emergency;

(d) "Continuity of Operations," or "COOP," means an effort within individual executive departments and agencies to ensure that Primary Mission-Essential Functions continue to be performed during a wide range of emergencies, including localized acts of nature, accidents, and technological or attack-related emergencies;

(e) "Enduring Constitutional Government," or "ECG," means a cooperative effort among the executive, legislative, and judicial branches of the Federal Government, coordinated by the President, as a matter of comity with respect to the legislative and judicial branches and with proper respect for the constitutional separation of powers among the branches, to preserve the constitutional framework under which the Nation is governed and the capability of all three branches of government to execute constitutional responsibilities and provide for orderly succession, appropriate transition of leadership, and interoperability and support of the National Essential Functions during a catastrophic emergency;

(f) "Executive Departments and Agencies" means the executive departments enumerated in 5 U.S.C. 101, independent establishments as defined by 5 U.S.C. 104(1), Government corporations as defined by 5 U.S.C. 103(1), and the United States Postal Service;

(g) "Government Functions" means the collective functions of the heads of executive departments and agencies as defined by statute, regulation, presidential direction, or other legal authority, and the functions of the legislative and judicial branches;

(h) "National Essential Functions," or "NEFs," means that subset of Government Functions that are necessary to lead and sustain the Nation during a catastrophic emergency and that, therefore, must be supported through COOP and COG capabilities; and

(i) "Primary Mission Essential Functions," or "PMEFs," means those Government Functions that must be performed in order to support or implement the performance of NEFs before, during, and in the aftermath of an emergency.

Policy

(3) It is the policy of the United States to maintain a comprehensive and effective continuity capability composed of Continuity of Operations and Continuity of Government programs in order to ensure the preservation of our form of government under the Constitution and the continuing performance of National Essential Functions under all conditions.

Implementation Actions

(4) Continuity requirements shall be incorporated into daily operations of all executive departments and agencies. As a result of the asymmetric threat environment, adequate warning of potential emergencies that could pose a significant risk to the homeland might not be available, and therefore all continuity planning shall be based on the assumption that no such warning will be received. Emphasis will be placed upon geographic dispersion of leadership, staff, and infrastructure in order to increase survivability and maintain uninterrupted Government Functions. Risk management principles shall be applied to ensure that appropriate operational readiness decisions are based on the probability of an attack or other incident and its consequences.

(5) The following NEFs are the foundation for all continuity programs and capabilities and represent the overarching responsibilities of the Federal Government to lead and sustain the Nation during a crisis, and therefore sustaining the following NEFs shall be the primary focus of

the Federal Government leadership during and in the aftermath of an emergency that adversely affects the performance of Government Functions:

(a) Ensuring the continued functioning of our form of government under the Constitution, including the functioning of the three separate branches of government;

(b) Providing leadership visible to the Nation and the world and maintaining the trust and confidence of the American people;

(c) Defending the Constitution of the United States against all enemies, foreign and domestic, and preventing or interdicting attacks against the United States or its people, property, or interests;

(d) Maintaining and fostering effective relationships with foreign nations;

(e) Protecting against threats to the homeland and bringing to justice perpetrators of crimes or attacks against the United States or its people, property, or interests;

(f) Providing rapid and effective response to and recovery from the domestic consequences of an attack or other incident;

(g) Protecting and stabilizing the Nation's economy and ensuring public confidence in its financial systems; and

(h) Providing for critical Federal Government services that address the national health, safety, and welfare needs of the United States.

(6) The President shall lead the activities of the Federal Government for ensuring constitutional government. In order to advise and assist the President in that function, the Assistant to the President for Homeland Security and Counterterrorism (APHS/CT) is hereby designated as the National Continuity Coordinator. The National Continuity Coordinator, in coordination with the Assistant to the President for National

Security Affairs (APNSA), without exercising directive authority, shall coordinate the development and implementation of continuity policy for executive departments and agencies. The Continuity Policy Coordination Committee (CPCC), chaired by a Senior Director from the Homeland Security Council staff, designated by the National Continuity Coordinator, shall be the main day-to-day forum for such policy coordination.

(7) For continuity purposes, each executive department and agency is assigned to a category in accordance with the nature and characteristics of its national security roles and

responsibilities in support of the Federal Government's ability to sustain the NEFs. The Secretary of Homeland Security shall serve as the President's lead agent for coordinating overall

continuity operations and activities of executive departments and agencies, and in such role shall perform the responsibilities set forth for the Secretary in sections 10 and 16 of this directive.

(8) The National Continuity Coordinator, in consultation with the heads of appropriate executive departments and agencies, will lead the development of a National Continuity Implementation Plan (Plan), which shall include prioritized goals and objectives, a concept of operations, performance metrics by which to measure continuity readiness, procedures for continuity and incident management activities, and clear direction to executive department and agency continuity coordinators, as well as guidance to promote interoperability of Federal Government continuity programs and procedures with State, local, territorial, and tribal governments, and private sector owners and operators of critical infrastructure, as appropriate. The Plan shall be submitted to the President for approval not later than 90 days after the date of this directive.

(9) Recognizing that each branch of the Federal Government is responsible for its own continuity programs, an official designated by the Chief of Staff to the President shall ensure that the executive branch's COOP and COG policies in support of ECG efforts are appropriately coordinated with those of

the legislative and judicial branches in order to ensure interoperability and allocate national assets efficiently to maintain a functioning Federal Government.

(10) Federal Government COOP, COG, and ECG plans and operations shall be appropriately integrated with the emergency plans and capabilities of State, local, territorial, and tribal governments, and private sector owners and operators of critical infrastructure, as appropriate, in order to promote interoperability and to prevent redundancies and conflicting lines of authority. The Secretary of Homeland Security shall coordinate the integration of Federal continuity plans and operations with State, local, territorial, and tribal governments, and private sector owners and operators of critical infrastructure, as appropriate, in order to provide for the delivery of essential services during an emergency.

(11) Continuity requirements for the Executive Office of the President (EOP) and executive departments and agencies shall include the following:

(a) The continuation of the performance of PMEFs during any emergency must be for a period up to 30 days or until normal operations can be resumed, and the capability to be fully operational at alternate sites as soon as possible after the occurrence of an emergency, but not later than 12 hours after COOP activation;

(b) Succession orders and pre-planned devolution of authorities that ensure the emergency delegation of authority must be planned and documented in advance in accordance with applicable law;

(d) Provision must be made for the acquisition of the resources necessary for continuity operations on an emergency basis;

(e) Provision must be made for the availability and redundancy of critical communications capabilities at alternate sites in order to support connectivity between

and among key government leadership, internal elements, other executive departments and agencies, critical partners, and the public;

(f) Provision must be made for reconstitution capabilities that allow for recovery from a catastrophic emergency and resumption of normal operations; and

(g) Provision must be made for the identification, training, and preparedness of personnel capable of relocating to alternate facilities to support the continuation of the performance of PMEFs.

(12) In order to provide a coordinated response to escalating threat levels or actual emergencies, the Continuity of Government Readiness Conditions (COGCON) system establishes executive branch continuity program readiness levels, focusing

on possible threats to the National Capital Region. The President will determine and issue the COGCON Level. Executive departments and agencies shall comply with the requirements and

assigned responsibilities under the COGCON program. During COOP activation, executive departments and agencies shall report their readiness status to the Secretary of Homeland Security or the Secretary's designee.

(13) The Director of the Office of Management and Budget shall:

(a) Conduct an annual assessment of executive department and agency continuity funding requests and performance data that are submitted by executive departments and agencies as part of the annual budget request process, in order to monitor progress in the implementation of the Plan and the execution of continuity budgets;

(b) In coordination with the National Continuity Coordinator, issue annual continuity planning guidance for the development of continuity budget requests; and

(c) Ensure that heads of executive departments and agencies prioritize budget resources for continuity capabilities, consistent with this directive.

(14) The Director of the Office of Science and Technology Policy shall:

(a) Define and issue minimum requirements for continuity communications for executive departments and agencies, in consultation with the APHS/CT, the APNSA, the Director of the Office of Management and Budget, and the Chief of Staff to the President;

(b) Establish requirements for, and monitor the development, implementation, and maintenance of, a comprehensive communications architecture to integrate continuity components, in consultation with the APHS/CT, the APNSA, the Director of the Office of Management and Budget, and the Chief of Staff to the President; and

(c) Review quarterly and annual assessments of continuity communications capabilities, as prepared pursuant to section 16(d) of this directive or otherwise, and report the results and recommended remedial actions to the National Continuity Coordinator.

(15) An official designated by the Chief of Staff to the President shall:

(a) Advise the President, the Chief of Staff to the President, the APHS/CT, and the APNSA on COGCON operational execution options; and

(b) Consult with the Secretary of Homeland Security in order to ensure synchronization and integration of continuity activities among the four categories of executive departments and agencies.

(16) The Secretary of Homeland Security shall:

(a) Coordinate the implementation, execution, and assessment of continuity operations and activities;

(b) Develop and promulgate Federal Continuity Directives in order to establish continuity planning requirements for executive departments and agencies;

(c) Conduct biennial assessments of individual department and agency continuity capabilities as prescribed by the Plan and report the results to the President through the APHS/CT;

(d) Conduct quarterly and annual assessments of continuity communications capabilities in consultation with an official designated by the Chief of Staff to the President;

(e) Develop, lead, and conduct a Federal continuity training and exercise program, which shall be incorporated into the National Exercise Program developed pursuant to Homeland Security Presidential Directive-8 of December 17, 2003 ("National Preparedness"), in consultation with an

official designated by the Chief of Staff to the President;

(f) Develop and promulgate continuity planning guidance to State, local, territorial, and tribal governments, and private sector critical infrastructure owners and operators;

(g) Make available continuity planning and exercise funding, in the form of grants as provided by law, to State, local, territorial, and tribal governments, and private sector critical infrastructure owners and operators; and

(h) As Executive Agent of the National Communications System, develop, implement, and maintain a comprehensive continuity communications architecture.

(17) The Director of National Intelligence, in coordination with the Attorney General and the Secretary of Homeland Security, shall produce a biennial assessment of the foreign and domestic threats to the Nation's continuity of government.

(18) The Secretary of Defense, in coordination with the Secretary of Homeland Security, shall provide secure, integrated, Continuity of Government communications to the President, the Vice President, and, at a minimum, Category I executive departments and agencies.

(19) Heads of executive departments and agencies shall execute their respective department or agency COOP plans in response to a localized emergency and shall:

(a) Appoint a senior accountable official, at the Assistant Secretary level, as the Continuity Coordinator for the department or agency;

(b) Identify and submit to the National Continuity Coordinator the list of PMEFs for the department or agency and develop continuity plans in support of the NEFs and the continuation of essential functions under all conditions;

(d) Plan, conduct, and support annual tests and training, in consultation with the Secretary of Homeland Security, in order to evaluate program readiness and ensure adequacy and viability of continuity plans and communications systems; and

(e) Support other continuity requirements, as assigned by category, in accordance with the nature and characteristics of its national security roles and responsibilities

General Provisions

(20) This directive shall be implemented in a manner that is consistent with, and facilitates effective implementation of, provisions of the Constitution concerning succession to the Presidency or the exercise of its powers, and the Presidential Succession Act of 1947 (3 U.S.C. 19), with consultation of the Vice President and, as appropriate, others involved. Heads of executive departments and agencies shall ensure that appropriate

support is available to the Vice President and others involved as necessary to be prepared at all times to implement those provisions.

(21) This directive:

(a) Shall be implemented consistent with applicable law and the authorities of agencies, or heads of agencies, vested by law, and subject to the availability of appropriations;

(b) Shall not be construed to impair or otherwise affect (i) the functions of the Director of the Office of Management and Budget relating to budget, administrative, and legislative proposals, or (ii) the authority of the Secretary of Defense over the Department of Defense, including the chain of command for military forces from the President, to the Secretary of Defense, to the commander of military forces, or military command and control procedures; and

(c) Is not intended to, and does not, create any rights or benefits, substantive or procedural, enforceable at law or in equity by a party against the United States, its

agencies, instrumentalities, or entities, its officers, employees, or agents, or any other person.

(22) Revocation. Presidential Decision Directive 67 of October 21, 1998 ("Enduring Constitutional Government and Continuity of Government Operations"), including all Annexes thereto, is hereby revoked.

(23) Annex A and the classified Continuity Annexes, attached hereto, are hereby incorporated into and made a part of this directive.

(24) Security. This directive and the information contained herein shall be protected from unauthorized disclosure, provided that, except for Annex A, the Annexes attached to this directive are classified and shall be accorded appropriate handling, consistent with applicable Executive Orders.

GEORGE W. BUSH

Was there a war in Macedonia?

2007-04-16T01:26:00.002+02:00

The conflict in 2001 between the Macedonians and the Albanians remained one of the biggest enigmas in the recent Macedonian history. Even today, five years from its outbreak and end, round tables and tribunes are being held, where still the answer to the question: what really happened in 2001 is searched. Who stood behind the Albanian armed rebellion? Was it imported or domestic and what was the real goal? Was it a war for human rights or for territories? Was it a rebellion, uprising, war or a conflict? And finally, can violence be used as a legitimate method for the realization of political goals? The conflict ended with the Framework Agreement, which though a constitutional warning earned the Macedonian Albanian community rights that no other smaller ethnical community in the European countries have.

With the statements of domestic and foreign direct and indirect actors in the conflict, in this news article we will try to clarify this most dark period since the Macedonian independence and we will try to at least give answers to the questions raised…
„The village of Tanushevci, 16.2.2001 – there was direct shooting between ARM members and four NLA members; the same day at about 15:55 in the forest, 150 meters from the old shop, two more armed people were seen raising a tent. The border security tried to identify them, however the two armed people ran and opened fire to the border security from many positions from the forest. From our side there were no casualties nor injured, while one person was killed from their side. After the retreat of our patrol, on the opposite side five people in black uniforms were seen (Kosovo Defense Corps) who opened fire to our border guards…”
This report was put on the working table of the Chief of ARM General Staff, Jovan Andreeveski, the morning of February 17, 2001. No one expected this to be the introduction to a new, to put it mildly, uncertain chapter of Macedonia, with the epilog of 71 casualties from Macedonian and 76 casualties from Albanian side, demolished villages, mosques and churches in the crisis regions, displaced families… the Minister of Interior Affairs at that time, Dosta Dimovska, today says that even since November 200, they received warnings for big terrorist and criminal groups.
”We received such information and took measures for intensive security and increased presence of police in the border region. However, the border between Macedonia and Kosovo was guarded from only one side, the Macedonian side, while from the Kosovo side, the border was not guarded,” stated Dimovska in an article for the “Utrinski Vesnik” newspaper.
A problem was the undivided authorizations between the Armed forces and the Police. “The Armed forces then were authorized for guarding the border line, and the Police for area of 10 around the border line,” said Dimovska. “The armed conflict commenced with Tanushevci and its occupation by armed terrorist groups and keeping hostage of the civilian population. The first actions of the police and the armed forces were against these terrorist groups. Soon the penetration of Kosovo terrorist groups was intensified, and the Albanian population soon started joining these terrorist groups,” says Dimovska.
The attacks on the police station in Tearce on January 22, 2001 and on the passenger train from Skopje to Kichevo on January 26, 2001, the first signals of violence which threatened Macedonia appeared. In this assault the police officer Momir Stojanovski from Kriva Palanka lost his life, while three police officers were wounded. The assault was executed by the people who after the shooting ran away with a vehicle towards Kosovo. The so called National Liberation Army (NLA) took responsibility for the two incidents.
These was seeming calmness and serenity among the government officials, however the foreign and domestic press wrote about the possibility of military crisis in Macedonia. The village of Tanushevci was mentioned as one of the critical places.

The story of A1 TV Station
For the citizens in Tanushevci, the closest shopping malls, the stores and petrol stations are in Kosovo, not in Macedonia. When the Serbian and Macedonian government reached an agreement on the border status, the population of the Albanian villages from both sides of the border strongly opposed. For many years people crossed the border, many of whom without appropriate traveling documents. It is believed that the agreement on the border initiated the first intrusion on the Kosovo-Macedonian border in February 2001.
On February 16, a team from A1 TV station went to investigate the speculations about Tanushevci and fell into the hands of NLA. The opposition party SDSM felt that this event was deliberately staged to take the attention off of the “tapping of politicians and news reporters” scandal and the required resignation by the Minister of Interior, Dosta Dimovska.
”What we believe to be a coincidence should probably make everyone in the State think, because with each big scandal by the Government, each political crises, such as the resignation by Dosta Dimivska now, the pillar of the inter-ethnic relations is used to hide the big scandals,” stated Vlado Buchkovski, then a spokes person of SDSM.
Towards the end of February, the village of Tanushevci was under siege for days by the armed Albanian paramilitary forces. The Government, however, decided to act in a “diplomatic” way.
“Getting near the houses to register if there are people, means at the same time acceptance of the armed conflict, and this is according to me the intent of this armed group. But we do not want to fall for this,” stated the Minister of Defense of that time, Ljuben Paunovski.
Pande Petrovski, the latter Chief of the General Staff of the Macedonian Armed Forces, in his witness of the war in the article by “Utrinski Vesnik” news paper stated:
“Since the very beginning it was practically a war. It was an aggression by a foreign state on our territory. The first actions which occurred in the area of Tanushevci and Malino Maalo were by fighters or members of the Kosovo Defense Corps which crossed our border and entered our territory. There were 25 people from the Kosovo Defense Corps and five people from the village of Tanushevci.”

Missed assessment by Trajan Gocevski
In the beginning the Macedonian Government reacted with underestimation, proclaiming NLA for inexistent phantom organization. During the first days of the attacks, the Prime Minister Ljupcho Georgievski announced: “We indeed feel and the assessment is that the situation in the State is stable. I will only remind that there are many States in the World where terrorist incident occur, and no one says that those countries are instable.”
The biggest mistake in the assessment of the situation was made by the at that time member of the National Security Council, PhD. Trajan Gocevski, who said: “My personal assessment is that currently Macedonia and its national security are in no way directly threatened. Within the State I believe that the institutions function on a satisfactory level. Certain appearances in Macedonia occur, which are not wanted at all, however if we take into consideration the latest announcements by the government organs, I feel that they are in a position where they control this situation.”
And while the government was completely disoriented, wondering what befall upon the state, NLA was slowly forming a corridor through which the foreign reporters easily reached their leaders, giving to the World the one-sided truth about the conflict between the Macedonians and the Albanians. The incapability of the Macedonian Government to handle the NLA threats was the first indicator that NLA was a lot stronger then what it was thought. It had five brigades which performed operations in Kumanovo (113 brigade), Skopje (114 brigade), the Tetovo region (112 brigade) and the areas around Gostivar (116 brigade) and Radusha (115).
According to Ahmeti, there were around 5 thousand members of NLA during the crises, however according to the foreign and domestic military analysis it counted not more than 2-3 thousand members, while the brigades were recognized and enumerated before the end of the conflict in the second half of 2001.
“We could not avoid the conflict with the Albanians from Kosovo who interacted with the Albanians who had settled in the Kumanovo-Tetovo villages near the border from 1981 and on,” says Professor Ljubomir Frchkovski who at that time was advisor to the President Boris Trajkovski.
“When the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) ended its part with the tension in Southern Serbia, they simply oriented themselves towards entering Macedonia, because those were groups who did not think of disarming themselves and who made business of the war. From the NLA communiqués it could have been deducted that it was a war with racist program, a war for territories and a war against the Slavic population, and later it transformed itself into a war for rights,” witnesses Frchkovski.

Moujahedines in NLA
Among the NLA there were those who called themselves “dogs of war”, who already had experience fighting in Croatia, Bosnia and Kosovo. The greater part, however, were Kosovo people, former or at that time current members of the Kosovo Defense Corps, who were already trained and armed by foreign trainers during the NATO war against the regime of Slobodan Miloshevich. A group of moujahedines were a part of the forces, which fought for money in the Balkan wars in the period after the fall of Yugoslavia. The members of those groups were responsible for the greatest number of murders of the members of the Macedonian armed forces. Jezair Shakiri, known as commander Hodza or Dzeza, claimed that Ali Ahmeti in 1999 believed that the war operations in Macedonia will be possible in 2003 or 2003 at the earliest. Shakiri, who led the group which seized Tanushevci in February 2001 and who later was a commander in the KLA operations in Arachinovo in June 2001, claimed that Ahmeti had made that assessment upon the entrance of KFOR in Kosovo. Some of the leaders of NDP (Kastriot Hadziredza) were in close contact with the NLA core even before the conflict in Macedonia. They stimulated the meetings in Kosovo and Macedonia in the beginning of March 2001, where the Tetovo Old Fortress activities were discussed and agreed upon. They claim that if the public finds out the details of these meetings, the idea of who is who in the former NLA will be drastically changed. Fazli Veliu was a leader of the Kosovo National Movement, and one of the financiers of NLA and of other Albanian organizations. He is the uncle of Ali Ahmeti and they are both born in the Kichevo area. Fazli Veliu was in prison in Germany, where he waited to be extradited in Macedonia. On March 13, 2000, the Former Political Prisoners Organization gathered signatures in Macedonia, which were to be sent in the German embassy, protesting against the hand over of Veliu. The petition was signed by 20 members of parliament from the Albanian political parties. The Minister of Justice, Dzevdet Nasufu withdrew and chose not to activate the arrest warrant (the request) for the extradition of Velui and he was released from the prison in Germany. These reports give support to the speculations about the relations which existed before 2001 between the NLA and the Albanian political parties in Macedonia. It is believed that the NLA recruitment was enlarged from May mainly because of the military intervention of the Macedonian government and because of NLA self confidence, its success and the occupation of territory.
Hisni Shakiri, Member of Parliament from DPA, who became member of NLA, today says that his first meetings with NLA occurred in the beginning of March, 2001. “At that time NLA was already acting in the Karadak region”, narrates Shakiri today. “The meetings became more frequent in the middle of March in the time when NLA’s structures started appearing in uniforms in the bigger villages in the Lipkovo region”, told Veliu for the “Utrinski Vesnik” newspaper.

Shakiri’s Story
“In the middle of March, the situation worsened greatly. There was panic among the civilian population (the Albanians) due to the withdrawal of NLA from the Tetovo Old Fortress on March 24. This increased the insecurity with the Albanian population. This was in the period when there was great movement and I, as a member of parliament, took the obligation to join the NLA in order to give them political support, to encourage the population not to leave their homes and to inform the domestic and international public that the problem is internal and is not taken from abroad. Thus, on March 27, 2001 I informed all media that I am joining the NLA”, said Hisni Shakiri. “The fact that I joined NLA increased the moral among the young and a voluntarily mobilization commenced, which led to increased number of NLA soldiers. The population started feeling safer because now they were counting on a consolidated military force which would defend them from the possible attacks of the government forces. This created a favorable atmosphere and the population started thinking differently and they all decided to remain in their homes and to defend themselves together with NLA,” said Shakiri.
Shakiri claims that the good relations between the civilian Albanian population and the NLA contributed to the success of their military front. “The war was terrible and it took young lives every day” he says today. Two days after the attack in Tearce, NLA announced its program. “So far we the Albanians demanded our rights through a dialogue and in a peaceful manner by using the institutions, but they (the demands) were ignored.
The Macedonian authorities used state terror methods to answer to these peaceful demands, as was the case in Skopje, Ljubanishta, Tetovo, Gostivar and Kichevo. The Albanian-Macedonian dialogue that so far took place between anti-Albanian politicians the Macedonian authorities has no point. Successful negotiations with the Macedonians can be achieved only with international mediation. The National Liberation Army (NLA) is a force that will use weapons to fight until Macedonia becomes a constitutional Macedonian-Albanian State. We want to preserve Macedonia’s sovereignty and territorial integrity. We respect NATO and US interests, what we want in Macedonia is the rights that belong to us and we will fight until we get them” was stated in the proclamation.
Macedonia was viewed as the exception in the region for a long time and until 2001 was also considered the most successful country in regard to its integrity and cooperation with the EU and NATO. However, the international community started becoming more and more aware of the inter-ethnic tensions in Macedonia. The tense inter-ethnic climate explains the rapid escalation often conflict that jeopardized the country’s stability. There were fresh skirmishes in Tanushevci early in 2001 and the target was an ARM patrol which came under sniper fire twice. There were three casualties on March 4. An ARM vehicle that was driving towards the border post Tanushevci, municipality Ramno region, ran over an antitank mine, which killed Kirche Dimitrov and Dejan Jakimovski. Only fifteen minutes later and in the same region, Teodor Jakimovski - another ARM soldier was killed by sniper. However, the State officials still believed that diplomatic methods should be given priority.

Government Inaptitude
Why didn’t the Government react on time in order to prevent further spreading of the conflict, as the experts and the analysts advised? They (the experts and analysts) gave a timely warning that if the incidents are not isolated, the conflict will have to be resolved on a negotiating table. Dosta Dimovska, Minister of Interior at the time, looks back at the events that took place five years ago and states: “The non reformed security structure, the non existing coordination and the undetermined Government institution responsibilities created vacuum. That led to postponement of necessary action which had negative consequences. We were not properly equipped as a nation as well. We did not have military helicopters, did not have other equipment, warplanes war bought only after the conflict began. We did not even have specialized groups for handling such this type of terrorism. All of this made defense and rapid actions difficult. “
The opposition party SDSM at the time insisted that only with a fierce and direct military response in Tanushevci, Brest and Malino can the crisis be resolved. The Government still held back. The incidents and skirmishes in the Tanushevci region intensified.
Women and children started leaving the village of Goshince as well and sought cover at other places. They were running away from the village, which is near Kumanovo, and were mainly looking for cover in the village of Nikushtak (in the same region), the Chento neighborhood and the village of Arachinovo in the Skopje area. The Mayor of Arachinovo, Mr. Reshat Ferati, said that those are not refugees but guests that have arrived in the village because of the Islam holyday Bajram and are visiting their relatives.
Just when it was officially announced that the situation in Tanushevci is calming down, fierce clashes commenced in that region, the very next day on March 8. Goran Stojanovski, member of the Special MOI Unit was killed on March 9 in clashes around Brest. The police convoy had been dispatched from v. Goshince to v. Brest in order to hold talks with the local population and to distribute humanitarian aid, as well as to meet with the local leaders.
Conditions at the northern border were calm for several days with no skirmishes taking place. However, Macedonian police was around Malino Maalo, but not inside. Albanian terrorists were stationed inside it. The Government still held the position that an eventual armed action could further more radicalize inter-ethnic tensions in the country.
Towards the end of March 2001 the Macedonian Army started to shell the villages above Tetovo, and four days later the Government declared the action a success.
After that the NLA moved the conflict east of the Shar Planina (mountain) as well as north of Kumanovo, increasing by that the territory under its control. For many weeks the NLA occupied Albanian populated villages in the Kumanovo Valley in the northeast and around Tetovo and Gostivar in the west during several weeks.
Thousands of civilians were stuck between the Government Forces and the NLA. Macedonian Forces accused the NLA for using civilians as a live shield in order to prevent the Army to undertake a full scale offensive. NLA on the other hand dismissed those claims and insisted that the civilians do not trust the Macedonian authorities.
„It was a drama where we were all concerned and careful” says today Mrs. Dosta Dimovska. “None of us had war experience before. We didn’t think that Macedonia is going to have war and that we will have to face war situations, and we especially did not expect the penetration of terrorist groups in civilian p[populated areas and them using the civilian population as a life shied” witnesses Mrs. Dosta Dimovska in an “Utrinski Vesnik” daily newspaper article.

Shield of civilians
Using a Live wall of civilians has greatly aggravated defense and handling of terrorist groups. “Macedonia hasn’t had defense for that sort of terrorism. As opposed to us, the Army had such units but it wasted a lot of time arguing with the Government about the method of our defense”, says Dimovska today.
In mid March Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) extended its battle to Tetovo. After six days of combat in Tetovo, the Government finally declared ultimatum to the Albanian guerrillas to disarm and to leave the country or to face up full military intervention. The ultimatum was not met.MoI distributed weapons to the Army and Police reservists in Skopje, Gostivar, Tetovo, Kumanovo and surrounding villages. But KLA continued recruiting young people during the summer. It was perfectly clear that Macedonia is on the verge of civil war.
KLA gained ever-growing support from the local Albanian population. The occupation of Tanusevci, then Brest and Malino Maalo, generated ever more supporters and KLA members.As opposed to the government top that gave priority to the diplomatic methods in the beginning of crisis, the public demanded decisive and military resolution of the crisis.„Every wound is curable after early diagnosis. That means that the measures have to be timely, decisive and led by the masters in their trade. That means if we leave them to work undisturbed then that wound will continues to grow and it will be difficult to treat “, states the former Chief of ARM General Staff Mitre Arsovski.Dosta Dimovska, as a person that found herself in the most heated armchair during most turbulent times – Minister of Interior, from today’s perspective says that she didn’t expect that the conflict will gain such proportion. But after first successful action performed and liberation of large number of villages in Tetovo, there was a constant influx of new groups of rebels from Kosovo.
„Many places in the national border zone were used for that purpose, where previously a lot of weapons had been hidden“, explains Dimovska. „So the conflict developed and reached Skopje“.
The day when Tetovo exploded was 14 March – on the group rally organized by PDP political party and Albanian NGOs. There were 10 thousand Albanians on the meeting that chanted “KLA” and at the same time they were “greeted” by shots from the surrounding mountains and Tetovo fortress.
From that day onwards all illusions of the Macedonian government that Tanusevci is isolated incident of small group of extremists were blown away.
The shootings of the KLA forces lasted whole day. Dosta Dimovska, Minister of Interior, said that it is a matter of around 200 terrorists that immersed themselves into Tetovo area from Shara mountain.
That night the senior government had a meeting with the President Boris Trajkovski. “It is a matter of well-trained sabotage units.”, said the Prime Minister Ljupco Georgievski.
At first there were noticeable differences in the positions for resolving the crisis, between the President Boris Trajkovski and the Prime Minister Ljupco Georgievski. Trajkovski was more inclined for resolving the crisis with political instruments whilst Georgievski was for fierce military response.
„Whoever wants to instigate war in Macedonia needs to be aware that he will encounter strongest defense both from the Macedonian police and Army, and I have to say that we won’t choose allies in defending Macedonia “, said Georgievski.

Return of general Petrovski
General Pande Petrovski has back then returned from retirement and was appointed Deputy CHOD of the Macedonian Army and was tasked to lead the defense of the country after the attacks of Albanian guerrillas.
Vlado Popovski, member of the National Security Council, was the first to contact him, and arrange a meeting of the retired general and the top government in order to reactivate him and go into action against the rebels in Tetovo.
With regards to the meeting with the Prime Minister Georgievski, the general recounts:„I thought that he was intending to ask me for an advice, but after the discussion with the Prime Minister I understood that they need a man for resolution of the crisis with military instruments, as it is becoming for a country “, says Petrovski.
That very day Petrovski talked to the President as well. „I received all authority to establish an operational group of leaders out of those 500 retired in 2000 “, he said.„The third corps were disbanded, the second bitola corps were in a phase of disband, armored professional battalion disbanded, the border brigade in a phase of establishment. The only brigade existing was the First light infantry brigade in Stip“, recounts Petrovski in news article in „Утрински весник“.
„On the 21 March I reactivated myself and formed a team for planning of operation in Tetovo. I had five days to prepare for that operation“, he says.
However, some unexpected things happened.
„On the night of 23 March I waited till midnight to see the President and for him to sign the operation Plan. But he didn’t come “, says Petrovski. He went to see the defense Minister Ljuben Paunovski. „Minister, what are we doing, is the President coming?“, Petrovski asked.
„I’ll check“, replied Paunovski.
„After he checked he told me that the President is tired, because he came that night from a business trip and he won’t come but the next day, Saturday at noon, he will come to sign the decision for Tetovo operation “, recounts Petrovski.
„Tomorrow the units already occupied the positions of the whole location planned for that operation. I didn’t’ go to Tetovo that day but I had a contact with the commanders and we started with the actions“, he says.

Waiting for the President
Around 12 o’clock Petrovski called Vlado Popovski again.
He asked him: „Pande, where are you?“
„I am waiting for the President to sign for the operation“, Petrovski said.
„Can I see you for a minute“, Popovski asked.
„Yes, you can“, the general said.
„Vlado came, I told him to sit down, he said that he didn’t have time “, Petrovski recounts.
„Can you break up the terrorists“, Popovski asked.
„Damn it, Vlado, have you come to ask me that“, Petrovski siad. „Why is the President still not coming to sign the decision ?“.
„Well, that’s the problem, Vlado told me. Someone scared him in Geneva and now he is hiding, he doesn’t want to sign. Now me and Frckoski and few other MPs will go to convince him. But 12 o’clock passed and nothing happened. Ljupco Georgievski called me to ask where I was. I told him, here. He said – Come to see me. So I went and he wanted me to explain the whole plan once again “, Petrovski recounts. „I explained the plan in detail, by time and place, goal and method. But I felt that something is going on. I was about to engage into attack tomorrow, but something is not going well. I waited until 9 pm. Dosta Dimovska, Stojan Andov and others started coming. I thought, it’s Ok, something may come out of it “.
General Pande Petrovski recounts afterwards how the whole senior government, except President Trajkovski, gathered in the Defense Minister Cabinet.
„I went there also, everybody is present, having random chat and waiting for the President. Somewhere around 11 pm comes the Prime Minister. I see him, he sees me but I can tell from his face that he is in a good mood. He sits down, after 5-6 minutes Trajkovski comes in and gives me a dark look. Sits at his seat and tells me: 'Come on general, let’s see the plan once again '. I’ve laid down the map once again and started briefing on the operation for the fourth time that day. I finished and sat down. Everyone is quiet. Trajkovski asks how many victims there will be. How many on their side, how many on ours, etc. Stojan Andov says the plan is good, sign it! And all supported it. But Trajkovski keeps silent“.
„Midnight came. And tomorrow at 7 am I am about to move to attack. The commanders are awaiting. So I got up and told the President: Mr President, Listen to me! If you don’t intend to sign the decision, let’s go! It’s already too late. Tomorrow we cannot perform the operation! And then the President said: “Bring me the document“.
The President said the following words: „God help us and take care of us “. He crossed himself and signed the decision.I took the document and went out. They stayed. My people were waiting for me outside and I immediately left. I phoned the commanders and told them, we are acting upon the Plan tomorrow.
On 28 April near Tetovo village Vejce was the most horrible massacre in this war. From an ambush between Tetovo and Kosovo border, there were eight policemen and soldiers belonging to the special units of “Tigers” and “Wolves” killed and then massacred. The following were the policemen that were killed Marjan Bozinovski, Kire Kostadinovski, Bosko Najdovski and Ilce Stojanovski and soldiers Robert Petkovski, Boban Trajkovski, Mile Janeski and Igor Kosteski. The bloodshed further accentuated the conflict and caused ethnical chaos in Bitola, Veles and Skopje.
The massacre happened near Breza, more known as Vejacka Krivina, on the local road Selce - Vejce on the slopes of Shar Mountain, when they opened fire on two combat vehicles „hammer“ and two police „lada niva“ with total of 16 members of the patrol combined of army units „Wolves“ and police „Tigers“.

Horrible pictures
In addition to eight killed, there were six wounded. Branko Stojkovski, Jonce Dancev and Tose Krstevski from “the Wolves” and Goran Kolevski, Jovica Bozinovski and Zlatko Jankulovski from “the Tigers” received severe wounds.
After the killing, the band massacred the victims and then withdrew to the Shar Mountain villages and moved to the border zone, wherefrom it escaped into Kosovo.
he government spokesman Antonio Milososki described the crime as “horrifying massacre that demonstrates that Macedonian democracy is faced in combat with monsters, for which we have no choice, but to defeat them “.
The Minister of Interior Dosta Dimovska estimated that after this event the security of the country has significantly deteriorated.
The horrible pictures cause great revolt in Bitola, place where many of the killed came from, that climaxed into riots on the streets resulting in four wounded and 40 shops damaged, mostly of Muslim owners.
First speculations that emerged after the event were that the massacre was performed by Mujahadenis, and Daut Haradinai commanded the group – brother of the Kosovo politician Ramush Haradinai.
The eyewitnesses claimed that the crime was committed by a group of ten people with beards and long knives. The terrorists shot only one of the victims whilst the remaining seven were slaughtered in peaces or were burnt alive.
Daut Haradinai was a Chief of the Kosovo defense corps and it was easy to identify him because he was one-armed after losing his other arm in mine accident. His brother Ramush Haradinai is also under suspicion for responsibility of killing at least 50 Kosovo Serbs.
The ambush was set up on a very good location and the Macedonian Security Forces jeep was all drilled with grenades and machine gun fire from all sides.
Many evidence prove that the terrorists were informed about the movement of the combined police-military patrol by radio link. According to police sources, only few days after the horrible event, there was an attempt, for another ambush near the same place. However, the police found about it on time and broke up the terrorist group.
The police radio station „motorola“ was found on the place, which indicated that the terrorists have been in constant contact with some of the members of the Tetovo police all the time.

Hard moments
The director of the Public Security Agency of that time Zvonko Kashirski says today: „I was in Berovo when the Operational Centre in Skopje notified me that combined police-military patrol was ambushed near Vejce. First information was that there was only one wounded. I immediately set out for Skopje, but received information on the way that there is one killed, then they said two and at the end the number rose to eight “. He was notified about the event by the Minister of Interior Dosta Dimovska.
Speaking about that horrible event today, the former Minister of Interior Dosta Dimovska says: „ The director of the Public Security Kashirski briefed me about the case. For me Vejce was a tremendous shock. Regardless of the fact that we were serving at such high positions, first of all, we are humans and such situations require cold heads to finish the work. But those were very hard moments, we strived to investigate the whole case, to determine how all that happened. Yet that has not been cleared up and I hope that in the course of time this event will be completely cleared out“.
Daily newspaper „Vreme“ in December 2004 published that there was an official note in MoI that the Mayor of Tetovo Hazbi Lika, who was former Deputy Minister of Interiors, popular under the name of Commander Chela during the 2001 conflict, was one of the twenty participants in the Vejce massacre.
The police record, titled as „insight of the horrifying murder at the village of Vejce , Tetovo“, was registered under No. 470/13.11.2001, „Vreme“ wrote. According to the police record, as „Vreme“ states, the massacre was led by Ismaili Shinasi or known as Commander Hodza, Ceka Iljaz –Cori, and Ceka Bilal-Brada, all three from Kosovo. Ceka Iljaz was indebted with two million DM to pay out the foreign mercenaries from Western countries, Mujahedinis and volunteers from this country. Ceka Bilal, was member of the Kosovo intelligence service and one of the main organizers to supply KLA with arms.
From the “domestic” participants in the event, besides Hazbi Lika, Лика Иса-Илир, Самии Раим-Зогу, Самии Изаир-Шурли, Бајрами Асим-Пуча, Рифати Енвер-Џаџи, Абдурамани Исак, Велиу Муарем, Вејсели Екрем, Османи Фадил, Љуљзим Ислами, Емини Ибрахим, Џемаили Џават, Башким Рустеми-Кими, Османи Хајри, Хисен Џемаили, Емини Абаз и Емини Рамадан were also listed. Most of them were from Tetovo area and few from Vejce village.
Part of them were well trained as former members of KLA from Kosovo. Few days before the attack they were preparing themselves and did training in a camp in Kosovo that was very close to the Macedonian border. The sabotage-terrorist group had a specific task to eliminate live patrol force and to destroy the vehicles and military equipment. In cooperation with terrorist group from Tetovo, they have organized the ambush and performed the terrorist attack on the patrol of the Macedonian security forces, for which they had wide support from the local population too. After the attack some of them have found shelter in the villages of Vejce, Brodec and Bozovce and some have withdrawn to Kosovo, having mined the road of their withdrawal, the official MoI record stated according to „Vreme “.
During the 2001 conflict the national government acted under conditions of deep internal crisis. The Prime Minister Ljubco Georgievski and Minister of Interior Ljube Boskoski requested declaration of state of war, but the international community and part of the government disagreed. The President Boris Trajkovski was exposed to strong criticism by all internal stakeholders in power whilst the international community used him to implement the peacekeeping plan. Professor Ljubomir Frckoski who was advisor of Trajkovski says today:
„There was a great discord between President Trajkovski, Defense Minister Vlado Buckovski and Minister of Interior Ljube Boskoski. We had a problem coordinating the work. I believe that the main problem was not the indecisiveness of the President or his mentors. At the end he delivered the decisions“, Frckoski says.
Not only the security actions in Tetovo, but also in Kumanovo and Skopje were a problem, where the incapacity of our police was demonstrated.
„Then the system of lack of coordination emerged. We have to acknowledge that, not fool ourselves, because that is the reason we lost both lives and part of our political positions“, Frckoski says.
„I could never forgive the Macedonian part of the government for that lack of coordination which was paid by the lives of the Macedonian soldiers who were sitting targets for the bandits. That was horrible. The least informed and least victim was the President. I was a witness how that functioned and how bad it was. We had to create monumentality with articles in public.“, Frckoski says today.
The Prime Minister Vlado Buckovski was Defense Minister of that time as part of the Wide coalition government. Today he claims that at the beginning SDSM tried not to impede the government action against terrorist attacks.
„Though, he says, there was a long hesitation and tactics by the former government. An affair with the Defense Minister Ljuben Paunoski came to the surface and he was removed, so until establishment of the wide coalition government Defense Minister was actually the Prime Minister Georgievski “, Buckovski says.
Today Buckoski claims that when he undertook the function of Defense Minister, there was no one to pass him over the duty.
„I entered the Ministry of defense on 14 May and there was no one to give me the function. Paunoski was removed, Ljubco Georgievski didn’t even show up and I found myself face to face with reality “, Buckovski says.
The night on 13 May after the government election, the meeting finished somewhere before midnight and Buckovski and Crvenkovski went to Crvenkovski’s cabinet that he used as Chief of the Parliament opposition.
„I told him: 'Branko, pour a glass of whiskey for us to drink and make a toast because from now on God should save us “, Buckoski recounts.
„After a short while President Boris Trajkovski called us to go into his cabinet. I thought that he wanted to do small celebration on the occasion of election of wide coalition government and to wish us cooperation, as the Defense Minister, by the Constitution, is collaborator to the Supreme Commander too“, Buckovski says.
„But when we entered his cabinet, the Prime Minister Georgievski, General Jovan Andrevski, the CHOD, the new Minister of Interior Ljube Boskoski and Stojan Andov were already sitting there. There were two maps laid on the table. I understood that nothing will come out of the information that the international community has found a solution to the crisis. That night all my expectations that we are getting a large and wide coalition government able to politically resolve the crisis were put out. I faced the reality that the national and military top management are already planning operation in the Lipkovo region. Then it became clear that we are not formed as big coalition to resolve the crisis politically “, the Prime Minister Vlado Buckovski speaks for the news article in „Utrinski Vesnik “.
There were two opposing forces, Buckovski says. "One were 'the hawks' that wanted military solution, аnd me, Ilinka Mitreva and part of other structures were peacekeepers led by the late President Trajkovski “, Buckovski says.
„I think that it is high time for those who were directly involved in the crisis to speak up about the events in those several months from their perspective“, said the Prime Minister Vlado Buchkovski five years after the military conflict in Macedonia.
The former Minister for Interiors, Dosta Dimovska, who was replaced from that function, stayed closely connected to the President Trajkovski until the very end of the conflict. She stated that she saw difference in the approach that Gjorgievski and Trajkovski wanted to use to resolve the crisis.
„Gjorgievski and Trajkovski were strongly committed to the defence of the country. They both lived 24 hours with that thought. They proved great patriotism. They just had differences when deciding about the approach to resolve the crisis. Ljupco wanted to resolve the conflict as soon as possible and successful, while the President wanted to end the crises in peaceful manner“, states Dimovska today.
„But, you know, added Dimovska, the military experience is the most difficult temptation for every person. I can’t put the blame on anyone or say this one is the good and the other one is the bad patriot“.
The senior EU representative for foreign and security policy, Havier Solana, who was constantly present in Macedonia during the critical months, stated for the daily newspaper „Utrinski vesnik “ the following
Under the leadership of President Trajkovski, your leaders have professionally completed their work. They were in a position to work as a team and together they succeeded to give priority to the highest national and government interests. In critical moments, regardless of the political and ethnical affiliation, they all demonstrated maturity and leadership potential. That was a lesson learned for the entire region “, stated Solana.Quite different is the statement given by the NATO secretary general George Robertson, who practically was part of the Macedonian political team who was trying to resolve the crisis. This is what he stated for the daily newspaper „Utrinski vesnik “:
„Their relationship was, mildly said, under tension. The Government was wide coalition composed of all major parties with serious differences in their views, while some were occasionally trying to ambush the peacekeeping process with plea for use of force. “, said Robertson, who is not politically active any longer.
„Regardless of the tensions, still all key players signed the Ohrid Framework agreement. They, even though a team, passed the ball at each others goals, unfairly attacked the captain of the team and sometimes were even unable to pass the ball to their players, but at the end, they were all on the same side, wanting the same results and goals and all signed in Ohrid in 2001 “.
NLA occupied Arachinovo on June 9, 2001, which is a village close to the capital Skopje. This was a new serious escalation of the conflict. NLA threatened that they would attack the Parliament building and Government, as well as the international airport located several kilometres away from Arachinovo.
Arachinovo occupation was commanded from start till end by commander Hodza or Dzezer Sakiri, who is a Parliament representative today. He stated that he is following the instructions provided by Ali Ahmeti and other NLA leaders.
When the public realized that NLA is in Arachinovo, the illusions disappeared and the tension in Skopje grew higher. MOI started handing out weapons to the police and military reservists. There were rumours going around that the NLA rebels spread through the Albanian neighbourhoods in the capital city.

The war close to Skopje
The sounds of the mass attack of the governmental forces for re-occupation of Arachinovo were vividly heard and seen from the capital. Skopje and Macedonia were shaking from the “SU 25” test flights. So, the citizens of Skopje realized that the country is standing on the verge of a civil war.
The battle for Arachinovo finished ingloriously on June 24th. During this battle three police members were killed: Atanas Janev, Nikola Pehchevski and Aleksandar Stojchev; and Oliver Kitanovski was heavily wounded and passed away in the hospital on June 28.Although earlier the Minister of Interior, Ljube Boshkoski expressed optimism for rapid liberation of the village, it did not happen. Three days later, the offensive of the Macedonian security forces was discontinued under the pressure of the EU Senior Representative Xavier Solana, the US Ambassador Mike Aenik, UK Ambassador Dickinson and the French Ambassador Terral on Trajkovski, Georgievski, Boshkoski and Buchkovski.
NATO made an agreement with NLA to evacuate the insurgents from Arachinovo. The operation was agreed and personally observed by Peter Fait, special representative of NATO Secretary General George Robertson, and a person that maintained close connections with the NLA practically throughout the conflict. Around 350 insurgents were allowed to leave the village, with their weapons, assisted by the US troops serving in KFOR, NATO Kosovo Forces. The Macedonian Army was forced to withdraw.
The Macedonian majority considered the evacuation as humiliation and the people reacted strongly to the fact that the insurgents have not been disarmed, but deported with their weapons to another Macedonian territory occupied by NLA.
That evening several thousand Macedonians gathered in front of the Parliament building in Skopje and requested resignation from the President and the Prime minister. The demonstrators occupied the Parliament building, and the protest turned into mass riots, breaking the vehicles owned by the international organizations, total demolishment of the entrance door of OSCE and the offices of “British Airways”. President Trajkovski was evacuated at “Ilinden” barracks.
Xavier Solana, who was in Skopje in those days, states today for the feuilleton in “Utrinski vesnik”:
“In that time I was visiting Skopje regularly, almost every week. I was observing the events with great engagement from my side. Clearly I was worried. But I always believed that a political solution is possible”.

Dangerous situation
In his testimony for this feuilleton, the NATO Secretary General at that time, George Robertson agrees that Arachinovo was a turning point. “I believe that unless we discovered a solution for the crises at that moment, the conflict would have escalated into a civil war”, he says today.
“It was a dangerous situation from numerous aspects and I admit I was desperately worried concerning several things. The question of wanting war or peace was open on both sides. There were people from the side of the Government that wanted to defeat military the NLA, regardless of the cost. This ignored the brutal reality that the Macedonian security forces were incapable of accomplishing this victory, and the hardcore currents publicly persuaded the public regarding this issue”, says Robertson for our feuilleton. On the NLA side, he says, there were people that preferred to keep the villages occupied and undertake actions anywhere, than to accept withdrawal even without their weapons being taken.
“So, the leaders, such as Trajkovski and Ahmeti, regardless of their differences had to face and oppose each with his own hardcore followers, and thank God they won”, says Robertson.
“From my perspective I was very proud of the role of the small NATO team that was negotiating and leading the withdrawal. Those were only a few persons that were unarmed, but showed courage and skills in a very difficult situation. They were also helped by other factors of the international community, for example EU and OSCE monitors, and finally the US soldiers, so that all together they solved a dangerous crises. It was an uncertain situation, worse than ever before, and partially because, I believe, all the sides decided to look for a longer-term and realized that they do not want to lead its own country to ruin”, he says today.
The unsuccessful of the Government to free Arachinovo from the occupation of Ali Ahmeti’s army is a claim that even today has two sides. One say that it is not true that the Macedonian security forces couldn’t defeat the insurgents, whilst others claim that the Army and the Police together with the operation organization truly showed as incapable. General Pande Petrovski, who was commanding with the Arachinovo operation and the evacuation of President Trajkovski speaks about these critical moments.He says it is not true that they were unable to occupy Arachinovo.
“ARM had 20 thousand soldiers available, armored battalions and professional crews, 54 tanks, 120-130 mortars, combat helicopters and enough ammunition for conduct of a final operation and full disburse of NLA”, claims the General today.

The Macedonian minority in Arachinovo suffered the consequences
The inhabitants were pressed to abandon Arachinovo. Until June 2001, around 1300 Albanian and around 200 Macedonian families were leaving in Arachinovo. The Macedonian minority was not aware that Albanian paramilitary forces are penetrating until June 7th, when they realized the Albanian women and children have left the village. The Macedonians did not begin their evacuation until the situation escalated dramatically. Since the Macedonian inhabitants could not prepare themselves before abandoning the village, they had to leave most of their property behind. Those that did not leave on time or had to come back were threatened, kidnapped, and even tortured by the NLA fighters.
The Macedonian Army General, Pande Petrovski who was commanding with the Arachinovo operation speaks about the dramatic events at the discontinuation of the operation, the gathering of the revolted Macedonian citizens in front of the Parliament and the evacuation of President Boris Trajkovski.
“Propaganda was spread in the public through the media that there are 4 thousand terrorists in Arachinovo, but there were only 200-220. I was against an intervention in Arachinovo. It was not a real problem and we could have occupied it. I claim this as an expert”.
The first day of the operation, the security forces penetrated up to the new mosque in Arachinovo and began their actions against the insurgents. The circle was closing slowly and the third day the security forces have already penetrated in two thirds of Arachinovo”, Petreski says.
But, at the meetings we were having, it was strange at the very beginning that President Trajkovski several times emphasized that for Arachinovo “we have been given only two days”. At the beginning I could not understand it. Who has given us two days? And that is why I reacted as a soldier. I said that I do not rush in Arachinovo, two days, three, ten, fifteen days, it doesn’t matter since it does not cause any problems in aspect of some strategy” the General told President Trajkovski. But, Trajkovski replayed that it was the recommendation received from NATO Secretary General George Robertson.On June 25th, around 12.45hrs Trajkovski called him on the phone and told him: “General you are to stop the operation at 13.00hrs”. Petrovski replayed that it can not be stopped at 13.00hrs, but at 13.30hrs since the units are in action.
Trajkovski told the General to be at the “Belvi” hotel at 14.00hrs.
On his way to hotel “Belvi” Petrovski received a phone call from General Zvonko Stojanovski, the Air Force commander and informed him that his pilots noticed white sheets on the houses in Arachinovo and that six fighter planes were noticed on the radars, heading from Italy on a course towards Macedonia.
The General told him to have the helicopters grounded.
“When I arrived at “Belvi” hotel there was quite a sight to be seen. All the western diplomats and military-diplomatic representatives were present. I was surprised from what was going on. I entered the hall and met Buchkovski and Boshkoski there. I am asking Minister Buchkovski: what is this? He says: You will hear! And then, I don’t remember if Nikola Dimitrov or Stevo Pendarovski, introduced me to a men and told me that he is Mr. Peter Fait, a personal representative of NATO Secretary General”, tells Petrovski.
Everyone was present at “Belvi”, says Petrovski, “Ljube Boshkoski, Buchkovski and Peter Fait were sitting next to me. They asked me to prepare a plan for evacuation of the terrorists from Arachinovo”, Petrovski says.The plan was to evacuate the insurgents from Arachinovo and take them to Kosovo.
Then Ljube Boshkoski raised his voice: “They can not be withdrawn unpunished!”General Petrovski calmed him down by saying “Let’s listen to what he has to say and afterwards we will talk”.
And that is what happened. At 16.00hrs NATO entered with four buses from Tetovo and seven NATO buses, with security and plus seven combat “HUMWEES” and seven medical “HUMWEES”.
“As a professional, then I realized that our Army has been humiliated. It turned out that in two days we were unable to occupy Arachinovo, so NATO was suppose to enter for all of us to be able to sit around the table. I understood that this was planned since June 14th, when President Trajkovski send a letter to NATO Secretary General Robertson”, says today Petrovski.
But the problems occurred after entering Arachinovo. Nikola Dimitrov, Advisor of President Trajkovski at that time, told Petrovski: “General, Peter Fait is calling, saying that the insurgents do not want to be evacuated with NATO buses, but they want to withdraw through Nikushtak with their own tractors and trucks”.
“If that is the case, then let NATO withdraw and I will continue the operation! Tell that to Peter Fait” General Petrovski replayed wrathfully.
Dimitrov passed the reaction to Fait. Five minutes later he came back to the General smiling, and said: “General, they accepted the decision to withdraw with NATO buses”. Petrovski told Dimitrov: “You should know that it has been planned in advance. They (NATO) are not joking”.
When the public realized what has been happing at Arachinovo, gathering in front of the Parliament began. That evening, when Petrovski returned to the General Staff, Zlatko Keckovski Chief of President Trajkovski security called. He told him: “General there is a threat for the President to be assassinated, let’s evacuate him to a safe house”. Petrovski suggested evacuating President Trajkovski at “Ilinden” barracks”. Trajkovski arrived there with bodyguard Keckovski and one more bodyguard, all of them in one vehicle.
“The President was very upset, because already the events from in front of the Parliament were shown on television”, Petrovski tells. The group of revolted citizens began entering the Parliament. “I told the President I had to inform Minister Buchkovski of my whereabouts. I asked the President if the Prime Minister knows that he is with us here”, Petrovski tells.
But Trajkovski replayed “Nobody knows where I am, except me and you”. Petrovski informed the President that he told Minister Buchkovski where they are and that he immediately departed towards “Ilinden” barracks.
In meantime, General Petrovski also called the Prime Minister Ljubcho Georgievski. He asked: “Where is the President?” Petrovski told Trajkovski that he would have to inform also Georgievski where they are. “He is with me”, he told Georgievski. “Where are you?” Georgievski asked. “At “Ilinden” barracks”, Petrovski replayed. “I am coming as well”, Georgievski said.
After a short time Crvenkovski arrived also and the event turned into a small state officials gathering. From “Ilinden” barracks they were observing the events in front of the Parliament on the television. Prime Minister Georgievski said: “Find Ljube Boshkoski”.
Petrovski tried to reach the Minister for Interior Ljube Boshkoski on his mobile phone, but he could not be reached. Georgievski himself tried to call him as well, but without success. “I knew where Boshkoski was and with who”, claims today General Pande Petrovski. General told as a joke to Georgievski: “Why they are not pulling down the Government, but the Parliament?” Then Petrovski phoned the police General Risto Galevski. He told him: “Do not let anybody cross Vardar”.
“If they went to Bit-Pazar it would turn into a civil war! The swarm was furious. There was a serious discussion on the possibility for the Army to be used to close down the bridges on Vardar towards Bit-Pazar. I did not allow that. The Army is not for that, neither has been trained for that nor has that function. The whole situation could easily get out of control”, says Petrovski.
As the intensity of the crises was increasing, the number of foreign diplomats and politicians that were staying in Macedonia was increasing. One day before the offensive of the Macedonian security forces in March, the OSCE Presidents’ Special Representative, American Robert Frowick arrived. He was pessimistic regarding the “military defeat of the terrorists”. Because of his suggestions for negotiations with NLA, cease of fire, amnesty and change of the Constitution he was fiercely criticized in public, even by the Macedonian political bloc.
It was stated in his plan that cease of fire is the first step that Macedonia should make, and the Macedonian forces to maintain the positions and not continue forward. After this, the withdrawal of NLA would follow through a security corridor into Kosovo. The plan also envisaged the NLA withdrawal to finish within 48hrs. NLA would not be allowed to enter Kosovo with their weapons. KFOR would not arrest NLA members unless accused in Kosovo. Creation of a wide coalition that would initiate a political dialogue, in which the final task that would need to be attained is the amendment of the Macedonian Constitution. In May 2001, the public discovered that DPA and PDP have signed an agreement with Ali Ahmeti secretly, at a meeting in Prizren, Kosovo.
The agreement caused additional mistrust between the Macedonian side and the international community because of the role of the American diplomat Robert Frowick, who believed that direct contacts with NLA are necessary for establishment of permanent agreement. Frowick suggested immediate cease of fire from NLA side, in exchange of a promise for amnesty. His mission finished soon after the photo of Arben Xhaferi and Imer Imeri with Ali Ahmeti was revealed in the Macedonian media at the end of May, when the Macedonian public learned about the agreement between the Albanian leaders.
Because of his plan for resolution of the crisis, Frowick was discretely banished from the country. But after a few months, his ideas officially became part of the plan of President Boris Trajkovski, supported also by the four leaders: Ljubco Georgievski, Branko Crvenkovski, Arben Xhaferi and Imer Imeri.
In the spring of 2001 the EU Senior Representative for Foreign and Security Policy, Xavier Solana, and NATO Secretary General, George Robertson, used shuttle-diplomacy in an attempt to accelerate the agreement process. Today, Xavier Solana, in the feuilleton of “Utrinski Vesnik”, diplomatically replies to our question on which was the crucial moment during the conflict for the Albanian insurgence to be renamed into fighters for human rights:
“In 2001 there was a very complicated situation. The black and white categorization does not help in understanding what happened!”
In June 2001 the American administration named James Perdue from the State Department as a special representative in Macedonia, while EU presented that role to the French politician François Leotard. Perdue was a former officer of US military intelligence, and Leotard a former minister of defense, so they could combine diplomacy and security expertise in their activities for resolution of the Macedonian conflict. During the crisis and after, it was considered that NATO\KFOR, EU and USA consolidate with the Albanian people not only in Kosovo 1999 but also in Macedonia in 2001. In spite of the common attitude and the public condemn of NLA and the insurgency in Macedonia by the international community, the Albanians believed that the outside world not only supports the political dialogue and the new reforms, but also the Albanian uprising as such. The Albanian interlocutors claimed that KFOR enabled NLA to move almost freely between Kosovo and Macedonia and by this it was believed that NATO explicitly supports NLA.
Also, the international press was considered to be ally of the Albanians. Many Macedonians claimed, for example, that the BBC world news is reporting in favor of the Albanians especially at the beginning of the crisis.
Today, the NATO Secretary General at that time, Robertson, in the feuilleton of “Utrinski Vesnik” says that NLA was not right in its actions, but also the Macedonian government did not have a good approach.
“Yes – I knew that some people believe that we support the insurgents, but it was not true. To make it clear, the NLA was not right, as I was constantly repeating back then. But, this did not automatically mean that the only way was to attack NLA”, he says today. The Albanian ethnic community had legitimate complains, adds Robertson, regardless of the fact that NLA was using illegitimate means to reach its goals.
“Our policy was, with the full support from the government, to discover a peaceful solution for the crisis, to give a guarantee that the problems of the Albanian ethnic community will be solved in legitimate manner and by such to cut all the possible justifications of the NLA violent behavior. Allow me to emphasize that we’ve been always acting in agreement with the government and if during any phase of the conflict President Trajkovski would ask us to leave, we would have gone although without our free will”, says Robertson today being no longer an active politician.
According Robertson, the thing that was making the situation even more difficult was the big differences inside the Macedonian government, and fierceness caused by violence is difficult to be controlled.
“We did not support NLA, but both we and the legitimate government of Macedonia mutually realized that the best way to surpass it is what later became known as the Ohrid Agreement”, stated Robertson five years after the conflict ended.
Generally the Macedonians believe that the international community supports the Albanians and the former NLA and not only in 2001 but today also. They believe that in 1999 NATO started a war on behalf of the ethnic Albanians in Kosovo. The Macedonians strongly believe that NATO was supporting NLA also by pretending to be blind for the NLA movement and through the purchase of, for example, the communication equipment.
Even today the Macedonians believe that it was inadequately reported about the great number of ethnic Macedonians abandoned their homes in Tetovo region during the crisis (fifteen thousand in less then two weeks in July).
This was not fair, looked from the Macedonian perspective, having in consideration the international focus on the ethnic Albanian refugees at the beginning of the crisis. Especially considering the fact that during the refugee crisis in 1999 Macedonia accepted several hundred thousands Kosovo-Albanian refugees to Macedonian territory.
Fazli Veliu was the leader of the People’s Movement of Kosovo (PMK). Although, born in Kichevo, he hid himself running from the Belgrade regime and lived in Switzerland for a certain period of time. He gave wholehearted support to NLA (Kosovo Liberation Army) since its formation. The book “PMK and NLA, one symbol, one goal” was written by him.Veliu took diary, that is very confusing, during the conflict, but we pulled out a few major events and conversations he described. Several conclusions can be made reading the diary about the thing that actually remained as biggest enigma during the war: the foreign support of NLA, the moral among the rebels, the role of Albania and the disparity inside NLA.
On June 10th, 2001 during a phone call with Ali Ahmeti whom he dubs as “Ali the nephew”, Ahmeti told him: “Our forces are moving to Skopje. They have targeted the main aims, the highway Belgrade – Skopje – Athens, the airport, etc.” In reference with the international support they received, Veliu wrote that on July 2nd, 2001 he had an immediate meeting with the Albanian ambassador in Bern, Vladimir Tanasi, who told him: “What the Albanian government can do for the Albanians in Macedonia at this crucial moment? It is suggested for an international conference! Which role can our father land have? It deserves more then the other countries to give guarantee and contribution”.On July 23rd, 2001 Veliu had a meeting in Prizren for which he says:
“I met there Ali (Ahmeti), G’zim Ostreni and the others. There are skirmishes in Tetovo. We are providing means. I express my wish to enter the vicinity of Tetovo or Kumanovo. `It is not easy, say Ali and Gzim. There are checkpoints at the both sides, be careful how you go.` Haxi Mefail, the son of Shukri and the son of the killed Kamber (killed near Gajre), arrived from abroad. We have one accidental but important meeting with Rafiz Aliti who is disappointed and tired. We encourage him suggesting to have a meeting with the freedom fighters”, wrote Veliu.
On July 25th, Veliu phoned in Tetovo. “I express my deep condolences to Ilir for the members of NLA that were killed. I congratulate him for the raise of the flag in Tetovo and he does the same”. “Here they do not ask for politics but for joint action with the people. They want to join us! The situation made them all take important duties”, Ilir told him.
Finally, on July 26th, Veliu went to Macedonia. “We are going to our areas in Macedonia together with Shaban, Mefail, Azem and Hamdi. Despite the obstacles we are determined to get there. There are young people escorting us, helping us, carrying the weapons. We just passed the border with Kosovo – approaching our area. In Macedonia we were welcomed by our NLA soldiers. We arrived in the legendary Lipkovo… We are standing in the improvised barracks with Commander Sokoli. We are awarding them with guns, books, memorabilia…” Veliu had written.“I have heard sad news. Three young people have been killed by an explosion, among which was Tahir Sinani (expert from Albania). I met with him in Prizren. He was one of the most professional NLA officers.”
eliu met with NLA soldiers on 9th of August in the village of Lisec.
“The previous day, one of them had been wounded in the battles in Tetovo. I am meeting a commander from Albania”, he explains.On ninth of September nearby the school in Sipkovica, where the NLA headquarter was located, a working meeting was taking place between the NLA and NATO political and military representatives. This is how Veliu is describing this meeting:
“Ali is meeting them by the stairs, as always modest and hospitable. Gzim Ostreni in dress uniform with rank on his chest…The NATO representative greets me and he says to me”I know you, but I would like you to tell me your surname.”
“Veliu” – I respond to him.
“Yes”. I add“Congratulations” he said.
The discussion was in German.
Veliu, in his diary wrote also one interesting dialog that took place during the disarmament:
Veliu: “Are any weapons left for self-defense?”
Hadjibaba: “We have turned in the old ones”.
Veliu: Do we have an agreement for participation of the Macedonian side, because today, during the disarmament one of the Macedonian parliamentary members was present”?
Ahmeti: “The agreement intends this. We have agreed to have a common country”.
Veliu:”We will not go to be together with the Macedonians”.
Ahmeti:” Those that have the courage will go”.
Veliu: “Who”?Ahmeti: “I”.
Veliu: “They do not like your photograph; let’s not even discuss your presence”.
Ahmeti: “They will have to”.
Veliu: “They do not let the other citizens to move, nor the Albanians”.
Ahmeti: “I can play the role of Prime Minister from Tetovo”.
Veliu: “We have not placed this in the agreement.”
Ahmeti: “We will in the future.”
Veliu jokingly: “I guess you have signed something in secrecy, are you trapping me prematurely…”
Veliu, in his diary wrote also a detail when NATO representative participated in promotion ceremony for certain Commander Sokol, which occurred after the official ending of the war.
Ali Ahmeti was treating. This is what he wrote:
“This one is our ideologist”, says Liar (Nazmi Bekiri), finger pointing Veliu.
“Prison waits for him” he said smiling.“
”No, no, said Veliu, neutral Switzerland defends me. Besides that I have a decision for representation by the Court of Carlsrhooe from Germany”.
Veliu was trying to find out the destiny of his brother the entire time, which remains unknown today:
“I continually try to find out about my brother Ruzhdi. I have informer Dj. N. by telephone where my brother can be found (on Vodno-Skopje) and I have asked him to help me, but he did not call me that day. The lawyer did not call me, nor the Red Cross representatives to give me information. Chaos, confrontation, treason is in the Government…”
“My wife from Switzerland is informing me on the situation there: the prosperity has improved. Besarta and Ariana have gotten used to being in preschool. By the nephew Ali Ahmeti things are good and are preparing their residency documents. It is a wish to live in the mother land. “
During the negotiations in Ohrid, the balance of war was totaling to 47 killed and 217 wounded members of the security forces, 35 wounded civilians and 25 kidnapped 6 of those children.With the beginning of the negotiations the conflict intensified on the field.
The radical politicians and Para military structures used violence to strengthen their positions in the negotiation, while threatening with civil war if their demands were not met.
On the road Zhilce-Leshok, Naca Petrovska and Petre Petrovski, a mother and son were killed when their vehicle drove over a mine. Near Lavce 4 soldiers were wounded. The road Tetovo-Jazhince with days was a location of the NLA members.
The key event, for which many presume to be the generator of new violence, even though on the negotiation table the end of the war could be seen, happened on 7th August. That day at 5 o’clock in the morning, MOI conducted an action in the Skopje suburb Chair, during which the Commander Teli’s group was killed (explosives expert from Albania). The goal of the terrorists group, as it was claimed, was to organize execution of police members. The epilogue of the action was five killed, among which was Commander Teli and five arrested.
After the execution of Commander Teli in Chair, the revenge by NLA was not waited on for long. The next day on 8th of August, bloody event took place. ARM convoy was going towards Tetovo to replace personnel in the barracks. An ambush set by the rebels in the Grupchin region, near Karpalak opened fire with rockets launchers and automatic weapons. In the attack, transport vehicle from the convoy was hit, eight soldiers and two officers were killed, and all members of ARM reserve composition.
Nane Naumoski, Sasho Kitanoski, Branko Sekuloski, Goran Minoski, Marko Despotoski, Erdovan Shabanoski, Ljube Grujoski, Darko Veljanoski, Pece Sekuloski and Vebi Rusitoski were killed.
Buchkovski, Minister of Defense at the time, was in the base of the Ministry of Defense in Sveti Naum in Ohrid, when Karpalak happened, he tells the story today. He returned to Skopje immediately, and in the evening returned to Ohrid again, where the Where the Session of the Security Council was held.
“That was one of the most dramatic sessions, because it was obvious the many things were broken in the state and military senior officials, which options will win-if the option that more like Israeli tactic of maximum use of military and to convey revenge, or to implement other solutions”. Says today Buchkovski.
“It was clear that the end would not have been seen if the revenge continued by both sides, speculation was spread that Karpalak was consequence of the Commander’s Teli’s group execution”, he adds.
The violence continued the next day on 9th of August. During the NLA attack on the security forces in Ratae, a member of the police composition was killed. On 9th and 10th of August, during the night the security forces were attacked in Radusha, with mortar fire from Krivenik and Goranci, Kosovo. MOI has called upon ARM for help. In meantime in the Tetovo village Ratae one more policeman was killed.The NLA members again had closed the valves from Lipkovo Lake, which had left one hundred Kumanovo residents without water.
Only 48 hours after the bloody event by Karpalak on 10th of August one more shock took place: near Skopje village Ljubanci, 8 soldiers were killed when their transport vehicle drove over two mines on the forest road between Ljubanci and Ljuboten near Skopje. Aside the eight killed ARM members, other eight soldiers were wounded. Branko Brdarevski, Branko Janev, Marjanco Boskovski, Rade Jankovski, Goce Chankulovsk, Tomislav Nastevski, Ivica Zlatevski and Tome Dimovski were killed.
On the same day the border post near Radusa had been attacked. According to the information from the Macedonian authorities, in the attack large part of KPC participated in the attack.The shootouts in Radusa have continued on 10th of August. Soldiers and policemen were wounded. It is presumed that NLA here suffered the most casualties, although for NLA and KPC casualties official data does not exist.
On 12th of August a controversial police action took place in Ljuboten, which today happens to be a subject of interest by the Hague Tribunal, and the former minister of Interior is being tried and is still pending.
On the same day, in the afternoon, one day before the signing of the Ohrid Agreement, President Trajkovski has announced unanimous cease of fire that became effective at 19:30 that night.
Even though on August 13 the Framework agreement was signed in Skopje it did not mean end to the violence.
One week after signing the agreement, on 20th of August the Leshok Monastery was destroyed. Five days later, near Tetovo village Chelopek, Hotel Brioni was mined with the two guards, civilians, which were tied to a chair under which the explosives were placed.
When we asked the question if he feared for the future of the country during these moments, Vlado Buchkovski today says:
“Realistically the issues were quite critical. In such circumstances common sense could hardly overcome the emotions. In any case, I believed that the crisis was managed within the borders and we were able to control it. Therefore, there was control”, says Buchkovski.
The engagement of the International Community in these critical moments was enforced, says the Prime Minister today. Buchkovski was encouraged when he understood that the NATO representative Peter Fait has the role to be the liaison between the NLA and NLA on one side and government forces on the other side.
Therefore, Buchkovski says today, during the critical moments when we faced problems with respecting the cease-fire, we used the services provided by Peter Fait. The services by Fait, he says, were especially used on 15 and 16 of August, during these two days, even though the agreement for cease fire was in effect, the danger of the crises to escalate existed.
Ljubomir Frchkovski, which happened to be an advisor to the President during the conflict in 2001and actively participated in the Ohrid negotiation’s process, today asked by us why so many were killed in this period and if maybe some felt insecure because the end of the “game” was getting closer, he responds:
“Partially yes”. The manner in which the negotiations were led has shown to the radical elements amongst the Albanians that there is nothing to be gained from claiming territories.But, that does not justify our mistakes. Our casualties were all casualties of ambushes and bad organization.
Practically we did not confront that with anything, except maybe with even worse organization”, says Frckovski today.
In July and August of 2001 the continuous international pressure had traced the path to the peace negotiations. NLA had not been directly involved in the agreement process in Ohrid. It was quite clear that only active inclusion of the international community can bring closer the two sides from their hard set positions.Professor Frckovski as an advisor to President Trajkovski actively participated in the preparation of the framework agreement. He says that if NLA sat behind the negotiations table, that would have meant something else.“It would have meant that we have been in a civil war, which was not the case here. We said that we will not talk to them, because their platforms were already known to us and because the larger part of the rebels were penetrated from Kosovo”, says Frckovski today.
“You will let us deal with Ahmeti, the international community said to us, says Frckovski. That is why we negotiated with Perdue and Leotard, which represented the Albanian requirements.
The international envoys, the American representative James Perdue and EU representative François Leotard have played a key role during the peace discussions.
The Albanians claimed that the Constitution of the Republic of Macedonia have deepened the crises. That is why the aim of the Ohrid agreement was to incorporate the ethnic equality between the Macedonian and the Albanians.
On August 13th 2001 in the residence of President Boris Trajkovski on Vodno, the framework agreement had been signed by Ljupco Georgievski (VMRO-DPMNE), Branko Crvenkovski (SDSM), Arben Xaferi (DPA) and Imer Imeri (PDP).
“This agreement will not bring peace on its own, but without this step that we have taken today, the chances for peace were almost none”, stated Crvenkovski. “From this moment on I will work for the Albanian people to send kind messages to the Macedonian people”, stated Xaferi.
One day after the Ohrid agreement was signed, on 13th of August 2001 an agreement for disarmament was made between the Albanian militia and NATO with the promise that the ones that voluntarily will surrender their weapon will be pardoned with amnesty. A ceremony was held in Sipkovica with the signatures of NLA’s political leader Ali Ahmeti and promised to disarm his soldiers and NATO ambassador Peter Fait, who stayed in contact with NLA. Few days later for the first time Ali Ahmeti officially addressed the public through a press conference that was held in Sipkovica, where he arrived with a car that belonged to the government.
Two days after the disarmament agreement was signed, President Trajkovski issued a decree for amnesty for the NLA fighters. Three thousand peaces of weapons were surrendered. The Prime Minister Ljupco Georgievski at the time claimed that at least 30-60 thousand peaces of weapons are supposed to be collected.
In accordance with the Framework agreement the use of the Albanian language has widened and was promoted to a second official language. One of the strongest requirements by the Albanians was to be given the status of constitutive community. On the other side, equally divided consensus by the Macedonians existed that the constitutional preamble should not be amended.
To the Albanians such reforms were of great significance for their inclusion in the Macedonian society, but also end of the Macedonian cultural and political dominance. The Macedonians viewed the reforms in entirety and the amendment of the preamble was taken as capitulation in front of the Albanian rebels.
“ The Macedonians thought the battle for the soul of Macedonia, long few hundreds of years, had been futile, and the loss of the preamble announces the burial bell of the Macedonian culture”, the Norwegian Helsinki Committee had written while analyzing the war in Macedonia.
The Framework agreement amended the parliamentary voting procedures. In accordance with the French supreme judge Robber Badinter, the overall legislation that has cultural or language significance can be adopted with two thirds majority votes, including at least half of the ethnic members of parliament.Professor Frckovski says that criticizers of the Ohrid Agreement are not right, Macedonia is not federalized nor has parallel use of the Albanian language or right to veto in the parliament”, Frckovski says today. On the question whether something could have been done better he says: “perhaps the provision for use of the language in the parliament should have been explained in details”.
Javier Solana, Senior Representative for Foreign and Security Policy of EU, today after five years from the crises says that the conflict in 2001 was mere test for the strength and maturity of the country. “The fact that the path of dialogue and mutual agreement had been chosen, has led the country to candidate status for EU membership, and only 5 years after the crises” he says in the column in “Utrinski Vesnik”.
George Robertson, NATO Secretary General at the time, he is no longer politically active, says that he feels combination of satisfaction and pride after the successful solution of the crises in Macedonia.“It was satisfaction because I played a role of helper to Macedonia to avoid the horrible civil wars that have devastated the Balkan, says Robertson today. The interest of NATO was to prevent the civil war that was getting closer”.
“There were individuals on both sides that regardless of the mutual differences saw that they have to make a compromise and to give up their strong views, as a price worth paying in order to avoid a civil war”, says Robertson.
The DUI leader Ali Ahmeti, NLA General Gzim Ostreni and present vice President of the Parliament, DPA leader Arben Xaferi and Ljupco Georgievski the Prime Minister during the conflict refused to provide their views in this column. Their testimony would have been crucial to solve the enigma of the armed rebellion by the Albanians and manner in which the crises was solved.Due to this fact, even today the dilemmas remains unsolved as to what exactly happened to Macedonia in 2001. Insurgency, transferred conflict from Kosovo, battle for territory or battle for human rights. In this last sequence of the feuilleton we are providing few of the analysis conveyed by the Helsinki Committee.
During the crises in Macedonia, the international community was becoming more and more aware of the connection between the Albanian militia in Kosovo and in South Serbia and the Albanian rebels in Macedonia. It is not a secret that NLA was undertaking military activities in Kosovo in which many young Albanians from Macedonia participated.
Today it is claimed that connections between NLA and the Macedonian Government existed through DPA, which was the coalition partner in the Government. The DPA contacts were mainly with NLA Chief, Hashim Tachi, while the connections with the regional leaders that acted more or less independently were by far weaker.
One of those leaders is Ramush Haradinaj, which was in control of the Prizren territory in South Kosovo. The NLA soldiers that begun the operations in Macedonia were recruited from Haradinaj’s former army. The other connection was Gzim Ostreni, Chief of the NLA Headquarters, which held high positions in KPC.
Fazli Veliu and Ali Ahmeti had been politically active earlier in Kosovo and NLA financiers.The role of the Kosovo leaders at the time, Hashim Tachi, Ramush Haradinaj and Ibrahim Rugova that called upon NLA to stop the operations and threatened with political isolation of its leaders remains unclear. They continuously kept saying that NLA action brings them damage.
Since the intervention by NATO in Kosovo in 1999 it was stated that the uncontrolled situation in Kosovo could be a threat to Macedonia.
The Albanian extremists from Kosovo kept trying to stimulate the Albanian national feelings, as well as aspirations for Great Kosovo or Albania among their people in Macedonia.
Few observers have connected the withdrawal of the Albanian guerrilla in South Serbia with the conflict in Macedonia. During this the Albanian militia and the armament were driven away from one area yet to show up in another area, emphasizing the regional dimension of the Albanian armed resistance in Kosovo, Serbia and Macedonia.According to the opinions of international analysts, the political conflict in Kosovo, South Serbia and in Macedonia must be studied in the close geographical, cultural and family relations between the ethnic Albanians in these areas. Prior to the fall of Yugoslavia, prior to the establishment of the new borders, the people with generations moved freely through the border and as a result of that members of one family quite often were located on both sides of Macedonia and Kosovo.
During the last decades large numbers of Albanians have migrated to Macedonia from Kosovo. The exact number of Kosovo Albanians immigrants in Macedonia is not known. According to some data by foreign researchers 40 thousand Kosovars live in Macedonia. This tendency has increased with the strengthening of Serbian repression in the 80’s and 90’s last century. Besides that in the time of Yugoslavia, when significant number of Albanians studied in the Albanian University in Prishtina, politically radical environment was created by the Albanians from the entire region, including parts from the present Albanian leadership in Macedonia. This is how the ideological connections were established among the Albanians. Few leading ethnic Albanians –politicians and intellectuals from Macedonia have completed their university education in Prishtina, lived for few years in Kosovo and many of them continued to maintain close contacts with the Kosovo Albanians politicians.
NLA was recruiting ethnic Albanians from Macedonia and South Serbia, as well as from abroad, and the Albanian militia was financed by the entire Albanian community. In Western Macedonia, the former NLA fighters were greeted as heroes after the war and in the spring of 2000. In a village near Tetovo a monument for the fallen fighters was built in their honour. Therefore it is impossible to define a strong “border between Kosovo and Macedonia and to describe the events in Macedonia as purely “internal”.
Few questions are of great importance connected to the influence of the Albanian cultural traditions on the modern Albanian life, the status of the clans and the wider family in the Albanian societies, as well as the relations among the powerful families, political parties, militia and the economic structures in the region. For example, do we really know in which manner the family ties between the PDK leader in Kosovo, Hashim Tachi and the DPA vice president Menduh Tachi influence the political and finance relations between the two parties? Close family ties were confirmed at the meeting with Hashim Tachi in Prishtina in November 2001.
And do we know at all, in which manner the former NLA and NLA structures are linked mutually logistically, financially and politically?
In the search of the roots of the armed conflict in Macedonia in 2001 other analysis should not be neglected. Some Albanian segments have gained a real economic growth in the last years. This is owed to few factors. First, in lack of economic integration during the communism, the Albanians were forced to establish small private enterprises and their own none-formal economy.Second, because the Albanians did not have access to employment in the public sector, large part of the male population migrated to Western Europe. The Albanians that working abroad kept sending finances to their families back home and many Albanian families still provide large part of the income in this manner. Also the rebuilding of Kosovo, which is marking high growth, after the war in 1999, has contributed to increase of the economic activities of the Albanian centres in Macedonia. This is quite obvious in the Tetovo region, where for the longer period of time construction is brewing and investments have increased. It is believed that part of the Albanian communities in Kosovo and Macedonia are involved in profitable criminal activities, such as smuggling and drugs.

War Crimes and The "Just War" Theory

2007-04-15T01:54:00.001+02:00

The "Just war" theory serves to camouflage the nature of US foreign policy, while providing a human face to the invaders.

The World Tribunal on Iraq (WTI) through sessions held in Western Europe, Asia and the US has established a comprehensive record of US-UK war crimes in Iraq.

An extensive documentation has been put forth, testimonies have been presented in some 17 global sessions. The Brussells Tribunal sessions of the WTI in Brussels in April 2004 focused on the role of "The Project for the New American Century" (PNAC) which consists in a blueprint of global military conquest. http://www.worldtribunal.org/main/?b=28

At the New York session in August 2004, organized by the International Action Center, criminal indictment charges were brought against inter alia George W. Bush, Richard B. Cheney and Donald H. Rumsfeld, for "Crimes Against the Peace" and violations of the Charter of the United Nations and the Constitution of the United States. (http://www.worldtribunal.org/main/?b=32 )

The WTI at its final session in Istanbul in June 2005, brought to public attention the testimonies of several prominent writers including Dahr Jamail , Arundhati Roy, Niloufer Bhagwat , Hans von Sponeck, not to mention the powerful statement of Denis Halliday on the role of the United Nations. ( http://www.worldtribunal.org/main/?# )

The WTI put forth a powerful final declaration by the Jury which contains the following charges against the the governments of the UK and the US:

• Planning, preparing, and waging the supreme crime of a war of aggression in contravention of the UN Charter and the Nuremberg Principles.
• Targeting the civilian population of Iraq and civilian infrastructure
• Using disproportionate force and indiscriminate weapon systems
• Failing to safeguard the lives of civilians during military activities and during the occupation period thereafter
• Using deadly violence against peaceful protestors
• Imposing punishments without charge or trial, including collective punishment
• Subjecting Iraqi soldiers and civilians to torture and cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment
• Re-writing the laws of a country that has been illegally invaded and occupied
• Willfully devastating the environment
• Actively creating conditions under which the status of Iraqi women has seriously been degraded
• Failing to protect humanity’s rich archaeological and cultural heritage in Iraq
• Obstructing the right to information, including the censoring of Iraqi media
• Redefining torture in violation of international law, to allow use of torture and illegal detentions

"The Jury also established charges against the Security Council of United Nations for failing to stop war crimes and crimes against humanity among other failures, against the Governments of the Coalition of the Willing."

The Just War Theory

There is one important aspect of the WTI's activities at its final sessions in Istanbul, which tends, however, to weaken the thrust of the work accomplished in the various global sessions. It pertains to the role of the "Just War theory" in assessing war crimes.

At the WTI's Istanbul venue, the "Panel of Advocates", which had a mandate to collect and analyze the evidence of US war crimes, was led by Professor Richard Falk, a protagonist of the "Just War" theory, who has gone on record for openly supporting two previous US led wars.

The "Just War" theory (justum bellum) has a longstanding tradition. It can be found in the writings of the Greek philosophers including Plato. It is contained in the Old Testament and was later embodied into the teachings of the early Christian Church. It has been used throughout history to uphold the dominant social order and provide a justification for waging war.

While Professor Falk rightly focuses on ethical and moral principles in assessing war crimes in Iraq, he fails to put the Iraq war in an appropriate historical perspective. War Crimes in Iraq cannot be divorced from the broader history of US military aggression and the crimes and atrocities committed in previous wars including Korea, Vietnam, Afghanistan and Yugoslavia. Moral and ethical standards for assessing war crimes cannot be formulated in a historical vacuum or in piecemeal fashion, in defiance of the Geneva Convention and the Nuremberg Charter, which apply unequivocally to all US led wars.

While Professor Falk condemns the US led war on Iraq, he has endorsed, on moral and ethical grounds, the 1999 NATO bombing of Yugoslavia and the 2001 US-led invasion of Afghanistan:

"The Kosovo War was a just war because it was undertaken to avoid a likely instance of "ethnic cleansing" undertaken by the Serb leadership of former Yugoslavia, and it succeeded in giving the people of Kosovo an opportunity for a peaceful and democratic future. It was a just war despite being illegally undertaken without authorization by the United Nations, and despite being waged in a manner that unduly caused Kosovar and Serbian civilian casualties, while minimizing the risk of death or injury on the NATO side."

(http://www.wagingpeace.org/articles/2003/08/01_falk_interview.htm , emphasis added)

In the immediate wake of 9/11, Professor Falk made a case for "self defense" and retaliation against terrorism, on moral and ethical grounds. His position regarding the launching of the war on Afghanistan was broadly consistent with that of the Bush Administration announced on September 12, 2001:

"I have never since my childhood supported a shooting war in which the United States was involved, although in retrospect I think the NATO war in Kosovo achieved beneficial results. The war in Afghanistan against apocalyptic terrorism qualifies in my understanding as the first truly just war since World War II. But the justice of the cause and of the limited ends is in danger of being negated by the injustice of improper means and excessive ends. Unlike World War II and prior just wars, this one can be won only if tactics adhere to legal and moral constraints on the means used to conduct it, and to limited ends. (The Nation, 11 October 2001, emphasis added)

He later revised his position with regard to Afghanistan, while maintaining the main moral and ethical thrust of his argument:

Early on, I was overly persuaded by the language used by President Bush and other leaders that they understood that force must be used sparingly and with great sensitivity in relation to civilian innocence. As the military campaign in Afghanistan deepened, with America once again seeming to confine its battlefield role to high-altitude bombing and Vietnam-era tactics, I felt unable to endorse any longer the justice of the means. Now, given the unexpectedly rapid collapse of the Taliban regime and the obvious impact on the operational nexus of Al Qaeda, there seems, at least temporarily, to be a restored sense of proportionality between means and ends. (The Nation, 6 December 2001, emphasis added)

Professor Falk was not alone in endorsing the wars on Yugoslavia (1999) and Afghanistan (2001). Many "progressive" intellectuals supported the US war agenda. The humanitarian mission of the US administration was accepted and upheld: jus ad bellum. In March1999, a large segment of "the Left" in the US, Canada and Western Europe took a stance in favor of the NATO led war, including support, in some cases, for the self proclaimed Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA), which was responsible for atrocities committed against Albanian, Serbian and Roma civilians in Kosovo.

Yugoslavia

It was known and documented at the time that the pretext to bomb Yugoslavia had been fabricated in the same way as the WMD pretext was fabricated for Iraq. NATO was upheld by Western public opinion as coming to the rescue of ethnic Albanians, whose rights had supposedly been violated.

I recall when the 1999 bombings of Yugoslavia occurred, the Canadian antiwar movement was completely isolated. None of the main organizations, including the trade unions and the NGOs were prepared to lift a finger.

The media lies on Yugoslavia were accepted as indelible truths. While the bombings were often condemned on humanitarian grounds, the overall legitimacy of the war was not questioned.

According to Nuremberg jurisprudence, NATO heads of State and heads of government were responsible in Yugoslavia for the supreme crime: "the crime against peace." In the words of the late William Rockler, former prosecutor of the Nuremberg War Crimes Tribunal at the height of the 1999 bombings of Yugoslavia:

"The [1999] bombing war violates and shreds the basic provisions of the United Nations Charter and other conventions and treaties; the attack on Yugoslavia constitutes the most brazen international aggression since the Nazis attacked Poland to prevent "Polish atrocities" against Germans. The United States has discarded pretensions to international legality and decency, and embarked on a course of raw imperialism run amok."

The geopolitics behind the war in Yugoslavia, not to mention the underlying economic interests, were misunderstood. The disintegration of Yugoslavia was part of the US foreign policy agenda, which had been carefully prepared in several stages since the early 1980s. National Security Decision Directives (NSDD) had been issued under the Reagan administration, which called for the destabilization of the Yugoslav model of market socialism. (See Michel Chossudovsky, Dismantling Former Yugoslavia, Recolonizing Bosnia-Herzegovina , 1996)

In the mid-1990s, the CIA and Germany's Secret Service, the BND, joined hands in providing covert support to the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA). In turn, the latter was receiving support from Al Qaeda.

The role of the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) as a terrorist organization has been amply documented by Congressional transcripts, yet many "progressive" voices upheld the KLA as a liberation movement.

According to Frank Ciluffo of the Globalized Organized Crime Program, in a testimony presented to the House of Representatives Judicial Committee:

"What was largely hidden from public view was the fact that the KLA raise part of their funds from the sale of narcotics. Albania and Kosovo lie at the heart of the "Balkan Route" that links the "Golden Crescent" of Afghanistan and Pakistan to the drug markets of Europe. This route is worth an estimated $400 billion a year and handles 80 percent of heroin destined for Europe." (House Judiciary Committee, 13 December 2000)

The relationship between the KLA and Al Qaeda had also been confirmed by Interpol's Criminal Intelligence division:

"The U.S. State Department listed the KLA as a terrorist organization, indicating that it was financing its operations with money from the international heroin trade and loans from Islamic countries and individuals, among them allegedly Usama bin Laden . Another link to bin Laden is the fact that the brother of a leader in an Egyptian Jihad organization and also a military commander of Usama bin Laden, was leading an elite KLA unit during the Kosovo conflict." (US Congress, Testimony of Ralf Mutschke of Interpol's Criminal Intelligence Division, to the House Judicial Committee, 13 December 2000).

The Broader War Agenda

With perhaps the exception of Michel Collon in his book Monopoly and the late Sean Gervasi, the relationship between the war in Yugoslavia and the broader US-NATO military agenda extending into Eastern Europe, Central Asia and the Middle East was never analyzed, nor was it addressed in a meaningful way by the antiwar movement.

Gervasi had already foreseen in 1995, the crucial geopolitical role of the Balkans:

There are deeper reasons for the dispatch of NATO forces to the Balkans, and especially for the extension of NATO to Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary in the relatively near future. These have to do with an emerging strategy for securing the [oil] resources of the Caspian Sea region and for "stabilizing" the countries of Eastern Europe -- ultimately for "stabilizing" Russia and the countries of the Commonwealth of Independent States. (Sean Gervasi , 1995)

Jus ad Bellum: 9/11 and the Invasion of Afghanistan

The Just War theory in both its classical and contemporary versions upholds war as a "humanitarian operation". It calls for military intervention on ethical and moral grounds against "rogue states" and "Islamic terrorists", which are threatening the Homeland.

Possessing a "just cause" for waging war is central to the Bush administration's justification for invading and occupying both Afghanistan and Iraq.

Taught in US military academies, a modern-day version of the "Just War" theory has been embodied into US military doctrine. The "war on terrorism" and the notion of "preemption" are predicated on the right to "self defense." They define "when it is permissible to wage war": jus ad bellum.

Jus ad bellum serves to build a consensus within the Armed Forces command structures. It also serves to convince the troops that they are fighting for a "just cause". More generally, the Just War theory in its modern day version is an integral part of war propaganda and media disinformation, applied to gain public support for a war agenda.

The US Military Academy at West Point has recently sponsored a Conference focusing inter alia on "just cause " and "the rules that govern just and fair conduct in war" (jus in bello). http://www.dean.usma.edu/departments/law/lawterror.htm )

In 2001, when Afghanistan was bombed and later invaded, "Progressives" largely upheld the Administration's "just cause" military doctrine. The "self-defense" argument was accepted at face value as a legitimate response to 9/11, without examining the fact that the US administration had not only supported the "Islamic terror network", it was also instrumental in the installation of the Taliban government in 1995-96.

In the wake of 9/11, the antiwar movement against the illegal invasion of Afghanistan was isolated. The trade unions, civil society organizations had swallowed the media lies and government propaganda. They had accepted a war of retribution against Al Qaeda and the Taliban. Several prominent intellectuals upheld the "war on terrorism" agenda.

Media disinformation prevailed. People were misled as to the nature and objectives underlying the invasion of Afghanistan. Osama bin Laden and the Taliban were identified as the prime suspects of the 9/11 attacks, without a shred of evidence and without addressing the historical relationship between Al Qaeda and the US intelligence apparatus. In this regard, understanding 9/11 is crucial in formulating a consistent antiwar position.

Professor Falk has not revised his position on Kosovo despite recent documentary evidence , nor has he fundamentally altered his position with regard to Afghanistan and America's right to defend itself in the wake of 9/11:

The Afghanistan War was again controversial in relation to the just war tradition. It seems to qualify as an instance of defensive necessity in view of the high risks of harm associated with the heavy al Qaeda presence in the country, and its demonstrated capacity and will after September 11 to inflict severe harm on the United States in the future. Again, as with Kosovo, the means used and the ends raised serious doubts about the just means and just ends of the war. The American failure to assume the risks of ground warfare in order to carry out the mission of destroying the al Qaeda presence, as well as the failure to convert the battlefield outcomes into a durable peace, raise doubts about the overall justice of the war. (Turkish Daily News, August 1, 2003)

Iraq

With regard to Iraq, Falk's position remains ambiguous. While he condemns the US led war, he nonetheless tows the official line in stating that the 2003 invasion had the "effect of freeing Iraqis" from oppression:

When it comes to the Iraq War, there seems to be little doubt that the war is generally regarded as an unjust war, despite its effect of freeing the Iraqi people from the oppressive rule of Saddam Hussein. The reasons for viewing it as unjust in origin are the following: the absence of defensive necessity, the refusal of the UNSC to authorize war, the dangerous uncertainties associated with recourse to war, the manipulation of evidence relating to the alleged presence of weapons of mass destruction in Iraq, the reluctance in the aftermath of the fighting to respect the aspirations of the Iraqi people to achieve political independence and exercise their rights of self-determination. For all of these reasons it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that the Iraq War is a clear example of an unjust war. (Ibid)

Moreover, at the WTI's press conference in Istanbul in June 2005, Richard Falk, speaking this time on behalf of the Tribunal, in blatant contradiction with the WTI Jury, indicated that the WTI "is not opposing the governments or the UN":

"The WTI is opposing aggressive war, war crimes, and crimes against humanity. It is not opposing the governments or the United Nations. Indeed it hopes to create pressure from below that will encourage law-abiding governments and the UN to do their proper job of protecting weaker countries and their populations against such illegalities. (WTI at http://www.worldtribunal.org/main/?b=89, June 2005, emphasis added)

The issue has to do with the perpetrators of war crimes as defined by the Nuremberg charter. In this case, it is the governments, which have committed war crimes. Military invasion on a fabricated pretext is a war crime under international law:

"To initiate a war of aggression… is not only an international crime, it is the supreme international crime differing only from other war crimes, in that it contains within itself the accumulated evil of the whole". (1948 Nuremberg Military Tribunal).

The illegal invasion of Iraq was ordered by President George W. Bush and Prime Minister Tony Blair and endorsed by the US Congress and the British House of Commons. In other words, war criminals lead those "governments" and Richard Falk speaking on behalf of the World Tribunal on Iraq at its final session in Istanbul, says we are "not opposing the governments". We want to put pressure on "law abiding governments" and help the UN "to do their proper job".

Is Falk suggesting that the WTI is opposed to war crimes but not to the governments, which have committed and ordered those war crimes, nor is it opposed to the United Nations, which is in violation of its own charter? The statement of Professor Falk is not only contradictory and misleading; it serves to weaken the thrust of the testimonies as well as the work accomplished in the WTI global sessions. It also contributes to creating divisions within the anti-war movement.

Unless there is a meaningful change of government in the UK and the US, not to mention the other governments which are part of the "Coalition of the Willing", it is difficult to see how the antiwar movement can "work with governments" headed by war criminals. This of course raises the broader issue of impeachment and prosecution of the war criminals, who continue to occupy positions of authority in the governments, which have ordered countless atrocities.

Moreover, the illegal occupation of Iraq was accepted by the UN and the so-called "international community", which instead of initiating sanctions against the invaders, have collaborated with the US-led occupation forces. Professor Falk's stance, once again, speaking on behalf of the World Tribunal on Iraq (WTI) is that we should work with the United Nations.

Under the disguise of peacekeeping, the UN played a supportive role in violation of its own charter. In the words of Denis Halliday in testimony at the Istanbul WTI sessions:

"[T]he March 2003 invasion took place in breech of all known international laws, executed with the application of terrorism and commission of war crimes, including further and massive use of depleted uranium. The UN, its member states and its Secretary-General failed to employ all possible means to protect the people of Iraq. Worse the UN was generally seen around the world to be acquiescent and collaborative. (…). The occupation was supported by member states and donor agencies, and then actively supported by the UN. That support and active involvement constitutes collaboration. (…) The UN had no mandate to be in Iraq. A demand from Washington and/or London does not constitute a legitimate invitation. And puppet regimes cannot be recognized by the UN.

History of US Led Wars

The "Just War" theory as formulated by Richard Falk sets double standards (on ethical grounds): some US led imperial wars are "just" whereas others are "unjust".

On what grounds? The whole concept is devoid of a historical perspective. Crimes against humanity were committed in all US led wars including Yugoslavia, Afghanistan and Iraq and more recently in Haiti where UN "peace-keeping" troops have participated in the massacres of innocent civilians

The invasion of Afghanistan in 2001 was not different from that of Iraq. It resulted in countless civilian casualties, it destroyed an entire country, while installing, with the UN's seal of approval, a US sponsored puppet regime.

The issue, however, does not pertain to Professor Falk's writings per se. The fundamental question is why did the Istanbul organizers invite Professor Falk to lead the Panel of Advocates, knowing that he was supportive of two previous US led wars, on "humanitarian grounds"? Why was this issue not raised by the participants and those who provided testimony?

From the Truman Doctrine to the "War on Terrorism"

George F. Kennan had outlined in a 1948 State Department brief what was later described as the "'Truman doctrine." What this 1948 document conveys is continuity in US foreign policy, from "Containment" to "Pre-emptive" War. In this regard, the NeoCons Project for a New American Century (PNAC), should be viewed as the culmination of a post-war agenda geared towards establishing US military hegemony and global economic domination, as initially formulated under the "Truman Doctrine" at the outset of the Cold War.

Needless to say, successive Democratic and Republican administrations, from Truman to George W. Bush contributed to carrying out this military agenda of global conquest.

Kennan's writings point to the formation of the Anglo-American alliance, which currently characterizes the close relationship between Washington and London. It also points to the inclusion of Canada in the Anglo-American military axis. In this regard, Kennan also underscored the importance of preventing the development of a continental European power that could compete with the US.

With regard to Asia, including China and India, Kennan hinted to the importance of articulating a military solution: "The day is not far off when we are going to have to deal in straight power concepts. The less we are then hampered by idealistic slogans, the better"

Moreover, from the outset of the Cold War era, Washington was also intent upon weakening the United Nations as a genuine international body, an objective that has largely been achieved under the Bush administration:

The initial build-up of the UN in U.S. public opinion was so tremendous that it is possibly true, as is frequently alleged, that we have no choice but to make it the cornerstone of our policy in this post-hostilities period. Occasionally, it has served a useful purpose. But by and large it has created more problems than it has solved, and has led to a considerable dispersal of our diplomatic effort. And in our efforts to use the UN majority for major political purposes we are playing with a dangerous weapon which may some day turn against us. This is a situation, which warrants most careful study and foresight on our part. (Kennan 1948)

The wars in the Balkans, Afghanistan and Iraq are part of the same "military road-map", responding to US strategic and economic objectives. These wars are intimately related from a geopolitical standpoint. Iran and Syria have already been identified as the next targets of the US led war.

There is a continuum in US-led military operations from the "Truman doctrine" to Bush's "war on terrorism".

The "Just war" theory serves to camouflage the nature of US foreign policy, while providing a human face to the invaders.

It undermines and weakens all forms of meaningful resistance to the US led war agenda. It is in contradiction with the basic tenets of international law including the Geneva Convention and the Nuremberg Charter. It can under no circumstances be part of a war crimes tribunal.

Tags: Bush, Geneva Convention, Balkans, Just war, Truman doctrine

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War Profiteering and the Concentration of Income and Wealth in America

2007-04-15T01:31:00.001+02:00

How Escalation of War and Military Spending Are Used as Disguised or Roundabout Ways to Reverse the New Deal and Redistribute National Resources in Favor of the Wealthy.

Escalating : Income Redistribution in Disguise

Critics of the recent U.S. wars of choice have long argued that they are all about oil. "No Blood for Oil" has been a rallying cry for most of the opponents of the war.

It can be demonstrated, however, that there is another (less obvious but perhaps more critical) factor behind the recent rise of U.S. military aggressions abroad: war profiteering by Pentagon contractors.

Frequently invoking dubious "threats to our national security and/or interests," these beneficiaries of war dividends, the military–industrial complex and related businesses whose interests are vested in the Pentagon’s appropriation of public money, have successfully used war and military spending to justify their lion’s share of tax dollars and to disguise their strategy of redistributing national income in their favor.

This cynical strategy of disguised redistribution of national resources from the bottom to the top is carried out by a combination of (a) drastic hikes in the Pentagon budget, and (b) equally drastic tax cuts for the wealthy. As this combination creates large budget deficits, it then forces cuts in non-military public spending as a way to fill the gaps that are thus created. As a result, the rich are growing considerably richer at the expense of middle– and low–income classes.

Despite its critical importance, most opponents of war seem to have given short shrift to the crucial role of the Pentagon budget and its contractors as major sources of war and militarism—a phenomenon that the late President Eisenhower warned against nearly half a century ago. Perhaps a major reason for this oversight is that critics of war and militarism tend to view the U.S. military force as primarily a means for imperialist gains—oil or otherwise.

The fact is, however, that as the U.S. military establishment has grown in size, it has also evolved in quality and character: it is no longer simply a means but, perhaps more importantly, an end in itself—an imperial force in its own right. Accordingly, the rising militarization of U.S. foreign policy in recent years is driven not so much by some general/abstract national interests as it is by the powerful special interests that are vested in the military capital, that is, war industries and war–related businesses.

The Magnitude of U.S. Military Spending

Even without the costs of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, which are fast surpassing half a trillion dollars, U.S. military spending is now the largest item in the federal budget. Officially, it is the second highest item after Social Security payments. But Social Security is a self-financing trust fund. So, in reality, military spending is the highest budget item.

The Pentagon budget for the current fiscal year (2007) is about $456 billion. President Bush’s proposed increase of 10% for next year will raise this figure to over half a trillion dollars, that is, $501.6 billion for fiscal year 2008.

A proposed supplemental appropriation to pay for the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq "brings proposed military spending for FY 2008 to $647.2 billion, the highest level of military spending since the end of World War II—higher than Vietnam, higher than Korea, higher than the peak of the Reagan buildup."[1]

Using official budget figures, William D. Hartung, Senior Fellow at the World Policy Institute in New York, provides a number of helpful comparisons:

Proposed U.S. military spending for FY 2008 is larger than military spending by all of the other nations in the world combined.

At $141.7 billion, this year's proposed spending on the Iraq war is larger than the military budgets of China and Russia combined. Total U.S. military spending for FY2008 is roughly ten times the military budget of the second largest military spending country in the world, China.

Proposed U.S. military spending is larger than the combined gross domestic products (GDP) of all 47 countries in sub-Saharan Africa.

The FY 2008 military budget proposal is more than 30 times higher than all spending on State Department operations and non-military foreign aid combined.

The FY 2008 military budget is over 120 times higher than the roughly $5 billion per year the U.S. government spends on combating global warming.

The FY 2008 military spending represents 58 cents out of every dollar spent by the U.S. government on discretionary programs: education, health, housing assistance, international affairs, natural resources and environment, justice, veterans’ benefits, science and space, transportation, training/employment and social services, economic development, and several more items.[2]

Although the official military budget already eats up the lion’s share of public money (crowding out vital domestic needs), it nonetheless grossly understates the true magnitude of military spending. The real national defense budget, according to Robert Higgs of the Independent Institute, is nearly twice as much as the official budget. The reason for this understatement is that the official Department of Defense budget excludes not only the cost of wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, but also a number of other major cost items.[3]

These disguised cost items include budgets for the Coast Guard and the Department of Homeland Security; nuclear weapons research and development, testing, and storage (placed in the Energy budget); veterans programs (in the Veteran’s Administration budget); most military retiree payments (in the Treasury budget); foreign military aid in the form of weapons grants for allies (in the State Department budget); interest payments on money borrowed to fund military programs in past years (in the Treasury budget); sales and property taxes at military bases (in local government budgets); and the hidden expenses of tax-free food, housing, and combat pay allowances.

After adding these camouflaged and misplaced expenses to the official Department of Defense budget, Higgs concludes: "I propose that in considering future defense budgetary costs, a well-founded rule of thumb is to take the Pentagon's (always well publicized) basic budget total and double it. You may overstate the truth, but if so, you'll not do so by much."[4]

Escalation of the Pentagon Budget and the Rising Fortunes of Its Contractors

The Bush administration’s escalation of war and military spending has been a boon for Pentagon contractors. That the fortunes of Pentagon contractors should rise in tandem with the rise of military spending is not surprising. What is surprising, however, is the fact that these profiteers of war and militarism have also played a critical role in creating the necessary conditions for war profiteering, that is, in instigating the escalation of the recent wars of choice and the concomitant boom of military spending.[5]

Giant arms manufacturers such as Lockheed Martin, Boeing, and Northrop Grumman have been the main beneficiaries of the Pentagon’s spending bonanza. This is clearly reflected in the continuing rise of the value of their shares in the stock market:

"Shares of U.S. defense companies, which have nearly trebled since the beginning of the occupation of Iraq, show no signs of slowing down. . . . The feeling that makers of ships, planes and weapons are just getting into their stride has driven shares of leading Pentagon contractors Lockheed Martin Corp., Northrop Grumman Corp., and General Dynamics Corp. to all-time highs."[6]

Like its manufacturing contractors, the Pentagon’s fast-growing service contractors have equally been making fortunes by virtue of its tendency to shower private contractors with tax-payers’ money. These services are not limited to the relatively simple or routine tasks and responsibilities such food and sanitation services. More importantly, they include "contracts for services that are highly sophisticated [and] strategic in nature," such as the contracting of security services to corporate private armies, or modern day mercenaries. The rapid growth of the Pentagon’s service contracting is reflected (among other indicators) in these statistics: "In 1984, almost two-thirds of the contracting budget went for products rather than services. . . . By fiscal year 2003, 56 percent of Defense Department contracts paid for services rather than goods."[7]

The spoils of war and the devastation in Iraq have been so attractive that an extremely large number of war profiteers have set up shop in that country in order to participate in the booty: "There are about 100,000 government contractors operating in Iraq, not counting subcontractors, a total that is approaching the size of the U.S. military force there, according to the military's first census of the growing population of civilians operating in the battlefield," reported The Washington Post in its 5 December 2006 issue.

The rise in the Pentagon contracting is, of course, a reflection of an overall policy and philosophy of outsourcing and privatizing that has become fashionable ever since President Reagan arrived in the White House in 1980. Reporting on some of the effects of this policy, Scott Shane and Ron Nixon of the New York Times recently wrote: "Without a public debate or formal policy decision, contractors have become a virtual fourth branch of government. On the rise for decades, spending on federal contracts has soared during the Bush administration, to about $400 billion last year from $207 billion in 2000, fueled by the war in Iraq, domestic security and Hurricane Katrina, but also by a philosophy that encourages outsourcing almost everything government does."[8]

Redistributive Militarism: Escalation of Military Spending Redistributes Income from Bottom to Top

But while the Pentagon contractors and other beneficiaries of war dividends are showered with public money, low- and middle-income Americans are squeezed out of economic or subsistence resources in order to make up for the resulting budgetary shortfalls. For example, as the official Pentagon budget for 2008 fiscal year is projected to rise by more than 10 percent, or nearly $50 billion, "a total of 141 government programs will be eliminated or sharply reduced" to pay for the increase. These would include cuts in housing assistance for low-income seniors by 25 percent, home heating/energy assistance to low-income people by 18 percent, funding for community development grants by 12.7 percent, and grants for education and employment training by 8 percent.[9]

Combined with redistributive militarism and generous tax cuts for the wealthy, these cuts have further exacerbated the ominously growing income inequality that started under President Reagan. Ever since Reagan arrived in the White House in 1980, opponents of non-military public spending have been using an insidious strategy to cut social spending, to reverse the New Deal and other social safety net programs, and to redistribute national/public resources in favor of the wealthy. That cynical strategy consists of a combination of drastic increases in military spending coupled with equally drastic tax cuts for the wealthy. As this combination creates large budget deficits, it then forces cuts in non-military public spending (along with borrowing) to fill the gaps thus created.

For example, at the same time that President Bush is planning to raise military spending by $50 billion for the next fiscal year, he is also proposing to make his affluent-targeted tax cuts permanent at a cost of $1.6 trillion over 10 years, or an average yearly cut of $160 billion. Simultaneously, "funding for domestic discretionary programs would be cut a total of $114 billion" in order to pay for these handouts to the rich. The targeted discretionary programs to be cut include over 140 programs that provide support for the basic needs of low- and middle-income families such as elementary and secondary education, job training, environmental protection, veterans’ health care, medical research, Meals on Wheels, child care and HeadStart, low-income home energy assistance, and many more.[10]

According to the Urban Institute–Brookings Institution Tax Policy Center, "if the President's tax cuts are made permanent, households in the top 1 percent of the population (currently those with incomes over $400,000) will receive tax cuts averaging $67,000 a year by 2012. . . . The tax cuts for those with incomes of over $1 million a year would average $162,000 a year by 2012."[11]

Official macroeconomic figures show that, over the past five decades or so, government spending (at the federal, state and local levels) as a percentage of gross national product (GNP) has remained fairly steady—at about 20 percent. Given this nearly constant share of the public sector of national output/income, it is not surprising that increases in military spending have almost always been accompanied or followed by compensating decreases in non-military public spending, and vice versa.

For example, when by virtue of FDR’s New Deal reforms and LBJ’s metaphorical War on Poverty, the share of non-military government spending rose significantly the share of military spending declined accordingly. From the mid 1950s to the mid 1970s, the share of non-military government spending of GNP rose from 9.2 to 14.3 percent, an increase of 5.1 percent. During that time period, the share of military spending of GNP declined from 10.1 to 5.8 percent, a decline of 4.3 percent.[12]

That trend was reversed when President Reagan took office in 1980. In the early 1980s, as President Reagan drastically increased military spending, he also just as drastically lowered tax rates on higher incomes. The resulting large budget deficits were then paid for by more than a decade of steady cuts on non-military spending.

Likewise, the administration of President George W. Bush has been pursuing a similarly sinister fiscal policy of cutting non-military public spending in order to pay for the skyrocketing military spending and the generous tax cuts for the affluent.

Interestingly (though not surprisingly), changes in income inequality have mirrored changes in government spending priorities, as reflected in the fiscal policies of different administrations. Thus, when the share of non-military public spending rose relative to that of military spending from the mid 1950 to the mid 1970s, and the taxation system or policy remained relatively more progressive compared to what it is today, income inequality declined accordingly.

But as President Reagan reversed that fiscal policy by raising the share of military spending relative to non-military public spending and cutting taxes for the wealthy, income inequality also rose considerably. As Reagan’s twin policies of drastic increases in military spending and equally sweeping tax cuts for the rich were somewhat tempered in the 1990s, growth in income inequality slowed down accordingly. In the 2000s, however, the ominous trends that were left off by President Reagan have been picked up by President George W. Bush: increasing military spending, decreasing taxes for the rich, and (thereby) exacerbating income inequality

Leaving small, short-term fluctuations aside, Figure 1 shows two major peaks and a trough of the long-term picture of income inequality in the United States. The first peak was reached during the turbulent years of the Great Depression (1929–1933). But it soon began to decline with the implementation of the New Deal reforms in the mid 1930s. The ensuing decline continued almost unabated until 1968, at which time we note the lowest level of inequality.

After 1968, the improving trend in inequality changed course. But the reversal was not very perceptible until the early 1980s, after which time it began to accelerate—by virtue (or vice) of Reaganomics. Although the deterioration that was thus set in motion by the rise of neoliberalism and supply-side economics somewhat slowed down in the 1990s, it has once again gathered steam under President George W. Bush, and is fast approaching the peak of the Great Depression.

It is worth noting that even at its lowest level of 1968, income inequality was still quite lopsided: the richest 20 percent of households made as much as ten times more than the poorest 20 percent. But, as Doug Henwood of the Left Business Observer points out, "that looks almost Swedish next to today’s ratio of fifteen times."[13]

The following are some specific statistics of how redistributive militarism and supply-side fiscal policies have exacerbated income inequality since the late 1970s and early 1980s—making after-tax income gaps wider than pre-tax ones. According to recently released data by the Congressional Budget Office (CBO), since 1979 income gains among high-income households have dwarfed those of middle- and low-income households. Specifically:

The average after-tax income of the top one percent of the population nearly tripled, rising from $314,000 to nearly $868,000—for a total increase of $554,000, or 176 percent. (Figures are adjusted by CBO for inflation.)

By contrast, the average after-tax income of the middle fifth of the population rose a relatively modest 21 percent, or $8,500, reaching $48,400 in 2004.

The average after-tax income of the poorest fifth of the population rose just 6 percent, or $800, during this period, reaching $14,700 in 2004.[14]

Legislation enacted since 2001 has provided taxpayers with about $1 trillion in tax cuts over the past six years. These large tax reductions have made the distribution of after-tax income more unequal by further concentrating income at the top of the income range. According to the Urban Institute–Brookings Institution Tax Policy Center, as a result of the tax cuts enacted since 2001:

In 2006, households in the bottom fifth of the income spectrum received tax cuts (averaging $20) that raised their after-tax incomes by an average of 0.3 percent.

Households in the middle fifth of the income spectrum received tax cuts (averaging $740) that raised their after-tax incomes an average of 2.5 percent.

The top one percent of households received tax cuts in 2006 (averaging $44,200) that increased their after-tax income by an average of 5.4 percent.

Households with incomes exceeding $1 million received an average tax cut of $118,000 in 2006, which represented an increase of 6.0 percent in their after-tax income.[15]

Concluding Remarks: External Wars as Reflections of Domestic Fights over National Resources

Close scrutiny of the Pentagon budget shows that, ever since the election of Ronald Reagan as president in 1980, opponents of social spending have successfully used military spending as a regulatory mechanism to cut non-military public spending, to reverse the New Deal and other social safety net programs, and to redistribute national/public resources in favor of the wealthy.

Close examination of the dynamics of redistributive militarism also helps explain why powerful beneficiaries of the Pentagon budget prefer war and military spending to peace and non-military public spending: military spending benefits the wealthy whereas the benefits of non-military public spending would spread to wider social strata. It further helps explain why beneficiaries of war dividends frequently invent new enemies and new "threats to our national interests" in order to justify continued escalation of military spending.

Viewed in this light, militaristic tendencies to war abroad can be seen largely as reflections of the metaphorical domestic fights over allocation of public finance at home, of a subtle or insidious strategy to redistribute national resources from the bottom to the top.

Despite the critical role of redistributive militarism, or of the Pentagon budget, as a major driving force to war, most opponents of war have paid only scant attention to this crucial force behind the recent U.S. wars of choice. The reason for this oversight is probably due to the fact that most critics of war continue to view U.S. military force as simply or primarily a means to achieve certain imperialist ends, instead of having become an end in itself.

Yet, as the U.S. military establishment has grown in size, it has also evolved in quality and character: it is no longer simply a means but, perhaps more importantly, an end in itself, an imperial power in its own right, or to put it differently, it is a case of the tail wagging the dog—a phenomenon that the late President Eisenhower so presciently warned against.

Accordingly, rising militarization of U.S. foreign policy in recent years is driven not so much by some general/abstract national interests, or by the interests of Big Oil and other non-military transnational corporations (as most traditional theories of imperialism continue to argue), as it is by powerful special interests that are vested in the war industry and related war-induced businesses that need an atmosphere of war and militarism in order to justify their lion’s share of the public money.

Preservation, justification, and expansion of the military–industrial colossus, especially of the armaments industry and other Pentagon contractors, have become critical big business objectives in themselves. They have, indeed, become powerful driving forces behind the new, parasitic U.S. military imperialism. I call this new imperialism parasitic because its military adventures abroad are often prompted not so much by a desire to expand the empire’s wealth beyond the existing levels, as did the imperial powers of the past, but by a desire to appropriate the lion’s share of the existing wealth and treasure for the military establishment, especially for the war-profiteering contractors. In addition to being parasitic, the new U.S. military imperialism can also be called dual imperialism because not only does it exploit defenseless peoples and their resources abroad but also the overwhelming majority of U.S. citizens and their resources at home. (I shall further elaborate on the historically unique characteristics of the Parasitic, dual U.S. military imperialism in another article.)

Tags: Military, Military Spendin, US Army, War on Iraq, Iran